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 In early November 1948, black police officers began patrolling the Beale Street 
area of Memphis, Tennessee.  The nine men hired to be black police officers in Memphis 
in the fall of 1948 were a surprising sight in a city that operated on racial segregation and 
maintained, often violently, a strict racial hierarchy.  This dissertation examines the 
conditions that created the opportunity for black men to police the segregated streets of 
the South.  Emerging during the years surrounding World War II, the trend among 
southern cities to hire black police officers was the result of the economic, political, and 
social changes brought to the American South by the war.  Taking Memphis, Tennessee, 
as a case study, this dissertation looks at the ways in which black and white leaders in the 
South navigated these changes and the ways in which southern urban race relations 
evolved during the World War II era. 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question of why the campaign for black 
police officers succeeded in Memphis, and what that campaign tells us about black 
activism and efforts towards greater black equality during the waning years of the Jim 
Crow era.  Black police officers do not fit into a southern narrative of racial progress, 
despite the claims of white Southerners in the late 1940s.  Nor do they fit into a post-Civil 
Rights narrative of progress seeking to negate a nadir of black activism.  Instead, white 
officials’ decision to hire black police officers was more directly the result of black 
reactions to white police brutality.   
Black Memphians used the language of the World War II era to demand greater 
protection for their community.  However, the increase in police brutality was the result 
of white officers’ perceived need to maintain their control in the face of the changes to 
southern society brought on by World War II.  Thus, white officials hired black officers 
to alleviate this tension by separating policing between white and black and expected 
black officers to enforce segregation and white conceptions of appropriate black 
behavior.  Thus, the campaign for and the experience of black police officers in the first 
years after hiring did not achieve black hopes to bettering black lives, but rather merely 
perpetuated segregation. 
Although it was not until 1948 that black officers became a permanent fixture on 
the Memphis police force, the city of Memphis has a long history of using black men to 
police the city’s streets in moments of crisis.  While this study is focused on the 1948 
campaign for black police officers, it begins with a look back at those moments of crisis, 
placing the 1948 campaign in the long history of Memphis’s black community and the 
community’s demand for an equal place in the city. 
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CHAPTER I 
SEGREGATING THE POLICE: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On a late Sunday afternoon in June 1948, police officers responded to a 
disturbance call at the Jefferson Food Shop on Jefferson Avenue in Memphis, Tennessee.  
According to the café owner, a black woman, thirty-five-year-old Viola Moore, was 
cursing and abusing his staff and the other customers after getting into an argument with 
a waitress over her food order.  The police took Viola Moore into custody around 4:15 in 
the afternoon.  By the next morning, Moore was in the hospital, where she would spend 
more than a week recovering from her injuries. 
Accounts of what transpired between Viola Moore and police on that Sunday 
afternoon vary.  Two Memphis police officers arrived at the café, and eyewitnesses 
reported the officers behaved courteously as they took Moore into custody, loading her in 
the police car without incident.  It seems the trouble began in route to the police station.  
Moore claims that as she tried to light a cigarette, one of the officers smacked the 
cigarette out of her mouth yelling at her: “Don’t smoke in this car…. You look like one 
of those smart black--- [sic].”  According to Moore, the officer then proceeded to beat her 
with his blackjack before finally hitting her over the head with the butt of his gun.  The 
officers, however, claimed that on the way to the station Moore began kicking the back of 
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the driver’s seat, pushing the officer driving the vehicle into the steering wheel, forcing 
him to slam on the brakes to avoid crashing.1 
Three witnesses sitting on their front porch saw the police car stop.  They then 
witnessed one officer, who was sitting in the back seat of the patrol car, beat Moore as 
she lay on the floor of the vehicle kicking and screaming.  When the officer in the back 
seat was unable to “subdue” her, the officer driving the car reached back and struck 
Moore with a blackjack until she gave up fighting.  According to the city’s police 
commissioner, these were only three of the seven total eyewitnesses who claimed to have 
seen Moore “resisting arrest” on the way to the police station.  Moore, however, 
vigorously denied this charge of resisting arrest; she claimed that “resisting arrest would 
have been the last thing she’d try doing,” knowing, as she did, of the other police 
beatings that had taken place in the weeks leading up to her arrest.2  
While Moore was in the hospital, news headlines questioned the nature of the 
force used in her apprehension by police.  Headlines such as “Charges Police With 
Brutality” and “Officers Suspended After Beating Negro: Protection?  Brutality?” called 
into question the amount of force used by the police to apprehend the suspect.  However, 
within two days of the incident, the two officers involved were exonerated of any 
                                                
1 The previous account is gathered from the following articles; “Woman, Attacked By Police, Fined $78 in 
City Court,” Memphis World, July 9, 1948; “Charges Police With Brutality: Woman Prisoner In Hospital,” 
Press-Scimitar, June 21, 1948; and “Officers Suspended After Beating Negro,” Commercial Appeal, June 
22, 1948.  In the article published in the black newspaper the Memphis World, the conclusion of the 
statement “You look like one of those smart black–” is blanked out.  Earlier in the article, Moore accused 
the officers of calling her profane names, leading to the assumption that the blank replaces a profane word 
the paper chose to remove for publication.  
2 “Officers Suspended After Beating Negro”; “Police Accuser to Face Court,” Press-Scimitar, July 2, 1948; 
and “Woman, Attacked By Police, Fined $78 in City Court.”  
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wrongdoing.  According to the Memphis police commissioner, the officers had acted in 
the line of duty and “did not use unnecessary force in subduing an unruly prisoner.”  
Following her release from the hospital, Viola Moore was charged with and fined for 
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.3  
Accounts of the brutal beating of Viola Moore highlight the white officers’ 
perception of the threats to white supremacy.  The officers identified Moore as looking 
“smart.”  This comment speaks to white Memphians’ perception that a large influx of 
northern blacks had migrated to their city bringing with them ideas about black equality.  
These ideas were a natural threat to a southern society built on black inferiority.  The 
beating was an effort to reassert white control over black bodies and black ideas about 
their place in southern society.  For blacks in Memphis, and elsewhere in the South, 
police brutality was a reminder of their vulnerability, both their physical vulnerability and 
vulnerability to systematic white supremacy.  Reports of Moore’s beating in the city’s 
black newspaper, the Memphis World, also recounted the string of recent police beatings 
of black Memphians.  Heading the article “Woman Attacked” emphasized Moore’s 
victimization.  Black citizens’ anger over the continuation of police brutality and the 
justice system’s failures to punish these officers led to increasing calls for protection of 
the black citizens.4   
                                                
3 “Woman, Attacked By Police, Fined $78 in City Court”; “Woman Victim of Police Beating Still 
Confined to Hospital With Charges,” Memphis World, June 29, 1948; and “Blackjack Victim Back in 
Hospital,” Press-Scimitar, June 24, 1948.  
4 “Charges Police With Brutality: Woman Prisoner in Hospital”; and “Woman Attacked,” Memphis World, 
July 9, 1948.  
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The violence that dominated black citizens interactions with white police only 
worsened already heightened racial tensions in the postwar city.  As cases of blatant 
police brutality against blacks – whether they were suspects in a crime or just a citizen 
seeking police assistance – became more highly publicized, it became apparent to black 
Memphians that they would “not receive fair-play and justice when they are left solely in 
the hands of white officers.”  An editorial issued by the Memphis World on the same day 
as Moore’s beating was published pointed out, “Not only Negroes but fair-minded white 
citizens have become alarmed over the situation.”  Racial tensions in the years 
surrounding World War II instigated multiple forms of violence.  Southern cities 
experienced eruptions of racial violence from citywide riots to trouble on city busses.  
The cases of police brutality in Memphis in 1948 were one manifestation of the racial 
tensions that gripped southern cities in the late 1940s.  These large and small-scale acts of 
violence led many Southerners, both white and black, to seek out alternative ways to ease 
rising tensions.  It was out of this effort to ease racial tensions that southern urban police 
departments began to hire black police officers.5  
American involvement in World War II in the 1940s brought many changes to the 
South.  Preexisting urban and industrial areas in northern states also experienced 
increases in industry and population.  The South, however, saw dramatic industrial 
growth where it had not existed before.  Industrialization combined with rapid population 
growth put a particular strain on southern cities and their municipal governments.  Many 
                                                
5 “Another Argument For Negro Policemen,” Memphis World, June 1, 1948; and “Police Brutality,” 
Memphis World, July 9, 1948. 
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new migrants to the urban South were black Southerners looking to take advantage of the 
new opportunities this economic growth offered.  This large influx of black migrants, a 
national wartime rhetoric of freedom, equality, and democracy, and a federal government 
more open to a discussion of black civil rights all posed a challenge to the traditional 
southern system of racial segregation and white supremacy.  Even as blacks across the 
country, and in the South, increasingly advocated for ways to better their lives and 
advance their place in American society, white Southerners became more vigilant in 
clinging to the traditional segregationist social order in the South.6   
Taking Memphis, Tennessee, as a case study, this dissertation looks at one 
particular way that blacks and whites in the South navigated these changes.  The 
American experience in World War II caused an evolution in urban race relations in the 
South.  One manifestation of this evolution was the debate over hiring black police 
officers.  Citizens in postwar Memphis struggled to control these changing race relations.  
White citizens strove to maintain supremacy and racial segregation while black citizens 
sought ways to protect their community from police brutality.     
Many blacks in Memphis, Tennessee, came to see black police officers as the 
answer to the problem of increased instances of police brutality in the late 1940s.  As the 
city changed after the war and blacks in the city increasingly agitated for their place in 
                                                
66 David Goldfield, Promised Land: The South Since 1945 (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc. , 
1987), 5; Robert Sigafoos, Cotton Row to Beale Street (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1979), 
208; and David. R. Goldfield, "The Urban South: A Regional Framework," The American Historical 
Review 86, no. 5 (December 1981): 1020-1025. See also Glenda E. Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical 
Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008); and Jason Ward, 
Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial 
Politics, 1936-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).  
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the new urban landscape, white police officers continued to enforce, often violently, a 
system of laws that required black deference to white authority.  By the summer of 1948, 
police violence against black Memphians had become one of the most pressing local 
issues for blacks citizens.  For many black Memphians, black police officers were 
symbols of protection and a chance for a more equal justice system.7  This study offers 
insight into how concepts of control and protection impacted race relations in the 
immediate postwar period.  Using newspaper articles, oral interviews, organizational 
records, and the papers of city leaders, this study examines how black and white 
Memphians reacted to local events and how those reactions impacted black Memphians’ 
efforts to improve their lives within the confines of segregation and postwar race 
relations more generally.  Memphis’s decision to hire black police officers was the result 
of the negotiations between a black community trying to protect black citizens and white 
officials trying to maintain the southern racial hierarchy.   
Memphis had a rich history of strict adherence to racial segregation and white 
supremacy, from the race riot in 1866 through the assassination of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. during the sanitation strike of 1968.  Memphis offers a unique case study because of 
this history.  How does a city with this history end up hiring black police officers in the 
late 1940s?  This dissertation seeks to answer this question by examining the context in 
which calls for black police officers emerged and the actions that ultimate led to the 
hiring of black police officers.  The story of how black police officers were hired in 
Memphis in 1948 and the experience of those officers in the immediate years following 
                                                
7 “Another Argument For Negro Policemen.”  
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their hiring offers insights into the negotiation between creating space for greater black 
equality while also maintaining racial segregation in the waning years of the Jim Crow 
era.  
In the early 1960s, historian Elliott Rudwick argued that southern cities’ hiring of 
black police officers in the 1940s was a direct result of the changes in the American 
South that allowed black citizens greater political and economic power.  According to 
Rudwick, “As a result of wartime democratic propaganda, improved economic 
conditions, and the increase in urbanization…the number of registered Negroes in twelve 
southern states grew to about 650,000 in 1947 and an estimated one million by 1950.”8  
For example, in Greensboro, North Carolina, journalist Robert Fleming concluded as 
early as 1947 that the increase in the number of black voters in that city “more than any 
other one thing… assured the proposal [for black police officers] a fair hearing and a 
serious consideration by city authorities.”9  Black political mobilization in the form of 
electoral politics was a significant factor in getting black police officers hired.  As 
Rudwick argued, the increased number of black votes over the course of the 1940s put 
new pressure on southern white city leaders to appease black demands.  
In her study of black politics in Memphis, historian Elizabeth Gritter found that 
during the Jim Crow era, black Memphians used electoral politics to fight injustice and 
advance the long Civil Rights struggle into the 1950s and 1960s.  Focusing her study on 
                                                
8 Elliott M. Rudwick, “The Negro Policeman in the South,” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, 
and Police Science, 51.2 (July-August: 1960):  273.  
9 Rudwick, 274; and Fleming, "How Negro Police Worked Out in One Southern City," New South 2.10 
(1947): 4.  The Southern Regional Council and its journal, New South, were the successors to the 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation, which dissolved in 1943. 
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electoral politics and Memphis’s key black political leaders, Gritter traced the ways in 
which black political activity changed over the course of the first hundred years 
following the Civil War and offers an in-depth examination of the role of electoral 
politics in black political mobilization.  Gritter’s work connects political activity 
throughout the Jim Crow era to the ultimate dismantling of segregation.10 
Examining black political activity, her work narrates the steady march towards 
civil rights progress for black Americans.  According to Gritter, the hiring of black police 
officers in 1948 was just one example of the success of black political mobilization, 
particularly during the political upheaval in the Democratic Party during the election of 
1948.  However, a closer examination of the black community’s campaign for black 
police officers reveals a more complicated story about the negotiations over control of the 
city’s changing race relations.  Rather than being an outright challenge to segregation and 
white supremacy, the black community’s effort to get black police officers hired was an 
effort to promote change that bettered black lives within segregation.  
While Gritter’s focus on black politics demonstrates how black Memphians were 
able to use their vote to influence city officials, the fact that white leaders allowed the 
police department to hire black police officers also offers insight into white southern 
politics in postwar Memphis.  The white southern racial militancy that had dominated 
politics in the South and fueled racially motivated violence during the years immediately 
following World War II hindered southern progress.  This racial violence brought 
                                                
10 Elizabeth Gritter, River of Hope: Black Politics and The Memphis Freedom Movement, 1865-1954 
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2014), 1 and 12.  
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national and federal attention to the southern race issue while also hampering the 
argument of those southern white leaders who “promoted segregation as the guarantor of 
interracial harmony and order.”  According to historian Jason Morgan Ward, in the wake 
of World War II, southern white leaders tried to find alternative strategies to balance 
economic growth and southern progress with maintaining the racial status quo.  Out of 
this desire to maintain white supremacy while promoting growth developed “a 
compelling agenda of economic modernization and racial retrenchment.”11  The desire to 
promote the South economically and the need to limit racial tension and violence created 
space for white officials to appease those black demands that did not pose an outright 
challenge to segregation.  While Ward focuses his study on the national and regional 
political agendas that developed out of this southern balancing act, this study offers an 
example of how one local southern city negotiated this balance in the everyday 
functioning of their city and how the hiring of black police officers in Memphis shaped 
the larger context of changing race relations in the postwar South.  
Other Memphis-specific studies, like Gritter’s, also examine a large swath of time 
to demonstrate how long-term activism worked to eventually dismantle segregation.  
Labor historian Michael Honey studied black involvement in the labor movement in 
Memphis from the 1930s through the 1950s.  Honey looks at the importance of race in 
labor organizing and how black labor activism “unsettled the segregation system.”12  The 
                                                
11 Ward, 93-95. 
12 Michael Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993), 7. 
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labor struggles in Memphis focused on equal pay, access to jobs, and ultimately the 
integration of the labor force.  The campaign for black police officers focused on equal 
protection and the separation of policing, rather than integration.  So while Honey’s study 
focuses on black activism for greater economic rights, this study focuses on black 
reactions to police brutality and efforts to protect their community and achieve more 
equal judicial rights.  The campaign for black police officers was one front in the battle 
for black rights being fought parallel to the longer history of black union activism laid out 
by Honey.       
Memphis historian Laurie Green takes an even broader view of working-class 
black activism in Memphis in her study covering the period between the New Deal and 
the 1968 sanitation workers’ strike.  According to Green, Memphis was a city rooted in a 
“plantation mentality” that encompassed both white paternalistic attitudes and the 
perception of black fear and dependence.  Thus, for Green, the struggle for black equality 
was in essence about changing attitudes.  Taking a broad look at culture, consciousness, 
and politics, Green examines how blacks in Memphis asserted their own definitions of 
freedom and democracy to challenge racist ideology in the city.  Green traced a long 
history of how black Memphians challenged ideas and perceptions and worked to 
dismantle the plantation mentality.13  However, the reality of the experience of black 
police officers did more to reinforce ideas about black inferiority as the officers were 
                                                
13 Laurie B. Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 2-7.  
 11 
controlled by the white power structure as they worked to control black community 
behavior.   
The specific story of the campaigns for black police officers and their experience 
in the 1940s urban South is one that has received little attention from historians.  The 
majority of the work focused on black police officers is rooted in sociological studies.  
For example, William Kephart’s 1957 study of the integration of urban police 
departments, primarily in the North, argues that black police were underrepresented on 
police departments because of inequalities within the hiring process.  Because blacks 
lacked the education equivalency of whites and the culturally inequalities of the written 
civil service exams, black police were hired in fewer numbers than white officers.  After 
the Civil Rights Movement moved many in the academy to reexamine the black 
experience, sociologists picked up where Kephart left off.  The studies that followed 
focused primarily on the discrimination against black officers in the North.  Sociologist 
Nicholas Alex found in his 1969 study Black in Blue that black officers in New York 
experienced a double marginality.  Stereotyped as inferior by their fellow officers and 
rejected by black residents as a symbol of white law, the black officers encountered 
tensions both at work and in their communities.  Focusing specifically on northern cities, 
sociological studies, such as Alex’s, highlighted the problems of discrimination and 
offered solutions for dissolving racial tensions in a post-Civil Rights Act North.14   
                                                
14 William Kephart, “The Integration of Negros into the Urban Police Force,” The Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology, and Police Science  45.3 (September-October 1954): 325-333; and Nicholas Alex, 
Black in Blue: A Study of Negro Policemen (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1969).  Kephart looks 
specifically at Philadelphia and finds that the lack of black police officers was due primarily to cultural 
inequalities that hindered black advancement.  For examples of the studies that followed Alex’s, see Robert 
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It was not until 1996 that historian Marvin Dulaney examined the role of black 
police officers in the South.  Dulaney’s work is a broad comparative study analyzed the 
black experience in the entire United States.  Moving through time and across locations, 
Dulaney gives a broad overview of the push to hire black police officers.  Adding to 
Rudwick’s argument, Dulaney shows how political power could translate into policing 
power.15  While political power was essential to the hiring of black police officers, the 
exclusive focus on politics excludes a discussion of the motivations behind black efforts 
to better black life in the postwar period and how those efforts intersected with white 
efforts to maintain Jim Crow prior to the modern Civil Rights Movement.  
As many historians have argued, the post-World War II years were a moment of 
increased black activism that worked to whittle away at the foundations of Jim Crow.  
The political organizing outlined in Gritter’s work and Michael Honey’s discussion of 
union activity in Memphis both demonstrate how black activism in the decades leading 
up to the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision worked to erode the Jim 
Crow system.  In earlier interpretations, black police officers were seen as one of the 
many advantages blacks were able to gain in the march towards integration.16  Historians 
have demonstrated a long history of black activism within the Jim Crow system; 
                                                                                                                                            
Wintersmith, Police and the Black Community (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974); James B. 
Jacobs and Jay Cohen, “The Impact of Racial Integration on the Police,” Journal of Police Science and 
Administration 6.7 (1978): 168-183; and Donald Walker, “Black Police Values and the Black Community,” 
Police Studies 5.4 (Winter 1983): 20-28.  
15 Marvin Dulaney, Black Police in America (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).  
16 For more on Memphis and black activism during Jim Crow see Gritter, River of Hope, Michael Honey, 
Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, and Laurie Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality.  
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however, this study seeks to complicate that narrative by exploring a moment when black 
efforts for change fit within the existing system of segregation.17   
An examination of the campaign for black police officers in Memphis, brings to 
life how varying elements of Memphis’s black and white communities negotiated the 
changing postwar racial landscape to meet local circumstances.  Armed with a national 
rhetoric of freedom and democracy and new efforts by the federal government to expand 
black civil rights, but living within the confines of legalized Jim Crow segregation, black 
Memphians looked for ways to expand their rights within segregation.  White southern 
officials on the other hand tried to advocate for southern progress but maintain the racial 
hierarchy.  While the majority of historical studies of black activism look at how black 
activism broke the chains of segregation, this study examines how blacks reacted to the 
circumstances they faced in their everyday lives in the late 1940s and worked within the 
confines of southern legal segregation to better that life.   
Black police officers do not fit into a southern narrative of racial progress, despite 
the claims of white Southerners in the late 1940s.  Nor do they fit into a post-Civil Rights 
narrative of progress seeking to negate a nadir of black activism.18  Instead, white 
                                                
17 The Long Civil Rights Movement is an idea that argues that the Civil Rights Movement did not begin in 
1955 with the Montgomery Bus Boycott.  Rather, blacks had been advocating for their rights for decades.  
See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," The 
Journal of American History 91 no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-1264; Richard Dalfiume, "The "Forgotten Years 
of the Negro Revolution," Journal of American History 55, no. 1 (June 1968): 90-106; Gilmore, Chapter 8; 
and Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South From Slavery to 
the Great Migration (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
18 For more on the development of a post World War II New South, see Jason Ward,  Defending White 
Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Momvent and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965; 
Kevin Kruse White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); and Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic 
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officials’ decision to hire black police officers was more directly the result of black 
reactions to white police brutality.  Black Memphians used the language of the World 
War II era to demand greater protection for their community.  However, the increase in 
police brutality was the result of white officers’ perceived need to maintain their control 
in the face of the changes to southern society brought on by World War II.  Thus, white 
officials hired black officers to alleviate this tension by separating policing between white 
and black and expected black officers to enforce segregation and white conceptions of 
appropriate black behavior.  Thus, the campaign for and the experience of black police 
officers in the first years after hiring did not achieve black hopes to bettering black lives, 
but rather merely perpetuated segregation. 
Memphis’s location on the Mississippi River, surrounded by rural agricultural 
areas spanning three states, made it an important southern distribution center and a mid-
South urban hub.  As more people moved into the city in the 1940s to take advantage of 
the expansion of industry, black neighborhoods necessarily expanded.  In their study of 
Memphis housing patterns, historians Christopher Silver and John Moser discovered a 
“natural zoning of the races,” in which black neighborhoods developed in patches around 
the city.  The majority of black Memphians lived north of Jackson Avenue, east of 
Overton Park, or south of Poplar Avenue, positioned in proximity to the central business 
district and white residential neighborhoods.  Black neighborhoods in North Memphis, 
                                                                                                                                            
Development, and the Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997).  For more works discussing black activism in the years prior to the modern Civil Rights Movement, 
see Richard Dalfiume,  "The "Forgotten Years of the Negro Revolution." Journal of American History 55, 
no. 1 (June 1968): 90-106; and Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political 
Uses of the Past." The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-1264.  
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such as Klondyke, developed into more affluent black neighborhoods in which 
homeownership rates often exceeded 53 percent by 1950.  The historically black 
neighborhood of Binghampton sat just east of East Parkway, which had once served as 
the city’s boundary and was home to primarily black working-class residents.   
Through the city’s use of federal housing funds, black neighborhoods in South 
Memphis grew steadily after the 1940s.  Starting in the late 1930s, the Memphis Housing 
Authority began to build the majority of black designated public housing in South 
Memphis.The result was that even as the population grew in this area of the city, black 
homeownership in South Memphis declined over the decade, dropping to 29 percent by 
1950 compared to 53 percent or higher rates of homeownership in the more affluent black 
neighborhoods of North Memphis.19  But even as city planners used public housing to 
encourage black residence in South Memphis, black neighborhoods remained dispersed 
within the city of Memphis throughout the postwar period.  
A city run by the paternalistic Democratic political boss E.H. Crump, Memphis 
was a place that operated on racial segregation and aggressively maintained a strict racial 
hierarchy.  But at the same time, it was also a city that offered benefits for its black 
citizens.  Black Memphians always retained the right to vote, black Memphians had 
access to John Gaston Hospital, there were parks within the city designated for black use, 
and the city boasted a vibrant black business and entertainment district.  With a black 
population hovering around 40 percent of the total city population since the turn of the 
                                                
19 Christopher Silver and John V Moeser, Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-
1960 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 33 and 39.  
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twentieth century, black Memphians had long been active participants in city life, and a 
tradition of cooperation between the city’s black political and economic elite and the 
Crump political machine existed since the early decades of the century.20  Over the years, 
this cadre of black leaders were able to negotiate for services such as parks and schools in 
exchange for continued black electoral support of the Crump machine.   
However, by the summer of 1948, some segments of the city’s black community 
began to question the system of accommodation and cooperation between black elites and 
the white leadership.  The campaign to hire black police officers crossed class lines 
within Memphis’s black community.  During this period, black ministers, journalists, and 
black students from the local black college, LeMoyne College, emerged as voices for 
more radical action to enact change.  The traditional black leadership’s accommodation 
to the Crump machine that had dominated efforts for black uplift throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century was called into question as police brutality continued.  The 
leaders that emerged during the campaign for black police officers represented a shift 
away from Memphis’s traditional black leadership class made up of the economic and 
political elite.  And although the city’s hiring of black police officers was ultimately the 
result of city’s leaders efforts to appease black demands in exchange for continued 
support, the emergence of more radical voices from below set the stage for later activism.  
                                                
20 For population figures in Memphis since 1900, see Silver and Moeser, 32. For more on the rise of the 
Crump political machine and his relationship to black Memphis’s political and economic elite, see Wayne 
G. Dowdy, Mayor Crump Don't Like It: Machine Politics in Memphis (Jackson : University Press of 
Mississippi, 2006); Elizabeth Gritter, River of Hope: Black Politics and The Memphis Freedom Movement, 
1865-1954 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2014); David M. Tucker, Lieutenant Lee of 
Beale Street (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971); and Lester Lamon, Black Tennesseans, 1900-
1930 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977). 
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The building blocks for later black activism can also be seen elsewhere in the 
campaign for black police officers.  The endeavor for black police officers itself was an 
example of a black community coming together to develop and advocate for a strategy of 
racial uplift directly related to the community’s concerns.  Black electoral politics also 
played a role in the effort to have black police officers hired, as supporters called on 
black voters to use their vote to impose change.  Questions over the meaning of black 
manhood, black leadership, black equality, and American democracy were negotiated as 
black Memphians struggled to improve their lives and solidify their place in postwar 
Memphis.   
Although it was not until 1948 that black police officers became a fixture on the 
Memphis police force, black men had patrolled the streets of Memphis at three key 
moments in the city’s history between the Civil War and World War II.  Chapter II 
examines how black Memphians took advantage of these moments of crisis in Memphis’s 
history to advocate for greater black rights, protect their community, and reinforce the 
place of the black community in Memphis society.  The chapter begins immediately 
following the Civil War when white police clashed with black Union soldiers in the days 
immediately following the end of the war.  In what has come to be called a race riot, the 
racially motivated violence that swept the black area of Memphis in the spring of 1866 
set the tone for Memphis race relations in the years to come, as the newly established 
black community in the city refused to be pushed out, clinging to the promise of freedom 
and equality that came with Union victory.  In an effort to protect their families and 
community, black soldiers policed black community events during and immediately after 
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the Civil War.  Their experience set the foundation for the experiences and relationships 
to both the black and white communities that the black police officers who would come 
later would have. 21 
Just over a decade after the violence following the Civil War, black Memphians 
reaffirmed their commitment to Memphis when a series of yellow fever epidemics 
devastated the city in the 1870s and created a manpower crisis.  As white Memphians 
succumbed to the disease at exponentially higher rates than blacks, most white citizens 
who did not die fled the city by the thousands.  Black community leaders seized the 
opportunity created by the epidemic to demand black rights as citizens and greater black 
civic involvement.  Blacks represented 70 percent of the city’s total population at the 
height of the epidemic in 1878, giving them a strong majority.  Hiring black police 
officers became the obvious answer to solving this manpower crisis.  However, when the 
epidemics ended and whites returned to the city, traditional white supremacist attitudes 
prevailed.  By the 1890s blacks had lost the power their population majority had allowed 
them, and thus, black police power also ceased.22  
In the aftermath of World War I city leaders faced a political crisis as blacks 
pushed for greater political participation.  As black Republican leaders worked to 
organize the black community in a push for greater political and social rights, they 
challenged the city’s traditional political leadership.  In an effort to maintain the support 
                                                
21 Stephen V. Ash, A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook The Nation One Year After the 
Civil War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013). 
22 Dennis C. Rousey, "Yellow Fever and Black Policemen in Memphis: A Post-Reconstruction Anomaly," 
The Journal of Southern History 51, no. 3 (August 1985): 357-374. 
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of the city’s black community and thus maintain control over city politics, city leaders 
conceded to black demands for black police officers.  Although traditional racial 
prejudice and the strength of white supremacy prevailed in limiting the ability of black 
officers to become a permanent fixture on the police force, these three moments 
demonstrate a history in Memphis of white leaders negotiating times of crisis in order to 
maintain racial peace and white supremacy.  These instances also set the precedent for a 
black community working to gain greater rights as Memphis citizens while protecting 
their individual communities and the broader Memphis community.  
Chapter III explores the context of American involvement in World War II and 
the ways in which that impacted race relations in the city of Memphis.  The 1940s were a 
decade of change in the city.  The demographic and economic changes resulting from the 
depression and World War II challenged the traditional social and political structures in 
the southern city.  A growing black population and an increase in black opposition to 
racial inequality meant that white city leaders had to find alternative ways to control the 
city’s black population.  Chapter III examines how city leaders navigated the changing 
racial landscape while also clinging to the traditional southern racial hierarchy.  The 
chapter briefly outlines how the city’s white leaders asserted social, economic, and 
political control over blacks during the 1940s in order to maintain the racially segregated 
duality of the city of Memphis.  It looks at how fear and control shaped the definition of 
community protection and black equality over the course of the decade.  
By the second half of the 1940s, white Memphians’ anxiety over the changing 
demographics of the city and what that would mean for white supremacy and racial 
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segregation had heightened racial tensions in the city.  These tensions were exacerbated 
by Memphis police officers’ violent interactions with the black community that appeared 
to be less about enforcing the law and more about enforcing black deference to white 
supremacy.  Chapter IV examines four specific cases of police brutality in Memphis and 
the reactions to these attacks.  The four cases of police brutality discussed in this chapter 
became symbols of black inequality, bringing to light the failures of traditional black 
leaders to protect the community and reminding black Memphians of the continued 
disregard for black life by white authorities.  As police brutality continued, outrage grew 
in the black working-class neighborhoods most affected by this brutality and among those 
expecting changes in southern race relations in the wake of World War II.  Black 
Memphians worked to find alternative ways to protect themselves and win justice for 
their community.  It was out of this search for a way to combat the violence of black 
inequality that the call for black police officers reemerged as a way to protect black 
Memphians from the violence of white control.  
Chapter V takes an in-depth look at black Memphians’ campaign for black police 
officers.  Utilizing editorials and community petitions, this chapter draws on the voice of 
black Memphians as they challenged the traditional system of racial accommodation that 
had ruled Memphis for decades.  The chapter begins with a brief history of black activism 
throughout the 1940s to demonstrate how a tradition of black activism in Memphis 
impacted the efforts to get the city to hire black police officers in 1948.  The campaign 
for black police officers that emerged in 1947 and 1948 was about protecting black 
Memphians from the continuation of police brutality.  For black Memphians, these 
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instances of police brutality represented the historical injustice of white supremacy and 
the immediate need for black Memphians to take control of community protection.  Out 
of this campaign for black police officers came a solution that represented local 
circumstances and connected community protection with justice and equality.  Drawing 
on a tradition of black electoral participation in Memphis politics, black Memphians used 
their voting power to force city leaders to respond to efforts to create positive change in 
the lives of the city’s black citizens.  
While the campaign was ultimately successful, in that by the fall of 1948 the city 
hired nine black police officers, the reality of having those officers on the streets of 
Memphis did not live up to community expectations.  From the outset, black and white 
Memphians had varying and often conflicting expectations about the functioning of these 
black officers.  Chapter VI explores both the expectations of black officers and the reality 
of being a black police officer in Memphis in the years immediately following the 1948 
hiring.  The black police officers hired in 1948 were defined by their race.  Being defined 
first as black and second as police officers shaped the experience of the black officers 
hired in 1948.  The restrictions placed on these officers because of their race limited their 
ability to promote equal justice and equality more generally.  The presence of black 
police officers in the Memphis Police Department worked to further segregate Memphis 
and reinforced the racial status quo.  
However, even as these black officers were segregated in their own substation, 
worked only in black neighborhoods, and were prohibited from arresting white offenders, 
black police officers became a fixture in the Memphis Police Department after 1948.  
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While the main focus of this study is the campaign for the initial hiring of black police 
officers in 1948, the epilogue traces the role black police officers came to play in the 
Memphis Police Department.  Although black hiring stagnated in the early 1950s and did 
not pick up again until the 1960s, the presence of black police officers from 1948 on laid 
the foundation for continued employment and advancement of black police officers in the 
decades to come.  According to R.J. Turner, one of the original nine officers hired in 
1948 who stayed on the force until he retired, “I stuck it out because I wanted to prove 
they couldn’t run me off.”23  By remaining on the force, Turner and fellow officer 
Wendell Robinson represented black Memphians’ persistence in demanding a place for 
themselves within the city.
                                                
23 Menno Duerksen, “Abused at First, Negro Policemen Now in Demand, Greatly Respected,” Press-
Scimitar, February 14, 1969.  
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CHAPTER II 
MEMPHIS IN CRISIS: A HISTORY OF BLACKS ON PATROL  
 
 
While black officers did not become a permanent fixture in the Memphis police 
department until 1948, the city of Memphis had a history of black men patrolling the 
city’s streets dating back nearly a century.  During the Union occupation of Memphis 
beginning in 1862, black soldiers helped to maintain Union control over the Confederate 
river town.  Then again in the late 1870s black men were hired to help keep order in the 
city when a series of yellow fever epidemics decimated the city’s white population.  And 
finally, in 1919, in order to secure black political support, mayoral candidate Frank 
Monteverde delivered on his promise to hire black police officers.  However, in all three 
instances, the presence of black men policing the streets of Memphis was short-lived.  As 
the immediate circumstances shifted and more conservative, white supremacist attitudes 
prevailed, uniformed black men patrolling the city’s streets disappeared.  
Black men in uniform meant to patrol the city appeared in Memphis in moments 
that necessitated action to maintain order within the city.  In the case of black Union 
soldiers, the crisis of war and the necessity to maintain military order prevailed as racial 
boundaries, particularly in the South, were shifting.  The yellow fever epidemics created 
a manpower crisis, and the hiring of black men as police officers became necessary to 
maintain civil order.  Again, in the aftermath of World War I and amid the growing push 
by blacks for greater black political participation, circumstances were such that it became 
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a political necessity to maintain the support of the black community with the promise of 
hiring black police officers.  Since the Civil War, Memphis’s black community played an 
integral role in the structure of city life, consistently demanding an acknowledgement of 
the black community’s place in Memphis.  And black police officers were one persistent 
manifestation of these demands. Throughout the city’s history, black men patrolling the 
city’s streets, even on a limited basis, offered black Memphians a symbol of their place in 
the city.  Simultaneously, they offered white officials a way to appease black demands for 
more control over their lives while also maintaining the social and political order that was 
defined by white supremacy and racial segregation.  
Black Union Soldiers in Memphis 
 Black soldiers in Memphis were a direct result of the national crisis of the Civil 
War, but the race riot of 1866 was a local crisis directly resulting from the presence of 
black soldiers in the city.  These black uniformed men symbolized Union victory and the 
potential for black equality with whites and were a direct threat to the old white 
supremacist guard in Memphis.  The black soldiers were part of an autonomous black 
community that was developing in Memphis during the Civil War.  This community took 
pride in the black soldiers and looked to them for protection.  During the Civil War years 
and immediately following, black soldiers performed de facto policing functions for the 
black community developing in Memphis.  Their position as soldiers meant they 
represented moves towards freedom and equality for this black community.   
The white community also saw black soldiers as representing freedom and 
equality, but for white Memphians these ideas of black freedom and equality were a 
 25 
threat to their traditional understanding of the social order.  For them, black soldiers were 
not protectors but a threat.  Although the black soldiers of the Union army were not 
patrolling the streets of Memphis and policing the civilian population, their experiences 
and relationship to both the white and black communities of the city parallel those of the 
black police who would come after them.  These black soldiers revealed the power of 
having black men in uniform and what that meant to the black community, the white 
community, and the city as a whole.24 
Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, Memphis was a booming Mississippi River 
business center.  Memphis’s location on the river and its railroad connections made the 
city a major trade center for cotton moving from the plantations of the Deep South up 
river to industries in the North.  This trade allowed Memphis to become the sixth largest 
city in the South.  The city’s rising prominence as a trade center attracted many 
businesses.  Similar to other growing southern cities in the 1850s, by 1860 30 percent of 
Memphis’s population was made up of immigrants, primarily German Jews and Irish.  
Within the total population the number of blacks was only 3,822, less than 200 of whom 
were free.25  Thus, prior to the war, the city had a diverse ethnic population, but a 
primarily white one.  
                                                
24 For more on the relationship between whites and blacks in Memphis during the Civil War, see Stephen 
V. Ash, A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook The Nation One Year After the Civil War (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2013); Joseph H. Parks, “A Confederate Trade Center Under Federal Occupation: 
Memphis, 1862 to 1865,” The Journal of Southern History 7.3 (August 1941): 289-314; and Kevin R. 
Hardwick, “‘Your Old Father Abe Lincoln Is Dead and Damned’: Black Soldiers and the Memphis Race 
Riot of 1866,” Journal of Social History 27.1 (Autumn 1993): 109-128.  
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 The Union army captured Memphis in 1862, causing many of the native-born 
white Confederate supporters to flee across the state line into Confederate-controlled 
Mississippi.  Historian Kathleen Berkley argues that Union occupation brought social, 
political, and economic changes to the city that were the result of the irreversible 
demographic changes that occurred as migrants from across the South as well as the 
North began flocking to the city.  Jewish businessmen and northern social workers, such 
as preachers and teachers, came to Memphis to take advantage of the reopening of the 
city under Union occupation.26  As time would show, these new groups would cause 
tension within the city’s white community, as they worked to impose both a free labor 
economic system and a more inclusive political system on the city while the native white 
population tried to cling to their traditional structures of power.  
 Black migrants, however, caused an equally significant demographic change.  
Memphis’s proximity to the Confederate slave state of Mississippi made it a mecca for 
slaves looking to run away from their masters in the confusion of war.  By July of 1862 
there were so many former slaves and free blacks living in and around Memphis that the 
Union army legalized the employment of these contraband slaves, who worked for 
provisions, rather than money, in order to keep the growing refugee community from 
starving.  By not paying these former slaves with money, the Union also retained a 
semblance of the slave system, in case these contraband slaves had to be returned to their 
owners and their lives as slaves.  By February of 1863, the growing number of runaway 
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slaves following the Union army had grown to such an extent that, in order to ease the 
burden of caring for them, the army decided to centralize the location of the contraband 
camps, choosing Memphis as one of these locations.  This centralization of contraband 
camps in Memphis meant that by March there were an additional 1,236 black people 
living in the city’s contraband camp.27    
Along with the contraband camp was a refugee camp that was housing twenty-
five hundred freedmen, three quarters of whom were women and children.  This number 
further increased in September of 1863 when Memphis became a collection point for 
black troops after the army ordered “all able-bodied draftable ‘colored men of the west’ 
be sent to Memphis” to join the Union army.  With these men came their wives and 
children, who moved to the city to be close to the fort where their husbands, fathers, and 
brothers were stationed.  This influx created a population of free blacks, which, because 
of their numbers, would shift the social and political makeup of the city.  As the newly 
arrived black citizens made their homes in the city, the black population of Memphis 
reached 31 percent of the total population by 1865.28  
The primary black unit at Fort Pickering just outside Memphis was the 3rd U.S. 
Colored Heavy Artillery, which formed in Memphis in June of 1863.  As this unit was 
primarily recruited locally, the soldiers were intimately connected to the local 
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community, and many of them would remain in Memphis after the war.  Although these 
men never saw combat, they did receive access to training with guns, which historian 
Kevin Hardwick argues was an “inversion of social norms.”  Prior to the war blacks had 
been excluded from access to firearms by the very nature of the social order.  Through 
the military, these men experienced a new type of equality with whites, the right to bear 
arms and protect one’s self, community, and family.  Black soldiers’ ability to serve in 
the military also gave these black men a stake in protecting their communities and the 
nation, empowering black soldiers as they gained experiences that were previously 
exclusive to whites.29  
Even as black soldiers gained greater equality and access to the privileges 
formerly reserved for whites in some ways, neither the Union army nor the Federal 
government always treated them as equal to whites.  Black soldiers received both less and 
inferior provisions than white soldiers.  As the 3rd Artillery’s commander Colonel Ignatz 
G. Kappner complained, his troops did not receive fresh bread and only got half the 
amount of rice and beef, which was “inferior in quality, badly butchered and the necks 
and shanks not excluded, and in some instances almost unfit to eat.”  Along with bad 
provisions, officials reported that the black soldiers “have not been paid during the last 
six months, and cannot provide for their families who [are] destitute.”  The Union army, 
as these white commanders pointed out, did not care for its black soldiers as it did the 
white soldiers.  This was not just the case in Memphis; the U.S. Army as a whole 
practiced discrimination against black troops.  The War Department provoked 
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considerable resentment when it went back on its promise to pay black troops a bounty 
upon mustering out, claiming a legal technicality.30  So, although black soldiers were 
given the opportunity to participate in the fight against the Confederacy, they were not 
treated as equal participants, even by the Federal government.  
But while the military did not treat these men as equals, Memphis’s growing 
black community, made up of black migrants and soldiers’ families settling in the city in 
the mid-1860s, took pride in the black soldiers who came from within their ranks.  This 
pride developed out of a vision of freedom that rested on the elevation of black men to 
the role of male protectors of the community.  As one black Memphian noted, “We are 
highly gratified by the appellation by which the colored soldiers are addressed by their 
officers, viz.: men; and we urge the colored men in all places, at all times and under all 
circumstances to cease using the vulgar phrase, ‘nigger.’”  This sentiment, expressed at a 
mass meeting in Memphis on the first anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, 
conveyed the feeling that soldiering represented a new way of being for black men in the 
South, one that qualified them as men rather than property.  The army’s use of the term 
“men” versus “boy” or “nigger” further removed these black men from the condition of 
property by using terms to address the black soldiers that were in direct opposition to the 
terms used to address them when they were slaves.  Blacks needed to own this new 
understanding of themselves and separate themselves from the perceptions of black 
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inferiority that had accompanied slavery.  This terminology called on black men to 
embrace equal manhood even in the language they used to describe themselves.  As 
Hardwick points out, “The social role of soldier, carrying with them the authority and 
prestige of the Union army, in itself enhanced the power and self-image of black 
soldiers” and the black community as a whole, because it proved their abilities and 
disproved their inferiority.31    
These black soldiers were not simply representatives of the possibility of a better 
life after slavery for the community; these black soldiers were actively working to better 
the position of their families and the other blacks who had migrated to make homes in the 
city.  Many of the soldiers had families living within the city’s developing black 
neighborhood who were unable to provide for themselves.  Soldiers would steal supplies 
and even uniforms to take home to their families to supplement what little the family was 
able to gather on their own.  This theft became such a common practice that eventually 
the Army ruled that it would recognize legal marriages between black soldiers and 
women living in the developing black community, thus entitling the family to extra 
rations.32  
Black soldiers not only worked to provide for their families but also to protect 
them from the military and Federal agencies’ efforts to control their lives.  When the 
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Army tried to relocate black women and children from the city to President’s Island in 
the Mississippi River to work on abandoned plantations, black soldiers refused to move 
the women and children and “a near ‘riot’ occurred.”  Black soldiers resisted the efforts 
of the Freedman’s Bureau to force the blacks living in Memphis into labor contracts.  In 
August of 1865, Commander General Davis Tillson complained that “the [white] soldiers 
employed to visit the Freed people in and about Memphis and inform them that none but 
those having sufficient means or so permanently employed as to be able to take care of 
themselves will be allowed to remain” had reported back that “colored soldiers interfere 
with their labors and tell the freed people that the statements made to them…are false, 
thereby embarrassing the operations of the Bureau.”33  Black soldiers purposefully 
undermined the efforts of the Freedman’s Bureau to control the labor of the new black 
citizens now living in Memphis.  These soldiers did not see themselves as simply agents 
of the U.S. Army obeying the commands of their superiors, but as agents for the 
community of freed blacks and their families who had come to Memphis to find lives as 
freedmen and women.  Soldiers used their position as U.S. military men to protect this 
emerging black community from infringements on their new freedoms.   
While black soldiers and their families were trying to act on and protect their new 
freedoms, the city’s white southern residents, new and returning, continued to resist the 
idea of black freedom, especially the implications towards black equality.  As early as the 
fall of 1862 General Sherman had ordered that “runaway slaves must be treated as free, 
and people encouraged to give them employment as such.”  Whites within Memphis saw 
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the large influx of blacks to their city as disruptive and even dangerous.  The Democratic-
leaning press was particularly vocal about the dangers of such a large free black 
population and spread rumors that fueled white anxiety.  For instance, in April of 1866, 
the Memphis Public Ledger reported that “south Memphis had become notorious for 
negro outrages,” referring to a robbery by a group of black men who remained at large.  
According to the Ledger, these criminals “will get so bold that there will be no safety, 
either for life or property, for any place these marauders feel like plundering,” which 
reinforced the image of the “blood thirsty spirit of the black population.”  Black soldiers 
were seen as particularly dangerous.  As Hardwick argues, white citizens of Memphis 
continued to commit themselves to a pre-war racial order in which blacks were 
subordinate to whites.  Black soldiers, “whose uniform conferred upon them the authority 
of the victorious Union Army,” reminded whites of the defeat of the South and “were 
deeply threatening to those whites committed to the old order.”  According to one 
commander in Memphis, “The prejudice of the southern people against the negro troops, 
seem to be insurmountable.”34  
This tensions between Memphis’s white southern community and the black 
soldiers often played out in the streets.  Outside of their role as soldiers, these black men 
lived in and were a part of the activities of the black community developing in the city.  
Most came from within that community and remained tied to it through familial 
connections.  On occasion, black soldiers were detailed to police community events such 
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as dances or festivals, thus functioning as the de facto police within the black community.  
Their job was to protect these events from any trouble.  As the commander of the 3rd 
Artillery put it, “I have never received any orders to stop Negro dances, but have been 
ordered many times to furnish guards for such to prevent disturbances by citizens.”  Thus, 
the soldiers attended these events in order to provide protection for their fellow black 
citizens and ensure conflict and disturbances were avoided.  In contrast, when white 
police got involved, they disrupted black community events.  At a ball in February of 
1866, white city police broke in, arrested the wives of several soldiers, and charged them 
with prostitution.  By one account the white soldiers “behaved in a very rough and 
boisterous manner crying ‘Shoot the damned niggers.’”35  In terms of the activities of this 
new black community, black soldiers came to protect, while white police came to disrupt.  
These two approaches to black community activity reflect two different visions of the 
place of blacks in the city.  While blacks were trying to build a community for 
themselves in Memphis, whites tried to prohibit this community from becoming a 
permanent fixture.  
White efforts to control and black attempts to protect themselves and their 
community resulted in physical confrontation.  In the case of the ball broken up by white 
police, black soldiers responded by firing their guns towards the police to drive them 
away.  On other occasions black soldiers and white police collided as black soldiers 
attempted to assert their newfound expectation of equal respect for their position as 
soldiers and white police attempted to maintain the pre-war social hierarchy that gave 
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them power over blacks.  For example, when black soldiers refused to move off the 
sidewalk for white police officers, white officers often responded with force, pushing and 
elbowing black soldiers out of their way.  This kind of behavior on the part of black 
soldiers was an expression of the expectation of the equal rights and the privileges that 
came with their new freedom.  Even though the soldiers’ actions were unruly and 
disorderly, they were also a fundamental challenge to “the expectations of black public 
behavior under slavery.”36  Black soldiers were a reminder to whites that the war had 
meant Union victory, and thus, a promise of social and political equality for black 
Americans.  
These tensions between black soldiers and white police eventually escalated to the 
point of explosion in the spring of 1866.  As one Memphis newspaper noted at the time: 
“It is only with the negro soldiers that trouble has ever existed…With their departure, 
will come order, confidence, and the good will of old days.  Had we had [white troops] 
instead of negro troops, neither this riot, nor the many lawless acts preceding it during the 
past six months, would have occurred.”  These comments from the white Daily 
Avalanche emphasize the resentment that had built up within the white community 
against black soldiers.  The immediate cause of the riot was a clash between newly 
mustered-out black soldiers and white police in early May 1866.  But this small skirmish 
soon escalated into an all out riot in which bands of whites, police and citizens, tore 
through south Memphis, the predominately black neighborhood.  These bands 
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specifically targeted black soldiers, “vowing to kill everyone one of ‘the God Damned 
nigger soldiers.’”37   
The actions of the mob made it clear that this riot was about subjugating the city’s 
new black community.  The mob targeted not only men in uniform but also any women 
associated with military men.  Attacking black soldier’s families had an emasculating 
effect, as it negated black soldiers claims to manhood through protecting their families 
and community.  Whites used these attacks to reassert white dominance over black 
bodies.  Francis Thompson and Lucy Smith were raped at gun point during the riot, and 
as Smith explained, “There were some pictures in the room: we had General Hooker and 
some other Union officers, and they said they would not have hurt us so bad if it had not 
been for those pictures.”38  While these images may not have been the only motivation for 
the men to violate these women, the fact that the men pointed out the photos that 
associated the women with the Union army emphasizes the larger motivation behind the 
violence, which was to reassert white dominance over the black community and black 
soldiers particularly.  The raping of women in the community and more specifically 
women associated with the military was a direct affront to black soldiers’ efforts to use 
their newly acquired freedom to protect their community.  These attacks were a reminder 
of the conditions of slavery, which included women’s particular vulnerability and black 
men’s inability to stop the violation of black women.  
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Even though in its aftermath the riot was blamed on the “lawless aggression on 
the part of the vicious negroes infesting South Memphis,” and the black soldiers living 
there, black Memphians refused to be driven from the city.  The black soldiers were 
disbanded when they had been mustered out of the military at the end of April, but many 
of them remained in the city, not only because they were waiting for back pay, but also 
because that was where their families had made homes there.  And although they had 
given up their uniforms, many became leaders within the community and helped to 
continue the fight for greater rights and equality.  Fraternal organizations, such as the 
Memphis Sons of Ham, planned large picnics to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the 
Union capturing the city and the Fourth of July.  Black-owned and operated businesses, 
schools and churches worked to rebuild and reopen.  Black stevedores even went on 
strike for higher wages.  Although the strike was unsuccessful, it, along with other 
rebuilding efforts, demonstrated that Memphis’s new black community would not be 
intimidated into submission but would continue to strive for the opportunities to live out 
their freedom.  Brian Page has described how blacks in Memphis celebrated the Fourth of 
July as a holiday, using it as a way to prove their American citizenship and therefore their 
worthiness of complete equality because of their commitment to the nation and its 
principles.  Former black soldiers even participated in the celebrations, often leading 
parades.  These parades frequently went beyond the bounds of established black 
neighborhoods and into white sections of the city.  As Page points out, however, although 
“the parades were not radical demonstrations… they sometimes reminded whites that 
local African Americans had power and that they were willing to go beyond their 
 37 
traditional neighborhood boundaries.”  The black community celebrated in public spaces 
as an assertion of their rights as American citizens, reminding whites that they not only 
were free, but were also citizens.39  
Black soldiers’ presence on the streets of Memphis during the Civil War was the 
result of the crisis of the war, but their presence also created a different type of crisis; the 
riot of 1866.  White resentment and resistance to black equality fueled this later crisis.  
But when the riot was over, so was the presence of active black soldiers.  Although their 
time in the city was short-lived, these soldiers proved to be a symbol of what black 
freedom could mean.  In the aftermath of the riot, Memphis’s new black community 
refused to be subjugated by the white mob, but rather, continued to build and push for 
greater equality.  Even though black freedom efforts would be stunted with the onset of 
Jim Crow laws and an era of intensified segregation and racial violence around the turn 
of the century, Memphis’s black community continued to be a force in the city.  In many 
ways the Civil War created the foundations for Memphis’s substantial black community, 
in terms of numbers of black citizens and their commitment to having a place in the city.  
From this point on, black Americans would represent a significant portion of the 
population in Memphis, who would be a factor in the social and political order of the city 
in the century to come.  
 
 
                                                
39 Appeal, May 2, 1866; Ashe, 183-184; Memphis Daily Post, February 27, 1867; and Brian D. Page, 
“‘Stand By the Flag’: Nationalism and African-American Celebrations of the 4th of July in Memphis, 1866-
1887,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 58 (1999): 292-293.  
 38 
Yellow Fever and Black Police 
During the 1870s, Memphis was racked by a series of yellow fever epidemics in 
1873, 1878, and 1879, with the epidemic in 1878 being the most deadly.  By the end of 
the decade, the city’s total population had dropped from forty thousand to thirty-four 
thousand residents.  Some seven thousand people died as a result of the disease and 
nineteen thousand Memphians suffered from nonfatal attacks of yellow fever.  From the 
outset it became clear that the city’s white citizens were exponentially more susceptible 
to the disease than its black citizens.  By the end of the 1873 epidemic, 1,377 whites had 
succumbed to the disease while only 144 blacks had died.  Naturally the city suffered as 
the economy stagnated, and managing the city became increasingly difficult as white 
citizens fled and those that stayed were stricken with fever.  Of the city’s fifty police 
officers in 1873, only two remained on duty at the end of the year.  The rest had became 
ill, died, or fled the city. 40 
Initially, city leaders hired replacement officers in accordance with a quota based 
on the city’s ethnic makeup - ten Italian, twenty Irish, and twenty German - but the plan 
did not take into account the city’s black population.  Policing continued to be 
exclusively a white man’s job, as many of the white supremacist attitudes that fueled the 
riot less than a decade before persisted.  The failure to consider the black population 
when fulfilling police quotas also reflected white inability to consider blacks as full 
citizens.  By the end of the second and most deadly strike of yellow fever in the city, in 
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1878, only twelve of the thirty-one recently hired police officers who had remained in the 
city survived.  City leaders faced a civic crisis as the city’s population continued to 
dwindle.  During this 1878 outbreak, twenty-five thousand people fled Memphis.  While 
the majority of the black population stayed in the city, only about six thousand whites 
stayed and of those 70 percent succumbed to the disease.  As one of the remaining white 
officers described it, “This city is almost depopulated.  The death rate is over one 
hundred every day.  The undertakers can’t bury them fast enough.  We find a lot that 
have been dead three and four days.  My God it is fearful.  There are very few white 
people left in this city.”41  City officials were left with not only a manpower crisis but also 
a racial crisis as the city’s black population approached a majority.  
As these numbers show, white flight along with black resistance to the disease 
meant that there were more blacks than whites left in the city.  Historian Dennis Rousey 
argues that this situation created a crisis in terms of the ability of the remaining white 
manpower to maintain control in the city.  As a result of this manpower crisis, city 
officials were forced to lower the racial barriers that had restricted blacks from positions 
in city management, even during Radical Republican Reconstruction.  Thus Memphis 
became an anomaly among southern cities, the majority of which had begun, by 1870, to 
move away from the racial integration that had occurred during Reconstruction and 
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toward racial exclusion, as southern whites resentful of black political involvement 
regained control over southern politics.42 
During the first yellow fever epidemic of 1874, a coalition of black and white 
leaders led by the city’s mayor, John Loague, and including the remaining black 
councilmen, had pushed for the city government to integrate the city’s police force.  It 
was not inconceivable in 1874 that a southern city would hire black police officers.  
Other southern cities with sizable black populations had hired black police officers during 
Reconstruction, including New Orleans, Louisiana; Vicksburg, Mississippi; and 
Montgomery, Alabama.  But this had not occurred in Memphis.  As one conservative 
Memphis newspaper noted, the “political dodging, for the purpose of securing the negro 
vote, won’t do in these times,” as the political climate had shifted away from the black 
and white coalitions that had dominated Republican politics during the Reconstruction 
years prior to 1874.43  
However, the circumstances were very different in 1878 when the city finally did 
hire black police officers.  One reason was the demographic shift that the epidemic 
caused.  In the 1870s, black Memphians still had the right to vote, and by 1880, they 
would represent 44 percent of the population as compared to 17 percent in 1860, meaning 
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that the black percentage of the population nearly tripled during the twenty-year period.  
In the county, black men outnumbered whites by 467 and represented just over half of the 
population.  During the 1870s, at least twelve blacks were elected to the Memphis city 
council, and of the twelve black men in the state legislature, nine were from West 
Tennessee.  So while blacks did not have political sway in 1874, by 1878, at the height of 
the epidemic, the black population was 70 percent of the city’s total population, giving 
them a clear majority and greater political influence.  In the face of such an 
overwhelming majority of black citizens, combined with the fact that, as one white 
survivor remembers it, “not more than 200 white people escaped the fever, and the most 
of these had been victims of it in previous epidemics,” white citizens feared the potential 
dangers of a discontented and rebellious black community, which resulted in a 
willingness to give in to black demands for greater civic involvement.44 
Members of the black community seemed less discontented and rebellious and 
more insistent on their right to a place in the city.  Black Memphians demanded to be 
treated as equal citizens by way of inclusion in city government.  When white 
Memphians tried to encourage the black citizens to leave the city for the refugee camps in 
the country during one of the epidemics, the black pastor of Beale Street Baptist Church, 
R. N. Countee, declared that black Memphians “would just as soon die in Memphis as 
anywhere else.  We are here in her prosperity and do not care to forsake her in the time of 
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adversity.”  Countee’s declaration was one of ownership and emphasized not only black 
citizenship but also black Memphians’ feeling of responsibility for the fate of the city.  
And with the extraordinary circumstances of the epidemic, in August of 1878, Memphis 
white leaders began to acknowledge the black population remaining in the city, or at the 
very least the reality of their numbers, by integrating the city government.45  
On August 17, the Citizen’s Relief Committee integrated, adding one black 
member for each ward.  Two days later, city leaders authorized the Chief of Police Phillip 
R. Athy to hire more police officers.  Chief Athy selected fourteen whites and thirteen 
blacks to join the ranks of Memphis police officers.  According to the Daily Avalanche, 
“The colored men are picked for good character, muscle, and pluck, and Chief Athy 
believes that every one of them will make good and efficient officers.”  As Rousey 
argues, the integration of the police department was the direct result of the crisis created 
by the yellow fever epidemic: “Nothing but the impact of yellow fever can explain the 
breakthrough for black Memphians.”46  The epidemic created the critical circumstances 
necessitating that white leaders reevaluate the color line within city government.   
The black community took advantage of the situation to demand their rights as 
citizens and a place in city management.  In the days after the announcement of the hiring 
of black police officers, black citizens continued to reiterate their commitment to the city 
and their desire to be a part of its future.  Some four to five hundred black Memphians 
held a mass meeting four days after the announcement to reinforce their intention to stay 
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in the city and show their support, “to come to the front in this hour of trial and do their 
whole duty in protecting life and property in the city of Memphis,” as full and deserving 
citizens.  The group present at the meeting also passed a resolution expressing their 
gratitude for these changes and declaring “unqualified confidence” in the police chief, 
“who merits our gratitude for his recognition of our race, in selecting from among the 
colored people an equal number of special policemen.” 47  This show of support for the 
city and its government, especially a government willing to include black citizens, 
demonstrates the black community’s claiming of their place within the city and their 
effort to force white Memphians to acknowledge that place and black Memphians’ equal 
rights and responsibilities to the city’s management.  
Because of the black community’s efforts to prove their commitment to the city, 
white city leaders’ acknowledged the black community’s role in the successes and 
failures of the city.  In a speech, the city’s mayor acknowledged, “they [the black 
community] were in the same boat, on the same stream, and common suffering should 
weld them together, even long after this unfortunate dispensation of Providence has 
passed.”48  In this statement the mayor spoke about the shared experience of all 
Memphians, black and white, in the face of the epidemics.  The mayor was attempting to 
justify the inclusion of black police officers on the Memphis police force even though it 
violated the tradition of white control and domination of city management.  The hiring of 
black police officers in Memphis in 1878 was the explicit result of the crisis created by 
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the epidemics, but the implicit result was the affirmation of black Memphians as citizens 
deserving of a role in the management of the city and a flexing of the color line in order 
to accommodate the city’s immediate needs.  
The hiring of black police officers also had another purpose: it gave white city 
leaders a political tool to help them garner black support.  As the black officers remained 
on the force into the early 1880s, white leaders were able to use the officers as “visible 
tokens to gain and hold political support from the black community.”  For white 
politicians, these officers became political tools to maintain their control over the city 
with the support of the black community.  So, even as the epidemics ended and the city’s 
white population began to rebound, black officers remained on the police force.  For the 
black community, these men were not just tokens or political tools but had proven 
themselves to be “ready and willing to patrol the streets of our city day and night to 
preserve order and defend public and private property.”  As a result, the black officers 
proved they were not simply token appointees of a magnanimous city government but 
deserved their place on the police force as protectors of the city wide community.49  
But this fluidity in the color line and the inclusion of the city’s black community 
in city government was short-lived.  The epidemics that came to an end in 1879 allowed 
for the creation of a “new city,” as Memphis historian Gloria Brown-Melton describes it.  
In 1860, 38 percent of the city’s population had been foreign-born whites.  By 1900, that 
number had dropped to just 15 percent.  The people that came back to Memphis after the 
epidemics were more rural and more conservative in their social and political thinking.  
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According to southern historian David Goldfield, these “rural migrants brought their 
distinct cultural baggage to the city” and made a rural ideology the defining feature of the 
urban South, Memphis included.50  These rural white migrants to the city brought with 
them rural ideology and values that altered the social and cultural landscape of southern 
cities like Memphis. 
In the decades following the epidemics of the 1870s, these rural migrants with 
their rural values helped to remake Memphis culture and society.  Memphis, by 1900, 
was the most rural of the urban southern cities, as 80 percent of the population had 
migrated from the Mississippi and Tennessee countryside.  A belief in family was at the 
core of this rural value system; honor, vengeance, and pride, especially where women 
were concerned, governed behavior inside and outside the home.  According to historian 
Gerald M. Capers, Southerners believed in and practiced “the right of private 
vengeance,” as exemplified by southern murder rates.  In the first half of the twentieth 
century the national homicide rate was 7.2 per 1,000 inhabitants while the murder rate in 
Memphis was 47.1 homicides per 1,000 inhabitants, which made it the nation’s murder 
capital.51  
This violence was connected to “the deep religiosity of the rural migrants.”  The 
evangelical Protestantism that rural migrants brought with them to the cities encouraged 
this focus on family values and protection of tradition.  For these evangelical Protestants, 
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the essence of their religious culture was “purification, antipathy to change and a sharp 
distinction between ‘we’ and ‘them.’”  But as this traditional rural religious culture tried 
to regulate and separate the urban landscape, with its booming population and 
increasingly shared public spaces, urban whites became “as vigilant, if not more vigilant 
than, their rural counterparts in maintaining the biracial society.”52  This vigilance 
towards maintaining the color line made its way into the state legislature as well.  In 
1881, the Tennessee State Legislature mandated segregated rail cars and in 1889 they 
passed the poll tax aimed at disenfranchising black voters.  The restructuring of city 
government after the city lost its charter in 1879 as a result of the epidemics eliminated 
many of the city’s electoral positions, thus eliminating much of the opportunity for black 
office holding.  As a result of these and other measures, throughout the 1880s, the 
number of black elected officials declined as white conservatives regained power in the 
city.53  
As white conservatives regained control of the city and the manpower crisis 
subsided, black police officers were pushed out of city employment just as they were 
pushed out of politics.  In 1882 when officer Charles Wilson was fired, he argued that it 
was the result of prejudice on the part of his bosses.  Five years later, another officer was 
fired for supposed inappropriate advances towards a white woman, a blatant violation of 
the color line.  By 1892, only officer Dallas Lee remained, but he too left the force soon 
                                                
52 Goldfield, 1021; 1024-1025.  
53 Gritter, 20.  
 47 
after.54  The tenets of white supremacy would not allow for black men to hold positions of 
power especially policing power, thus no more black police were hired in this period of 
white supremacist backlash.  Thus, by the turn of the century, with the return of the white 
population to the city, blacks in Memphis had lost both their manpower advantage and 
the opportunity for advancing their position in the city provided.  Although blacks 
continued to represent a significant portion of the population in Memphis, the necessity 
of using black police officers to maintain civil order had passed and so too did the time of 
having black policemen patrol the streets of Memphis.  
1919 Election: Maintaining Political Order 
 Even with the rise of conservative white Democratic politicians in the South, who 
ushered in the era of legal racial segregation known as Jim Crow, black Tennesseans 
retained the legal right to vote.  Tennessee suffrage restriction did not include multiple 
ballot boxes, literacy tests, property requirements, “grandfather clauses,” or the other 
kinds of legal restrictions to voting put in place by other southern states in order to 
restrict the black vote.  In 1906, when the state legislature did work to restrict the black 
vote, by allowing the state’s counties to opt for a white primary, Shelby County did not 
institute one.  Thus, black citizens living in and around Memphis retained at least the 
right to vote throughout the early twentieth century, even if they did not have the political 
power to overturn white Democratic control over Memphis politics.55   
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 Even with the poll tax, black political activity was not eliminated in Memphis 
during the first half of the twentieth century and became one factor in the ability of black 
Memphians to force the white power structure to negotiate over black police officers.  As 
outlined by historian Elizabeth Gritter, during the Jim Crow period, formal black political 
organizing made up a significant part of the black community’s struggle for freedom and 
ultimately helped to end legal segregation.  In the lead up to the 1919 election, black 
political organizing in Memphis helped to push city leaders to negotiate over black 
demands for greater equality.  The ability to vote allowed black Memphians to assert 
their desire for greater community protection, a more equal justice system, and an 
acknowledgement of their rights as citizens.  The hiring of black police officers in 1919 
set the precedent for both the motivations behind and the means by which black 
Memphians would push for black police officers three decades later.56  
 At the time of the 1919 election, the most prominent black Memphian was Robert 
R. Church, Jr., son of Robert Church, Sr., the first black millionaire in the South.  Born in 
1885, Robert R. Church, Jr. remembered a time of black political power and office 
holding.  The increasing restrictions on black rights that appeared during his youth were a 
clear memory for Robert R. Church, Jr.  Robert R. Church, Sr. had attempted to shield his 
family from the indignities of the Jim Crow system.  He refused to ride in segregated 
streetcars or trains and avoided segregated restaurants by having the family’s meals at 
home.  “We would eat and drink before we left home and go hungry or thirsty until we 
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returned if necessary,” Robert R. Church Jr. later recalled.57  These memories of black 
degradation and his father’s attempts to resist being subordinate guided Robert Church, 
Jr.’s political activity as an adult.  
 Robert R. Church, Sr.’s belief in the indignity and unfairness of the Jim Crow 
system was instilled in his son, who worked to organize Memphis’s black community 
politically in order to expand their rights.  To this end, Church and his supporters 
instituted a massive voter registration drive during the 1916 election.  Church registered 
some 10,612 black voters, representing one third of the total county voters, solidifying his 
role as a leader among black Memphians.  Then, these voters nominated a separate all-
black ticket for the national and state ballots, in order to draw white politicians’ attention 
to the fact that the black community was both willing and able to participate politically.  
The following year, Church founded the Lincoln League, a black Republican political 
advocacy group.  The Lincoln League was founded on the premise that in order to break 
down the Jim Crow system, the black community had to vote as a block and use their 
numbers as a way to encourage white politicians to make concessions to black 
Memphians.58   
 Memphis’s white Democratic political boss, E.H. Crump, encouraged this idea of 
the black voting block and further black political activity.  Born in Holly Springs, 
Mississippi, Crump came to Memphis in 1894 and built up a business empire that 
extended from agriculture to insurance underwriting.  But Crump’s real passion was his 
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political aspirations.  Crump was first elected mayor of Memphis in 1909.  Crump 
recognized the value in gaining the support of the black community in order to boost and 
maintain his political power.  Throughout his political career, Crump developed a 
relationship with black leaders like Church, Jr. by demonstrating a willingness to 
negotiate on certain issues important to the city’s black community in exchange for black 
support.59  
 For example, in 1914, Crump appealed directly to the Citizens Committee of 
Colored Voters in order to convince its members to support his candidate for sheriff.  He 
sent the group a summary of his candidate’s accomplishments in the black community, 
such as the creation of a branch of the juvenile court for black youth as well as Crump’s 
appointment of black doctors and nurses in public schools.  As Crump informed one 
black man who had complained of rudeness by a city employee, “It has always been the 
policy of this…administration to treat everyone with uniform courtesy, regardless of their 
station or mission.”  In this way, Crump reinforced his image as a friend of black 
Memphians, an image he continued to cultivate because he recognized both the power 
black votes could have as a block and the importance of maintaining peaceful relations 
through token concessions.60  
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 Crump saw himself as a paternal figure for his city’s black people.  Crump’s 
relationship with black Memphis may have been reciprocal, but it was in no way equal.  
Historians have found many ways to characterize Crump and his relationship to the black 
community.  Memphis historian Laurie Green found that black Memphians used the term 
“plantation mentality” in their everyday vernacular, “compar[ing] and contrast[ing] the 
racial parameters of city life to cultural memories of the plantation.”  And Crump’s 
attitude and actions toward the black community in Memphis did echo life on the 
plantation.  For him, black Memphians were “children to be managed rather than as 
enemies to be exterminated.”  This attitude allowed him to justify his concessions to the 
black community in the form of schools, healthcare, and recreation, while also stamping 
out any opposition or threats to his power with an iron hand.  According to historian 
Allen Kitchens, Crump “was a combination of showman, dictator, humanitarian, 
progressive, and hard-as nails, ruthless administrator.”  Although he was ousted from 
office for violating liquor laws in 1916, he was elected six months later to the powerful 
position of county trustee, which operated as the county’s treasurer.  Crump then spent 
the next decade consolidating his political power into a political machine that ran the city 
of Memphis from 1930 through his death in 1954.  While he was not on the ticket in the 
1919 election, Crump used his political prowess to influence the election and his ties to 
the black community to further his own agenda.  Specifically, he paid the poll taxes of 
working-class blacks and hosted barbeques to swing working-class black votes for the 
candidates he backed.61  
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Robert R. Church, Jr. and his organization the Lincoln League also worked to 
harness the power of the black voters in the lead-up to the election of 1916.  The Lincoln 
League led a massive campaign to register black voters in which Church himself paid for 
black voter education schools that some one thousand black Memphians attended, and he 
opened his auditorium on Beale Street for weekly rallies in the months leading up to the 
election.  Church and the Lincoln League attempted to empower all of Memphis’s black 
citizens, not just the middle-class.  True to its founding tenets of using black political 
power to improve the lives of the community, the Lincoln League worked to politically 
educate and empower ordinary black Memphians because Church “knew that their 
support and their grassroots mobilization were crucial to the success of the league” and to 
the success of black political power to institute change.   By election day the League had 
registered nearly ten thousand voters, representing a third of the total county electorate.62 
White Memphians, however, feared this growing black political activity.  The 
white daily, the Commercial Appeal, urged its readers to all vote Democratic in order to 
“write (sic) the brand of shame across the hideous plot” of the Lincoln League.63  The 
fear was that if whites voted for both the Democratic ticket and the all-white branch of 
the Republican party, it would split the white vote and open the door for black elected 
officials.  In response, the League took out a full-page advertisement in the white dailies 
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in the days leading up to the election in an effort to assuage white fears by declaring the 
black community’s loyalty to the city and the South.  In many ways the League’s ad was 
a precursor to the sentiment of white business leaders who would become concerned 
about blacks leaving the city in the wake of World War I, reminding white Memphians 
that the city’s continued success depended on cooperation between the races.64  Racial 
tensions and the fear of blacks “getting out of their place” were part of the political 
narrative in Memphis. 
League voters helped the Republican presidential nominee Charles Evans Hughes 
carry Shelby County, but he did not win in the state over all, nor did the Republican 
gubernatorial or senatorial candidates.  But even without these larger wins, the election of 
1916 in Shelby County had demonstrated the power black votes could have in 
influencing the outcome of elections.  And true to its mission of using black votes to 
increase black quality of life, the Lincoln League, realizing that local Republicans did not 
have enough support to win over a Democratic candidate, began to work with those local 
Democrats they saw as the most likely to treat blacks fairly.65  Three years before the 
1919 election, the Lincoln League had proved that black votes could sway an election.   
As America went to war to protect freedom abroad, black Americans worked to 
draw attention to the lack of freedom for black Americans at home.  Even as national 
black leaders such as W.E.B Du Bois called for African Americans to “forget our special 
grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow citizens” 
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in an effort to use black support of the war effort as a means to get white America to 
recognize black equality, instances of violence against blacks began to rise.  The summer 
of 1917 saw racially motivated violence in Houston, Texas; East St. Louis, Illinois; 
Chester, Pennsylvania; and Newark, New Jersey.  The violence in East St. Louis left 
some forty-seven people dead and six thousand, mostly African Americans, were left 
homeless.  Following the outbreak of violence, the NAACP held a “Silent Parade” in 
which upwards of ten thousand people marched in protest of the violence and carried 
signs reading, “Though Shalt Not Kill” and “Mr. President, Why Not Make America Safe 
for Democracy,” which explicitly pointed out the disparities between the country’s war 
aims and the reality of life for black Americans in America.66  
Members of Memphis’s black community also fell victim to the violence that 
swept the nation in the summer of 1917.  Ell Persons, a black Memphian, was lynched by 
a white mob after being accused of raping and murdering a white girl.  Persons was 
turned over to a mob almost a week before his trial date and taken to the location of the 
supposed crime, where hundreds of spectators watched Persons burn alive.  His body was 
then transported back to the city where it was dumped in the midst of a crowd on Beale 
Street.  James Weldon Johnson of the national NAACP office came to Memphis to 
investigate but could find no evidence of Persons’s guilt.  This incident “inflamed public 
opinion” among the city’s black citizens and contributed directly to the founding of the 
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city’s own chapter of the NAACP that same year.  By the end of the war in 1919, the 
Memphis chapter had over one thousand members.67  
Racial tensions continued to fester throughout the country during the war years 
and exploded into outright violence in the summer of 1919, which came to be known as 
Red Summer, with racial violence erupting in more than twenty-six American cities from 
Longview, Texas, to Washington, D.C, with the worst violence occurring in Chicago in 
July.  Although Memphis avoided outright racial violence that summer, it was not free of 
racial tensions, which boiled just below the surface.  In mid-May, the city avoided 
violence by “sheer luck,” according to one local daily.  A black man allegedly killed a 
streetcar conductor, which angered the some of the city’s more vigilant white 
supremacists, who threatened to retaliate against the city’s black citizens.  Church and 
other leaders assured city officials that the black Memphians would not seek out trouble, 
but they also warned that blacks would not stand by idly if they were attacked.68  
Tensions continued to run high through the summer of 1919, and white officials 
were ready to act.  Following the violence in Washington, D.C., the Memphis Press 
faulted D.C.’s police force for failing to “round up all negroes and disarm them, as would 
have been done in any southern city or most any place.”  After racial violence in Omaha, 
Nebraska, later that summer, the police in Memphis did attempt to disarm black 
Memphians by seizing guns from the pawnshops, sporting goods stores, and hardware 
stores frequented by black customers.  According to Gloria Brown-Melton, this move 
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represented Memphis’s white community’s impulse “to constrain and to control blacks,” 
as they had done in previous periods of racial tension.69  However, in the face of a 
growing community of black activists and the very real possibility that white aggression 
could result in racial violence, Memphis’s city leaders had to find an alternate way to 
both appease and maintain control over those black Memphians who were calling for 
change.  
This need was further exacerbated by the increased migration of black workers 
out of the city to take advantage of the economic opportunities offered by war industries 
in the North.  So many of Memphis’s black workers, whom the city relied on as its 
primary source of cheap non-union labor, were leaving that a serious labor shortage 
occurred.  In reaction, the Chamber of Commerce created the Industrial Welfare 
Committee “to keep its Negroes in Memphis.”  As the chairman of the Committee 
warned, “Business interests would languish, large and small property owners alike would 
suffer, and the city would disintegrate” if racial tensions were allowed to escalate.  Thus, 
city leaders were urged to do anything “that will make our colored people more contented 
and happy,” and “the business men of Memphis should help make Memphis the best 
town in this country for our Negro population, make it so much better for them to live in 
that they will not want to migrate to better places.”70  Even as racial tensions on the whole 
were on the rise, Memphis’s city and business leaders realized the importance of 
maintaining the support of all segments of the city’s black population in order to continue 
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to take advantage of the cheap supply of labor that working-class black Memphians, who 
made up the majority of the city’s black population, offered.  
Robert R. Church, Jr. and his Lincoln League saw an opportunity to take 
advantage of the atmosphere of uncertainty and tension that World War I had created in 
order to try and advance the position of blacks within the city in the 1919 election.  Thus, 
the 1919 election results were influenced not only by the Crump political machine’s 
grassroots campaigning style but also by the tensions brought on by the war, both of 
which necessitated that white leaders take into account the place of blacks in the city and 
the need to garner black support in order to win elections.  Frank Monteverde was both 
the candidate endorsed by Crump and an acquaintance of Robert R. Church, Jr’s.  So, 
while Crump used his political machine to encourage working-class black voters to vote 
the Monteverde ticket, Church secured a promise from the candidate to hire black police 
officers in exchange for the support of the Lincoln League, and thus, the majority of the 
black vote.71  
 Matthew Thornton Sr., F.M. Mercer, and “Sweetie” Williams were hired to the 
police department following Monteverde’s win.  The three men were originally hired to 
patrol the streets of the city’s black neighborhoods, but after only a few months on the 
job, the three got into a scuffle with some white men that resulted in one of the black 
officers being killed and the other two being dismissed from the department.  The black 
officers’ tenure, lasting only seven months, was much shorter than for those black 
officers who were hired during the yellow fever epidemics.  As Gritter argues, the hiring 
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of these officers in 1919 was a victory for black political leaders, such as Church, who 
were attempting to make inroads for their community into the management of the city, 
but it also revealed the limits of the reciprocal relationship black political leaders were 
trying to create with white city leaders.  In reality, the hiring was politically expedient for 
white city officials who were facing the threat of violent upheavals against growing black 
demands for political rights sweeping the nation.  And locally, the city’s black electorate 
had demonstrated its ability to wield its political power to shape the outcomes of 
elections.  The promise of hiring black police officers, even if their term proved to be 
short-lived, allowed white city leaders a way to maintain control over the black vote and 
the outcome of elections.  As historian David Tucker describes it, by the election of 1919, 
“the local white movement for social control had clearly advanced beyond the shotgun 
and the lynch rope.  Its new weapons were those of psychological and group 
manipulation,” which provided a hint of black advancement to stave off increased black 
activism for greater equality.72  So while the hiring of black police officers in 1919 can be 
seen as a victory of black political organizing, the motivations of white leaders to 
concede to that demand and the resulting short tenure of the officers demonstrated the 
way in which white leaders used black police officers as a means of social control, much 
as they would in 1948.  
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 As the hiring and subsequent firing of black police officers in 1919 proved, 
persistent racial prejudice and the strength of white supremacy continued to dominate 
Memphis society and politics and left little room for the continued presence of black men 
in uniform patrolling the city’s streets.  Even though calls for black police officers 
continued to resurface in the 1920s and 1930s, the strength of white supremacy and the 
lack of a significant race-related crisis for city government meant that these efforts did 
not gain significant traction.  In the mayoral election of 1927, the Crump-backed 
candidate promised to consider a reform program outlined by black leaders in order to 
secure black votes.  The program included the hiring of black police officers along with 
access to the city zoo and higher salaries for black teachers.  However, when the 
incumbent Mayor Rowlett Paine heard of this agreement, he publicly declared that 
Crump and his candidate, Watkins Overton, were “the greatest menace to white 
supremacy in this city since reconstruction days.”73 
 According to Crump biographer, Wayne Dowdy, Paine’s declaration caused 
“alarm [to] spread within the Crump organization that white voters would close ranks 
with Paine to bolster white supremacy and doom Overton’s candidacy.”  Thus, the 
Overton campaign publicly retracted its promise to black leaders, assuring white voters, 
that the candidate was committed to avoiding racial friction and was thus opposed to 
admitting blacks to community parks designated for white use and the idea of black 
police.  But in an effort to balance white racial fears of black equality and retain black 
support, Overton’s campaign pledged to increase the number of community recreational 
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facilities for black Memphians.  Thus, black calls for black police officers were stymied 
by white leaders’ promises of more equal distribution of municipal services but continued 
commitment to maintaining racial separation.74 
 Through the 1927 election, Crump was able to unify support for his political 
machine across racial and class lines.  Thus, by the onset of the Depression Crump had 
solidified his political power.  Crump’s support of the New Deal and President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt only continued to bolster his political power on the state and national levels.  
As the city dealt with the effects of the Depression, the Crump machine “appeared 
racially progressive.”  After being elected to Congress in 1930, Crump used his position 
to secure federal New Deal funds for Tennessee and Memphis specifically.  Although 
these New Deal relief efforts were distributed on a racist basis, black Memphians did 
experience increased employment opportunities along with improved living conditions.  
The number of parks and the number of paved streets in black neighborhoods increased, 
and the city also began construction on John Gaston Hospital, a hospital designated for 
blacks.75    
These benefits were primarily felt by working-class black Memphians and shifted 
their political allegiance to the Democratic Party.  The once strong oppositional political 
power of the city’s black economic elite dwindled with “collapse of the city’s black-
owned business economy” during the Depression.  As the city’s black Republican 
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leadership suffered, historian Laurie Green argues, “The political gap between 
Memphis’s black leaders and working-class African Americans” increased.  And 
although the nation and the city had suffered an economic crisis, Memphis’s white 
leadership had maintained control over its power and the city’s racial hierarchy.  So, even 
when police killed black postal worker George W. Brooks in early 1938, and the black 
community protested, calling for black police officers, no significant opposition to 
Crump’s control over the city surfaced.  The police officer involved was fired and the city 
opened a new swimming pool for blacks in the primarily black area of South Memphis.  
While more black voters than in previous elections stayed away from the polls in the 
primary later that year, Crump’s candidate won the election handily.  The crises of earlier 
decades were avoided, and throughout the 1920s and 1930s, limited accommodations that 
coincided with the continuation of the racially segregated social and political system in 
Memphis continued to be the dominant policy.76 
Prior to 1948, the hiring of black law officers came at moments when the white 
power structure of the city needed the support of the black community.  Whether it was a 
crisis brought on by war, epidemic, or political changes, in moments when a combination 
of changes to the city’s demographic, social, or economic situation collided, white 
Memphians sought to appease the demands of the city’s black population in order to 
maintain racial peace and continued white dominance.  However, through the city’s post- 
Civil War history, the black community in Memphis continued to be a force with which 
city officials had to deal.  The continued voting power and political activism of the black 
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community meant that black Memphians could not be ignored.  And when the city again 
faced a shifting demographic, economic, and political landscape in the mid-1940s with 
the onset of World War II, the question of black police officers gained greater traction.
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CHAPTER III 
THE WAR AND MEMPHIS:  
MAINTAINING AND CONTROLLING RACIAL PEACE IN THE CITY 
 
 
World War II transformed Memphis as it did many southern cities.  The decade 
leading up to the hiring of black police officers in Memphis can be described as a decade 
of change.  Demographic and economic changes spurred on by the Depression and World 
War II challenged social and political conventions in the city.  These changes brought 
more jobs and more people to Memphis, and this new competition for jobs and physical 
space in the city increased tension between the races.  This tension created a situation that 
necessitated white city officials take into account the needs of the city’s black citizenry, 
thus creating opportunity for black Memphians to demand greater equality.  This chapter 
explores the impact of the war experience on Memphis race relations.  White officials 
tried to maintain racial control over a changing city.  At the same time, black Memphians 
searched for ways to take advantage of the changes brought by the war to promote black 
equality and protect themselves and their communities.  In navigating a changing city, 
black and white leaders were forced to negotiate with each other and the larger black 
community in order to maintain control over the city’s segregated social and political 
order.  
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Mechanisms of Control Before the War 
Memphis’s population boomed in the wake of the Great Depression and the onset 
of World War II.  Between 1900 and 1940, the black population of the city went from 
49,910 to 121,498, with an estimated 28,000 added between 1930 and 1940.  The total 
population between 1930 and 1940 went from 253,153 to 292,942.  Then between 1940 
and 1948 the population grew by another 18 percent to 345,000, an estimated 34,000 of 
that growth occurring between the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 and 
1943.  Thus, by 1940, and throughout the following decade, blacks represented around 40 
percent of the total population in Memphis.77  
These changes in the city’s demographics, specifically the large influx of 
population during World War II, came from the surrounding rural agricultural areas that 
had provided Memphis with the raw materials to develop into a booming Mississippi 
River trade center.  While the city had been the cotton distribution center of the mid-
South prior to World War II, Memphis drew other industries to the city during the war 
with promises of reduced taxes and a low-wage, non-union labor force.  In the period 
between December 1941 and 1943, the city added nineteen thousand new manufacturing 
jobs, doubling the city’s industrial labor force.  These job increases came primarily 
through naval and military installations.  Fisher Aircraft converted its factories over to 
make wings and fuselages for bombers.  Quaker Oats, which came to the city in 1943, 
switched over to produce furfural alcohol for synthetic rubber.  The war brought more 
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jobs to the city for blacks and whites, and for men and women.  As the war continued and 
industry in Memphis grew, an increasing number of people migrated to the city to take 
advantage of these new war industry jobs.78  
But this massive influx of people in such a short amount of time put a strain on 
city government and city services.  By 1942, there was virtually no housing for non-war 
workers.  The Chamber of Commerce formed a rent bureau to control rising rents; the 
mayor appointed a citizens housing committee; and in 1944, the mayor founded the 
Emergency Housing Committee.  According to Mayor Chandler, the city’s number one 
problem was housing, a problem felt more acutely by the city’s growing black 
population.  Most housing built during this period was designated for sale or rent to white 
workers.  Many black workers coming to the city were forced to “double up” with family 
or friends, most of whom were already living in substandard housing.  Memphis Housing 
Authority director J.A. Fowler warned city leaders that as a result of this overcrowding, 
“maintaining health standards for negro workers is a recognized impossibility.  The 
absentee records of negro employees in local war production due to illness are becoming 
an alarming problem.”  These health problems were only exacerbated by the inability of 
the city to keep up with providing basic services such as sewer maintenance and street 
construction, as all available materials were going to the war effort and what the city 
could obtain was not keeping pace with the demands of a rising population.79  
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As the population continued to grow, so too did the problem of maintaining racial 
separation.  In many ways, by the 1940s, Memphis was two separate cities, one black and 
one white.  This separation can first and foremost be characterized by the spatial 
separation the city worked to maintain.  Because of the continued growth of the black 
population between 1900 and 1940, and with the population boom in the 1930s, black 
neighborhoods were scattered around the city, clustered around business districts and 
white residential areas, primarily in the northern and southern parts of the city.  With a 
continually expanding black population, city officials, as early as the 1920s, recognized 
the need for new black housing units.  City planners began to use federal housing and 
slum clearance funds, given to cities as part of the New Deal recovery programs, in order 
to confine black neighborhoods to specific areas within the city.80  
During the Depression, a Works Progress Administration study found that 
Memphis was in desperate need of new housing.  According to the study, one half of all 
residents lived in substandard housing, 77 percent of which were black residents.  As a 
result, three housing projects for blacks were built in the city, Dixie Homes (1938), 
William H. Foot Homes (1940), and LeMoyne Gardens (1941).  All three were built in 
what could be considered “grey zones” or mixed neighborhoods, which essentially turned 
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these neighborhoods into black areas within the city.81  The goal of this expanded housing 
for the city’s blacks was to confine them to the margins of the city.  
All of these projects were part of federal New Deal relief programs.  According to 
Memphis business historian, Robert Sigafoos, Memphis was the “first major FHA city.”  
Federal housing dollars came to Memphis to help save homes through refinancing and 
insurance and to help fund new home construction in the growing city.  The Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA) also helped to fund the Memphis Housing Authority, which 
became a major force in slum clearance on the eve of World War II.  But in some cases 
these “blighted areas” slated for slum clearance were in fact stable black neighborhoods 
torn down in order to encourage residence in the newly built black housing projects in 
northern Memphis or South Memphis.  Black homeowners on the east side of Mississippi 
Avenue between Willington Street and Georgia Avenue argued that theirs was “one of 
the best streets for Negroes in the city,” a location where many of the black residents 
owned their own homes.  Thus, a stable black community would be destroyed when the 
neighborhood was dismantled in the name of slum clearance.82  Essentially, federally 
funded slum clearance projects worked to solidify physical separation between the races 
within the city’s residential neighborhoods.  
                                                
81 Sigafoos, 182.  
82 Sigafoos, 181; and Gloria Brown-Melton, “Blacks in Memphis, 1920-1955: A Historical Study” (Ph.D. 
diss., Washington State University, 1982), 158-166. Brown-Melton outlines arguments from white and 
black Memphis residents for and against the slum clearance projects. As more black families moved into 
the new housing projects and surrounding areas, whites fled these areas because, they argued, blacks 
“would not desire white presence in the new reconstituted neighborhoods.” Thus, pre-war slum clearance 
projects accelerated the residential segregation of Memphis.  
 68 
Other southern cities experienced the same issues concerning housing.  The 
primary concern of southern cities was how to expand black housing while maintaining 
racial separation in the years following the war.  Housing in Memphis followed a similar 
pattern to that in Richmond, Virginia.  Planning consultant Harland Bartholomew 
prepared a master plan for both Memphis and Richmond in which he advocated for 
“vigorous slum clearance, rebuilding of neighborhoods, careful site selection for new 
low-income housing, and preservation of established middle-income neighborhoods.”83  
Bartholomew argued that these measures would allow southern cities to adapt to 
changing demographics.  These measures would maintain the status quo of racialized 
spatial separation by expanding existing black areas to both accommodate and confine 
growing black populations.  Atlanta, Georgia, also followed a similar pattern.  Like 
Memphis, Atlanta experienced a housing shortage in the years following World War II.  
This shortage necessitated an expansion of black housing, but Atlanta officials made 
every effort to control this expansion through zoning laws and slum clearance.  In one 
instance of slum clearance, black residents were vacated in order to build a whites-only 
park, thus cleaning up the white neighborhood while pushing blacks into the preexisting 
black neighborhoods.  Even when the Atlanta Urban League (AUL) tried to resist the 
confinement of black Atlantians, they did not challenge racial separation.  In an effort to 
take expansion into their own hands, the AUL convinced black professionals, real estate 
agents, and sympathetic whites to buy up land on the west side of the city, which allowed 
blacks to “leapfrog” over white neighborhoods to establish new black neighborhoods.  
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Thus, Atlanta’s black leaders were able to take hold of controlling future expansion in the 
city’s black neighborhoods without challenging the status quo.84  
Yet even as residential areas were becoming more segregated in urban areas like 
Memphis, growing populations led to increased instances of racial interactions.  This 
greater contact resulted in growing tensions over how public space would be divided 
between black and white.  Basic city services such as transportation became more 
crowded as whites and blacks moved around the city.  The population boom, combined 
with gas rationing, meant that in Memphis as well as other southern cities more people 
rode the bus.  In 1941, Memphis had 60 million bus riders.  By 1946, that number had 
grown to 127 million riders.  While black and white Memphians tried to share this public 
space but maintain the strict separation of the races, tensions arose.  White women 
workers complained to the mayor in 1942 that black riders on the bus “make you wait till 
they all get on; and they take up all the seats on the car and you [stand] up; and as they 
pass you they RUB and STOMP all over you.”85  Whether or not the rubbing and 
stomping was intentional or even occurred, the complaint emphasizes the fact that 
Memphis whites still expected deference from blacks and were clearly agitated by the 
influx of black people to the city.   
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That these women deemed the behavior of their fellow black riders as offensive 
and disrespectful demonstrates the building tensions between the races, particularly the 
tensions over the sharing of public spaces.  While white women in Memphis complained 
to the mayor of pushing and shoving by black passengers, other white bus passengers 
took more violent action against what they saw as an encroaching black ridership.  In one 
instance, a white student struck a black schoolteacher on the school bus for not giving up 
her seat.  The bus driver did not make the woman give up her seat, nor did he make any 
effort to protect her.  Both student and teacher were arrested, but the case was dismissed 
in court.86    
White officials and black business leaders alike tried to help alleviate the growing 
tensions on public transportation.  In 1943, the Negro Junior Chamber of Commerce 
issued a set of “rules” for black bus passengers.  These “rules” were primarily concerned 
with black behavior on public transit, behavior that would be deemed courteous and 
deferential.  Black riders were urged to “be glad to obey the laws of the land and follow 
the rules of good conduct.”  Not only were black passengers to behave properly and in 
accordance with the law, presumably segregation laws, but also “be neat and clean.  
Leave your work clothes where you work.  If this is not possible, be careful in entering 
and leaving crowded busses and coaches [so as] not to soil the clothes of others.”  Many 
of the rules related compliance directly back to the cause of the war and racial uplift:  
“Peace and good will among the races will do much toward winning the War.”  And 
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black riders were reminded that if this good will were maintained, “the progress of our 
race is certain.”87  Through these rules, black business leaders linked racial progress, 
victory, and black behavior.  By encouraging black passengers to exhibit the kind of 
deference expected by white Memphians, the chamber hoped to limit racial tensions on 
public transportation and promote black progress.   
Trouble on city buses was not limited to Memphis during the war years.  All 
across the urban South, population increases and gas rationing meant that on public 
transportation, it was “physically impossible to separate the races as the law requires.”  In 
Durham, North Carolina, after a black solider argued with a white bus driver, he called 
the driver a “lousy 4-fer” as he exited the bus, whereupon the driver shot him to death.  In 
Montgomery, Alabama, a black GI sat down in the front seat of a bus while he was home 
on leave.  The driver threw the black soldier off the bus and shot him in the leg.88  All 
across the South, as more people moved into the cities, it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain strict racial separation, and white Southerners and city officials had to find 
alternative ways to maintain the color line.  In terms of public services, the use of 
vigilante violence in order to maintain segregation became a threat of real concern for 
city officials.  
On the national scene during the war years, many blacks were increasingly calling 
on the federal government to protect and advance the civil rights of black Americans.  In 
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1941, A. Phillip Randolph’s March on Washington Movement had successfully 
bargained with President Roosevelt for Executive Order (EO) 8802, which banned 
discrimination in government-funded defense industries and created the Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (FEPC) to review complaints of violations of EO 8802.  In 
Memphis, thousands of black workers appealed to the FEPC to help combat racialized 
hiring practices in the city’s industries.  Even though racial tensions in southern cities, 
particularly between black workers and white unions, made elimination of discrimination 
in the workplace nearly impossible, the fact that black workers took the chance to appeal 
to the federal government in the hopes of increasing their opportunities demonstrates the 
willingness of black citizens to challenge the status quo even in the face of intimidation.89  
Southern labor historian Michael Honey found in his study of labor activism in 
Memphis that the city’s black workers had been agitating for their rights for almost a 
decade before the FEPC.  In order to attract industry to the city, Memphis had sold itself 
as a place of low-wage, unorganized labor.  The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company 
brought a mass-production subsidiary plant to Memphis in 1937 after the city allowed the 
company to build outside the city limits, thus avoiding taxes, while the city still provided 
the plant with water, police, and fire protection at minimal cost.  Firestone had left 
Akron, Ohio, in order to avoid organizing drives of industrial unions, and Memphis 
officials guaranteed Firestone that in their city the company would be free from industrial 
union organizing.  As early as 1929, the Memphis Chamber of Commerce was assuring 
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potential investors that unions were unlikely in the southern city “because of Anglo-
Saxon stock and the negro…[who] is not prone to organizing in matters of wages and 
working conditions,” a statement that emphasized both the lack of immigrants, who were 
imagined as agitators for socialism and unionism, and the presence of a docile black labor 
force, who would not stand in the way of industrial profits.90  
But, as Honey argues, the New Deal’s support of labor and the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) support of black workers destabilized Memphis labor 
relations, which resulted in the need for the city government to reinforce its control over 
labor, more specifically black labor.  The Depression and subsequent New Deal policies 
exacerbated racial discrimination in the workplace.  For example, with the rise in 
unemployment, white workers encouraged employers to hire white workers for jobs 
traditionally held by blacks.  The Loewe’s Theatre in Memphis responded by replacing 
black ushers with white ones, who were paid the same low wage as the former black 
ushers.  But in some cases the push by whites to take black jobs turned violent.  In one 
instance, white vigilantes killed ten black railroad workers in Mississippi, Tennessee, and 
Louisiana, because they refused to give their jobs to whites.  The multiple appeals by the 
Association of Colored Railway Trainmen, founded in Memphis, to the federal 
government to protect blacks and more specifically their jobs, failed.91  Even in the midst 
of the Depression, when all workers were suffering, the racial divide continued to put 
white worker’s rights above those of blacks.  
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By the late 1930s, CIO opposition to racial discrimination had encouraged black 
workers to organize as part of the CIO.  Specifically, black dockworkers in Memphis 
began organizing under the CIO, and in 1939, as part of a larger regional strike against 
the Federal Barge Line, Memphis’s black dockworkers also went on strike.  The strike 
pitted black workers against the white dockworker’s union, business leaders, and police.  
But the black-led union local refused to back down even in the face of police 
intimidation.  Finally, the U.S. Justice Department got involved and an agreement was 
reached, but not before black labor leader, Thomas Watkins, was run out of town.92 
City officials also made other moves to keep black citizens in their proper place 
both socially and economically.  Within the city, the federal government maintained 
separate United States Employment Services (USES) offices for whites and blacks, one 
downtown for whites and one on Beale Street for blacks.  Those blacks that found jobs 
through these agencies found themselves placed into segregated jobs.  According to 
Memphis historian Laurie Green, black workers “toiled as unskilled laborers in mass 
production plants, or in cotton compresses, cottonseed oil mills, hardwood processing 
plants, laundries or private domestic service.”  Black worker Altha Sims went to the 
Memphis USES to try and do her part for the war effort but was told “there was no 
defense work for Negro women.”  Sims persisted, writing to the mayor that “I want a job 
but I don’t [want] no cook job,” but she was informed that there was “no job for [her] but 
a skillet an[d] pan.”  Mayor Walter Chandler responded, “I know of no positions for 
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unskilled colored women other than domestic work.”93  Black men and women, like Sims, 
were forced into jobs that fit the traditional understanding of black workers as unskilled, 
low-wage workers.  Federal and local offices, such as the USES and the mayor’s office, 
used their resources during the war years to maintain the tradition of racialized labor 
organization.  
The National Urban League (NUL) was particularly concerned with black 
employment in the years immediately following the war.  In Atlanta, Georgia, the AUL 
had been instrumental in the campaign to open up industrial jobs for blacks during the 
war.  With the help of the FEPC, the AUL was able to secure the promise of an aircraft 
training school for blacks in 1942.94  But after the war, black workers, and veterans in 
particular, faced increased job discrimination.  Even after running employment 
advertisements stating that linemen “were badly needed,” Southern Bell refused to hire 
qualified black workers.  The company’s president explained that the company would 
hire black employees “within the framework of the customs of the communities in which 
we operate.”  This stance translated into black workers continually being relegated into 
domestic and service jobs, those jobs traditionally seen as black jobs.   
The NUL office criticized the Memphis Urban League (MUL) for what appeared 
to be the primary focus of its employment programs, the “training and place[ing] of 
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domestic workers.”  Upon returning from a field visit, George Edwards, the Assistant 
Director of the Southern Field Division of the NUL, noted that MUL Executive Director 
J. A. McDaniel appeared “unfamiliar with the League’s program” of helping veterans 
find skilled jobs outside of traditional service jobs.  Although the NUL encouraged 
McDaniel to focus on black employment in a broader range of jobs, the MUL’s jobs 
program continued to echo white city leaders’ definition of black jobs.95  Even with a 
positive outlook on new employment, the result of new industries coming to the city, 
black Memphians continued to face obstacles when seeking industrial employment in the 
city, whether skilled or unskilled. 
The actions of Memphis city officials and white citizens made it clear that 
Memphis was a city entrenched in the ideology of white supremacy and racial 
segregation, and it was this ideology that informed city leaders’ justification for their 
efforts to maintain economic, social, and political control over the city’s black 
population.  Even before the war began to impact race relations in Memphis, the Crump 
political machine used police intimidation to silence oppositional black political voices 
and bring the black political and economic elite in line with the machine and its policies.   
The harassment of black political leaders in the lead up to the 1940 election 
demonstrated the limits of the Crump machine’s toleration of black political power in 
Memphis in the early 1940s and the extent of white efforts to suppress and control black 
opposition.  The harassment of black Memphians during the 1940 election exemplifies 
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the relationship between white police and the city’s black citizens and begins to explain 
why black Memphians became concerned about issues of community protection and 
equal justice over the course of the 1940s.  It also sets the stage for the divisions within 
the black community that would emerge in the later years of the decade.   
During the first half of the twentieth century, the black economic and social elite 
played a role in city politics, sponsoring political and social gatherings for black 
Memphians and building relations with the Crump political machine.  As a result, these 
men came to represent the primary black leaders in Memphis.  Men like Robert R. 
Church, Jr. translated their economic position into political organization and action, 
ultimately coming to operate as the conduit between the Crump political machine and the 
mass of the black community in Memphis.  For two decades after the 1919 election, the 
black Republican leader had used his relationship with the city’s political boss to increase 
his own political and economic power within the city, often bargaining black political 
support for Crump’s candidates in exchange for concessions for the city’s larger black 
community, such as parks and educational facilities, or even black police officers, as seen 
in the 1919 election.  However, although Church was willing to work with the Crump 
machine to advance the opportunities for black Memphians, he remained a staunch 
Republican and continued to believe in the power of black support for the Republican 
party to create real change in the lives of black Americans and black Memphians more 
specifically.  For Church, black participation in the Republican party would ultimately 
work “to arouse the masses of colored Americans to a consciousness of the potency of 
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the ballot, and to use it most effectively.”96  It was this belief in the idea that the path to 
black advancement was through political action under the Republican party that 
ultimately led Church afoul of Crump, a staunch Democrat.  
In the months prior to the 1940 national elections, Church boosted his organizing 
efforts among black Memphians in support of the Republican candidate rather than the 
candidate backed by the political boss.  In response, Crump used his powers within the 
city government to silence Church.  Crump began by seizing and selling at public auction 
some twenty parcels of Church family land for back taxes that had previously been over-
looked during the Depression.  Then, the police department began harassing other black 
Republican leaders within Church’s organization.  Dr. J.B. Martin and Elmer Atkinson, 
both black business owners, found their stores under constant police surveillance, and 
their customers faced random police searches, all under the pretext of investigating and 
cracking down on illegal narcotics activity.  The Republicans ultimately lost the election 
in 1940, but police surveillance continued, and Martin and Atkinson both eventually fled 
the city.  Church also never returned to Memphis.97 
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This harassment of black Republicans during the election of 1940 ushered in what 
came to be called the “reign of terror,” a name given to Crump’s continued efforts to 
maintain control over the city through intimidation tactics.  The phrase “reign of terror” 
was coined by national civil liberties and civil rights organizations that learned of what 
was happening in the city through national media attention.  The “reign of terror” was 
primarily about maintaining white control over the city’s black population, control over 
political activity, control over labor, and more generally, social control over blacks.  The 
suppression of independent black political voices during the 1940 election sent a clear 
message as to the limits of Crump’s toleration of independent black political activity.  
Other black Republicans, such as former Church supporter Lieutenant George 
Washington Lee, fell in line with the Crump machine as a result of the harassment.  In 
order to get back in the good graces of Crump, Lee, having “admit[ed] that Mr. Crump’s 
great contribution to the colored people may not have been properly publicized to the 
masses,” organized a parade of black city employees and a speech by Crump to go along 
with the annual black charity football game, the Blues Bowl.98  Lee took the opportunity 
to prove his support to Crump and thus avoided the same fate as Martin, Atkinson, and 
Church.  
Black Democratic leaders also worked to demonstrate their support of the Crump 
political machine.  The leading black Democrat, Dr. Joseph E. Walker, had been a 
Republican in Mississippi before coming to Memphis.  But his experiences in Memphis 
led Walker to believe that an alliance with white Democratic leaders was the way to 
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greater opportunity for the black community.  Founder of the Universal Life Insurance 
Company in 1923, Walker quickly created a place for himself among the city’s black 
elite as his company grew to be one of the country’s largest insurance companies for 
blacks.  By the election of 1932, Walker was president of the Community Welfare 
League, a conservative civic organization linked to the city’s dominant white civic and 
political groups.  The League worked to develop programs to provide relief to the city’s 
poor black citizens.  In the lead up to the election of 1936, Walker became the chairman 
of the newly formed Negro Democratic Club.  Walker’s political argument focused on 
the idea that an alliance with white leadership would allow opportunities for community 
uplift.  Walker, along with Lt. Lee, saw economic opportunity, above political action, as 
the key to black community uplift.  And in Memphis, this could only be achieved through 
cooperation with the Crump machine.99  
As the Memphis police were harassing black Republicans during the 1940 
election, the Colored Democratic Organization circulated a list of benefits that black 
citizens had received from Democrats, both locally and nationally.  The list included the 
three federal housing projects, the $175,000 in Public Works Administration funds used 
to build four new black schools, the nine hundred free lunches to school children each 
day, employment assistance, and other health and educational benefits.  According to the 
Colored Democratic Organization, black Memphians were among some of the most 
fortunate in the South.  By the end of 1940, there was clearly a move by black leaders to 
fall in line with the Crump machine and take a more conservative approach to black 
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advancement in the city.  As Universal Life Insurance executive and Walker’s 
Democratic lieutenant M.S. Stuart noted, “Radicals get in the limelight of popularity.  
Conservatives get things done…They want the same thing…a conservative Negro is a 
radical who has grown ripe – and practical.  Both are at heart for the full, legal rights of 
the race.  Age and experience makes people more matter-of-fact.  More inclined to 
getting results.”100  After the harassment of the 1940 election, black leaders, regardless of 
political affiliation, chose to take the more conservative route in the hopes that alliance 
with the Crump machine would help at the very least to protect the opportunities the 
city’s black residents had gained during the New Deal.   
Crump’s intimidation of black opposition went beyond black political leaders.  In 
a letter to the black ministers of Memphis, Mayor Chandler, on behalf of Crump 
reminded the ministers “Mr. E.H. Crump has for years encouraged helpful things for the 
colored people.”  Chandler went on to warn ministers to avoid politics in their role as 
religious leaders since “he [Crump] has never requested a Minister to talk politics in his 
pulpit – that is no place to carry on a political discussion… it isn’t right and fair for just a 
few – a hand full of self-appointed leaders to misguide” their congregations of “good, 
hard-working, well meaning colored men and women.”  Written in the fall of 1940, 
Mayor Chandler’s letter reminded of the city’s black ministers of their place.  Deriding 
those the machine saw as “self-appointed” leaders, presumably those that spoke out 
against the machine, the letter reminded the ministers of Crump’s good will towards the 
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city’s black citizens.  The message being that black ministers should stay out of politics 
and any political action, especially organizing efforts in opposition to the Crump political 
machine.101  As a result of these types of intimidation tactics, most historians have come 
to see the 1940s as a decade of accommodation and cooperation with the Crump machine 
by Memphis’s black leaders.  
 But Crump’s continued efforts to maintain a strict racially segregated system 
caused some among his black allies to worry about how these efforts would impact 
continued support for the machine among the mass of black Memphians.  As harassment 
of black storeowners and black patrons continued after the 1940 election, M.S. Stuart 
tried to use his position and connection to the machine to stop police harassment of black 
business owners and their black patrons.  Stuart wrote to the mayor emphasizing the pride 
black Memphians felt for black businesses and the impact on black sentiment and racial 
harmony continued harassment might have.  According to Stuart, “It is one of the show-
places for colored visitors who come to Memphis; and the spectacle of a successful 
Negro business enterprise being crushed and closed by a powerful organization…I’m 
sure that the memory of it will rankle with bitterness for a long time in the hearts of 
thousands of Negroes.”102  Stuart was warning Mayor Chandler that Memphis blacks took 
                                                
101 Undated form letter to pastors of Memphis, Box 179, Folder 2: “Negroes Election Data 1940,” E.H. 
Crump Collection.  The date of this letter appears to be late October, early November 1940 and thus in the 
midst of the final weeks of the national campaign.  This estimation of the date is based on a letter from the 
pastor of Beale Avenue Baptist that references what appears to be this letter found in the Crump collection.  
See G.A. Long to Mr. Chandler, November 4, 1940, Box 14, Folder “Race Relations 1940,” The Papers of 
Memphis Mayor Walter Chandler. 
102 Merah Stuart to Walter Chandler, November 1, 1940, Box 13, Folder “Public Safety-Police,” The Papers 
of Memphis Mayor Walter Chandler. 
 83 
pride in their community’s successes and would not soon forget how the city had treated 
one of its own.   
 The mayor’s response reinforced the machine’s commitment to cracking down on 
those that opposed its power.  The mayor assured Stuart that the police were performing 
“earnest and impartial law enforcement” and that “there should be no compromise” of 
police action for the sake of black community pride.  In a statement to the press, police 
commissioner Joseph Boyle made it clear that the department would continue to arrest 
any one suspected of “racial trouble,” regardless of black opposition.  Boyle went on to 
emphasize the administration’s commitment to the racial order, stating that city officials 
would continue to appreciate and support “honest, contented, and law abiding” black 
citizens but would remain suspicious of and vigilant against the “fanatical, unappreciative 
group seeking a social equality that will never come about in this community.”103   
To Boyle’s hard-line segregationist attitude, Crump appeared as the paternalistic 
politician appealing to the city’s longtime black and white residents in an effort to 
reaffirm his control over the management of the city and its citizens and yet also appease 
tensions.  Crump claimed: “We have known the negroes always- known their problems, 
and are going to defend the right thinking, working, honest negro and they are ninety-five 
percent in majority; and at the same time we want to keep their race worth defending.  
We want to live together in peace, faith and confidence.”  Both Boyle and Crump made a 
distinction between the majority among the city’s black population and the “fanatical, 
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unappreciative,” who Crump saw as outliers among black Memphians and thus an 
external threat to peace in the city that had to be eradicated in order to defend the “right 
thinking” black citizens.  Crump couched police harassment in term of community 
protection.  
Crump saw the benefit of working with those black leaders who knew their place 
and were willing to work with the machine to maintain the status quo, men like Joseph 
Walker.  As Dr. Walker’s son commented years later, Crump “didn’t do anything to stop 
black success,” so long as that success didn’t infringe on segregation.  “He didn’t care 
how successful that you were…as long as you kept it all black.”104  For Crump, “right 
thinking” black Memphians were those who found economic success within the confines 
of segregation and were thus less likely to challenge the status quo of strict racial 
segregation and racial inequality in all aspects of city life.  By the end of the decade, the 
accommodation by black leaders, like Lt. Lee and Dr. Walker, to the Crump machine 
over the course of the 1940s would result in a divide between the black political and 
economic elite and the mass of the black community.  As race relations in Memphis 
deteriorated throughout the 1940s, many within Memphis’s black community came to see 
this accommodationism by black leaders as hindering the safety of the city’s black 
citizens specifically and black advancement more generally.  
 The city’s message continued to be that they knew what was best for black 
Memphians.  In 1948, NUL employee Isobel Chisholm noted, “He (Crump) wants to see 
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Negroes ‘in nice houses, clean and healthy, then they’ll be happy.’”  The implication was 
that if the city’s black population was “happy,” they would not challenge the status quo 
of racial segregation.  In a meeting Chisholm attended, Crump expressed a concern for 
black citizens’ well being while in the same breath he reminded the attendees that he was 
against black equality and integration.105  Crump’s concessions to the city’s blacks were 
rooted in his desire to maintain the racial status quo.  Crump realized that in order to 
maintain racial segregation and white supremacy, he also had to work to maintain racial 
harmony.  The city even went so far as to publish a pamphlet in 1943, titled “Benefits and 
Opportunities for Colored Citizens of Memphis,” which outlined services offered by the 
city, such as health services and educational services, as well as housing and recreational 
facilities, all for the “benefit” of black Memphians.106  The pamphlet was meant to 
influence black attitudes about city leadership by reminding them of all the city had done 
for black Memphians.   
 In Mayor Chandler’s opening address of the 1943 pamphlet, he quoted Abraham 
Lincoln, drawing on the historical memory of the “great emancipator” to appeal to black 
sentiment, and reminded the citizens of Memphis that the government could only go so 
far in helping the people and that the community must also work to better itself.  
Chandler acknowledged that black citizens represented 40 percent of the population.  But 
he also emphasized that black Memphians paid only 5 percent of the city’s taxes, a fact 
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meant to highlight the generosity of the city in providing benefits to its black citizens.  
The goal of the pamphlet was to “challenge and arouse the colored people of Memphis to 
the exceptional opportunities offered to them for the promotion of their health, education 
and general welfare and to impress upon them their duty to take the fullest advantage of 
those opportunities, benefits and privileges.  The city can provide these exceptional 
opportunities and benefits, but the colored people themselves must make use of them, if 
they are to enjoy the best health, if their children are to be educated, and if progress is to 
be made by the colored people of Memphis.”  By emphasizing black Memphians “duty” 
to take advantage of what the city had to offer them, the pamphlet placed the burden of 
creating a better life for blacks on the shoulders of the city’s black residents.   
The city government was not only trying to sway black citizens by pointing to 
strategic health and education benefits in the city but also trying to impress upon them the 
importance of supporting the city government in order to continue to enjoy the benefits 
outlined in the pamphlet.  While the “reign of terror” that had dominated black 
interactions with the city’s government in the first years of the decade had swayed black 
leaders to fall in line with the Crump machine, it had angered averaged black citizens.  
Propaganda pieces, such as the 1943 pamphlet which directly addressed the advantages 
for blacks in Memphis, suggests that Crump feared he was losing control of the mass of 
the city’s black population and had to make every effort to maintain that control.107   
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Maintaining Postwar Control 
 The vote was one of Crump’s primary tools for controlling working-class black 
Memphians long before the war.  Although black Memphians never lost the right to vote, 
they were still required to pay poll taxes.  Crump used poll taxes as a way to secure votes 
among poor and working-class blacks by paying off or forgiving black voter’s taxes.  
Early in his career, Crump realized the power of the black vote if used effectively to his 
advantage.  In 1928 when the Commercial Appeal launched a crusade against Crump and 
his political machine, it did so by trying to institute an all-white Democratic Primary in 
order to diminish the influence of black voters on elections.  Crump was able to stop calls 
for an all-white primary, presumably by cutting a deal in which Crump supported 
Governor Henry Horton, whom he had previously opposed, and thus help to ensure the 
Governor’s reelection.  This move to block the all-white primary in 1928 was indicative 
of Crump’s career-long strategy when it came to dealing with black people.  What 
appeared to be a progressive maneuver against white supremacy was in fact a move to 
shore up Crump’s control over city politics.  Throughout his career Crump became a 
master at balancing what he called a progressive southern agenda with maintaining the 
racial status quo.108  
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While locally the black vote had long been a factor in city politics, nationally, the 
1940s was a decade of expanding black voting rights.  The NAACP’s legal campaign 
against voting discrimination made headway in 1944 with the Supreme Court decision in 
Smith v. Allwright, which outlawed the all-white Democratic primary in Texas.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision eventually led to the end of white primaries across the South.  
By the end of World War II, the number of black voters nationally and in the South 
particularly was expanding.  
In Georgia, the 1946 state Supreme Court case Chapman v. King ended the white 
primary in that state.  The previous year, Georgia Governor Ellis Arnal had abolished the 
poll tax, opening the way for black registrants.  The number of registered black voters in 
Atlanta rose by nearly 70 percent between 1945 and May of 1946.109  Whereas Atlanta’s 
mayor Bill Hartsfield had previously ignored the city’s black residents by telling black 
leaders “come back to see me when you have 10,000 votes” when asked about hiring 
black police officers in the city, by 1947, when approached with the same request, 
Hartsfield only asked “How many do you want?”110  This shift in tone demonstrates what 
many southern city leaders were experiencing in the late 1940s as Supreme Court 
decisions and massive voter registration drives across the country increased black 
political participation.  The result was that southern cities were learning what Crump and 
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Memphis’s white politicians already knew, that black votes could make a difference in 
local elections, particularly in those southern cities with significant black populations.  
But even as the black voter rolls increased and politicians began courting the 
black vote, white politicians’ approach to the black community was still paternalistic and 
segregationist.  As one Atlanta leader stated, “I’m a true friend of the Negro and will be 
as long as he keeps his place,” implying that opportunity for black advancement rested on 
black willingness to abide by racial segregation.  Hollis Price, the first black president of 
LeMoyne College, the black college in Memphis, noted in the late 1940s that white city 
officials in Memphis did things “for” but not “with Negroes,” intimating that although 
there were benefits for the blacks who lived in Memphis, these were not the result of 
interracial cooperation but of the actions of whites officials who assumed they knew what 
was best for the city’s black citizens.  After her meeting with Crump in the spring of 
1947, NUL employee Isobel Chisholm noted that Crump “regards Negroes as a group to 
be tolerated because they have to be ‘here’ and in large numbers…the best way to 
maintain peace with them is to do whatever necessary to keep them ‘getting along’ with 
whites.”111 
 In Memphis, city officials continued to see racial separation as the answer to 
maintaining peaceful race relations.  After the war, the American Heritage Foundation 
sponsored the Freedom Train, a train carrying the nation’s founding historical documents 
usually held at the National Archives and other institutions, which toured around the 
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country for citizens to view.  The Freedom Train, as it was heralded because of its focus 
on American democratic beginnings, was scheduled to stop in 322 cities across the 
country between September 1947 and January 1949.  The train’s focus on uniting 
Americans through a shared history of democracy included desegregated viewing.  
Memphis mayor, James Pleasants, argued that having blacks and whites together on the 
Freedom Train “would surely lead to trouble and perhaps bloodshed, which we are ever 
alert to prevent.”112  Pleasant further argued that it was only by continued vigilance in 
upholding the laws of segregation that Memphis had supposedly experienced “less 
trouble between the races than in any other American city.”  According to Pleasant, 
separation of the races was key to Memphis’s success in maintaining peace within the 
city, and that “every thinking negro agrees with our position.”113  City leaders justified 
their continued adherence to racial segregation by claiming approval from the black 
citizens.  In the end, even with opposition to the mayor’s stance on segregated viewing 
from both black and white Memphians, the train bypassed the city on its way across the 
South.  The Freedom Train debate in Memphis demonstrated that city policy continued to 
rely on the enforcement of segregation in all aspects of city life as the best way to 
maintain racial peace. 
For decades, Crump used intimidation to control Memphis’s black population.  
Backed by a police department ruled by the racial hardliner, Joseph Boyle, Crump used 
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the strict enforcement of racial segregation to keep blacks in their place.  The fear of 
losing control over the city’s black citizens was only exacerbated by the increase in 
population and the influx of military personnel from outside the city.  In one police 
brutality complaint, two black army sergeants claimed that two white patrolmen 
confronted them on Beale Street declaring they were going to “learn this smart 
Northerner how to act.”  The police beat up one of the black officers while sparing the 
other because he was from the South and supposedly knew how to act.114  Reminiscent of 
the 1940 “reign of terror,” in the aftermath of the war and in response to the changes it 
brought to the city, Crump again made efforts to assert his control.  Returning veterans 
and the national moves toward greater rights for black citizens were a threat to the 
southern system of segregation. 
By the primary election of 1948, Crump’s political control over the city began to 
crack under the growing local and national pressure for change.  A war for democracy, 
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in favor of greater black voting rights, as well as 
President Truman’s expanding rhetoric on the issues of civil rights, meant that the rights 
of black Americans had become a national issue by 1948.  NAACP voter registration 
drives, black migration to the North, and the Smith v. Allwright decision meant an 
expanded black electorate that could have a greater impact on local and national 
elections.  Thus, as the election approached in 1948, these new national political realities 
meant that the national Democratic party had to appeal to this growing black electorate 
even at the expense of alienating those southern white Democrats committed to strict 
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racial segregation and white supremacy.  This lead to states’ rights Democrats breaking 
with Truman and the national Democratic party in the lead up to the 1948 election to 
form the Dixiecrat party, a party built on a platform of white supremacy and stopping 
federal moves toward civil rights legislation.115 
 According to historian Kari Frederickson, the Dixiecrats were a reactionary group 
that wanted to hold on to the positive economic changes that New Deal legislation and 
war production had brought to the region but maintain the racial and political stability, 
built on white supremacy and racial segregation, that had existed in the South since the 
early twentieth century.  New Deal programs such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
which used subsidies to control agricultural production, the Works Progress 
Administration, federal housing programs, and other federal New Deal programs helped 
to spur economic recovery in the South.  When the war broke out, the South was able to 
draw industry to the region, further stimulating the southern economy.  But the 1930s and 
1940s were also decades in which black Southerners increasingly agitated for greater 
rights in terms of jobs and the law.  This activism coupled with federal action “threatened 
to erase or considerably alter the color line in the South,” and it was out of this fear of 
losing their control over southern politics that the Dixiecrat party was born.116   
 While each southern state was unique in its break from the national party, the 
southern abandonment of the national Democratic party would eventually redraw the 
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political lines in the South.  Mississippi was the most forthright in putting race as the 
main political issue, most likely because the state had a majority black population and 
thus had the most to lose to a growing agitation for black political rights.  The majority of 
states used some kind of gendered language to justify their departure from the national 
party.  In the Dixiecrat party’s support of their national candidate for President, Strom 
Thurmond, the focus was on his physical strength and sexual prowess, highlighting his 
masculinity as a key piece of his character.117  For Southerners, Strom Thurmond 
represented a strong white man who could protect the South, and southern women, from 
the threat of black equality.  Thurmond’s candidacy, and the Dixiecrat party platform in 
general, was rooted in white southern cultural identity and an appeal to white Southerners 
committed to maintaining the southern traditions of racial segregation and white 
supremacy.  The Dixiecrat party represented the interconnection between southern 
politics and southern culture.  Although Thurmond did not secure the presidency in 1948, 
the southern split within the Democratic party helped to create a two-party South and 
marked the beginning of the transition of the South from a Democratic to a Republican 
stronghold.  
Crump’s support of the Dixiecrat candidate Strom Thurman for president over 
President Truman and Crump’s handling of the 1948 election demonstrated that, in 
Memphis, southern society and politics were very much interconnected.  According to the 
Shelby County Democratic Executive Committee, an arm of the Crump machine, the 
national Democratic party was trying “to force upon people of Tennessee and the South a 
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deplorable social condition repugnant to our ideas, principles and traditions.”118  For 
Crump and other white southern Democrats, Truman and his civil rights agenda 
represented a direct attack on southern life and southern culture.  The Dixiecrat bolt from 
the Democratic party and its ability to carry four southern states in the national election 
demonstrates how intertwined southern ideas about race and racism were with southern 
politics.  
 In Memphis, Crump’s support of the Dixiecrat ticket in 1948 marked the 
beginning of his decline.  In supporting Thurmond, Crump reinforced in the minds of the 
black advocates for change in the city and white moderates his commitment to white 
supremacy and thus fueled the growing opposition to his political machine.  Like other 
southern states, the Democratic primary in Tennessee amounted to the deciding election 
for political candidates.  Because of the power and reach of the Crump political machine, 
Crump’s candidates had nearly always been guaranteed victory.  But in the 1948 August 
primary, Senatorial candidate Estes Kefauver and gubernatorial candidate Gordon 
Browning ran against the Crump-supported candidates.  Browning ran primarily on an 
anti-Crump, anti- machine corruption platform.  While both Crump’s senatorial candidate 
John Mitchell and Kefauver were against a permanent FEPC and anti-lynching 
legislation, Kefauver leaned further left than most Democratic candidates by being both 
union-friendly and in support of anti-poll tax legislation.  Kefauver’s platform made him 
the natural candidate for unions and black unions specifically.  Kefauver’s open 
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challenge to the Crump machine won him support from a wide variety of Tennesseans, 
from municipal reformers to union organizations, women’s groups, and blacks.119   
Kefauver’s anti-Crump stance quickly gained him the support of several 
prominent black leaders in Memphis.  Rev. James McDaniel, director of the MUL 
campaigned for Kefauver along with former Crump supporter Dr. J.E. Walker, the head 
of the Memphis Democratic Club.  Kefauver, although moderate on issues concerning 
black rights, offered black Memphians a more independent political voice at a moment 
when they found themselves frustrated by the lack of progress their alliance with the 
Crump machine had offered.  McDaniel as the director of the MUL and Walker as the 
head of the Memphis Democratic Club used their organizations  not only to campaign for 
the anti-Crump candidates but also to register black voters.  One black union member 
remembered how “our union was really playing an active role in telling the people what 
they had to do if they wanted to change the conditions of the city — that you must...get 
out the vote.”120  The recent memory of the Freedom Train incident and a growing 
number of highly publicized instances of police brutality all fueled black opposition to 
Crump and the desire for change in Memphis.  
Even though the Crump-backed candidates carried Shelby County, enough black 
votes went against the machine in the primary elections of 1948 to crack Crump’s control 
over black political activity.  Both Kefauver and Browning won the election at the state 
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level and carried three predominately black wards in Memphis, demonstrating a growing 
black political independence in the face of Crump’s continued commitment to a strict 
racial hierarchy.  Long-time Crump supporter and black Republican, Lt. George 
Washington Lee, recalled later that the defeat was “the beginning of the gradual 
deterioration of the great Crump organization.”  The defeat of the Crump ticket solidified 
in the minds of both black Memphians and the Crump machine the power of the black 
electorate in Memphis.  “I[t] was like a new Memphis,” one black unionist remembered.  
“People began to see that they could protest what was happening, and they weren’t 
afraid.”  Although within the confines of a segregated southern legal and social system 
these protests were limited, the political activities of black Memphians in the primary 
election of 1948 demonstrated the increased leverage the black community had gained 
through their political activity.  Crump too recognized this reality and took steps to regain 
control.  Following the elections, Crump replaced James Pleasants as mayor with 
Watkins Overton, the former Memphis mayor who had positive reputation among black 
Memphians.  At the same time, Crump began to listen to black cries for black police 
officers in the city.121   
Many white Southerners, Crump included, perceived the growing racial tensions 
as a threat to the racial order to which they were accustomed.  The increasing racial 
tensions and city officials’ desperation to maintain control over the city’s black citizens 
socially, economically, and politically created an opportunity for black leaders to 
negotiate for greater protections for the city’s black residents.  Part of the increase in 
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racial tensions was the continued harassment, and in some instances outright brutality, of 
blacks by white police officers.  As a letter from the Memphis CIO Council to Mayor 
Pleasant pointed out, “The police are to protect lives and not to take them,” which voiced 
the feeling among Memphis’s working-class blacks, those most susceptible to police 
violence, that the police were not there to protect black Memphians, but rather, 
represented official white control over black citizens.122  It was out of this feeling that a 
growing number within the city’s black community began to call for the hiring of black 
police officers.  
Within the context of a growing black electorate beginning to demonstrate greater 
political independence, Crump could no longer ignore black demands.  Black citizen’s 
call for black police officers was instigated by the continued lack of respect for black 
rights and the increase in instances of police brutality in the years surrounding World 
War II.  The social, political, and economic context created by the war gave black 
Memphians greater leverage.  In order to maintain the system of racial segregation, 
Crump and other city leaders were forced to negotiate with the segments of the black 
community who were growing increasingly vocal about the injustices of this system.  The 
hiring of black police officers worked to both appease black demands for greater 
protection and equality and give city leaders another tool to control a growing black 
population.  In October of 1948, when police commissioner Boyle announced the hiring 
of black police officers, he made sure to put the decision in context by acknowledging the 
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growing black population and all the city had done for black Memphians, such as the 
opening of parks, schools, and more housing.123  The hiring of black officers would serve 
as a way to curb racial tensions and reduce crime in the black neighborhoods.  These men 
were the answer to a building crisis in Memphis over the changing racial boundaries of a 
growing city.  Crump, the mayor, and police commissioner Boyle saw having black 
officers patrolling black neighborhoods as a way to maintain control over the city’s black 
population.  By giving in to the black citizens’ demands for black officers, the Crump 
political machine could again leverage black votes for the upcoming election, while also 
using black men to maintain order in black neighborhoods.  As Memphis’s white 
community became increasingly vigilant in their efforts to maintain the system of racial 
segregation, black Memphians worked to find ways to both protect themselves and 
solidify their right to a place in the city. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROTECTING BLACK BODIES:  
POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE MECHANISMS FOR CONTROL 
 
 
 On the hot and muggy afternoon of August 3, 1947, Adelaide Hudson, her sister, 
and three friends lounged in the living room of Hudson’s home in the Foote Homes 
Housing development in Memphis’s Binghampton neighborhood.  Trying to beat the 
Memphis heat, Hudson wore nothing but shorts with a halter and brassiere.  Without 
warning, two Memphis police officers stormed into the house.  The officers demanded to 
know the whereabouts of Hudson’s nephew and the air rifle the parents of a 
neighborhood girl had accused him of firing at her.  When Hudson responded that her 
nephew had gone out swimming, one of the officers, a Patrolman W.L. Williams, barked, 
“Can’t you say ‘yes sir’ and ‘no sir’ to white people?” 
“I am sorry, sir,” Hudson replied.  
But Patrolman Williams continued to berate Hudson, “You try to be one of those 
smart goddamn northern niggers, I’ll knock your goddamn teeth down your throat and 
don’t think I won’t.”  Williams then declared Hudson under arrest.  
 As Hudson made her way upstairs to put on more clothing, the officers found the 
air rifle.  “This is dangerous, will put somebody’s eye out.” 
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 “I told him to be careful.…Usually when the children do anything around here the 
families are called and the matter is adjusted,” Hudson responded.124  
“They are not supposed to call you, you are not the law,” Patrolman Williams 
declared, slapping Hudson in the face.  Williams then grabbed Hudson and dragged her 
from the house.   
According to eyewitnesses, the officer continued to beat Hudson in the yard in 
front of the house for nearly ten minutes.  All the while, the neighbors stood looking on 
and crying.  Some of them likely knew that Hudson was pregnant. 
Finally, the officers put Hudson into the patrol car and carried her to the station.  
From here she was immediately sent to John Gaston Hospital.  Upon her release, Hudson 
appeared in city court, where she was fined $102 for resisting arrest and disorderly 
conduct.  
Hudson gave her account of the beating to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) legal department three days after the incident.  
In her testimony Hudson claimed that she did not resist the officer but only tried to 
protect herself.  Hudson even told Williams she was pregnant, to which he had 
responded, “that he didn’t care if I had had ten bitches” and continued to strike her in the 
side and stomach.  Officer Williams mocked the neighborhood women who looked on 
crying, saying, “Cry all you black sons of bitches, I wish one of you would say 
something, I would shoot you down like god damn rabbits.”  Essentially Williams dared 
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the members of this all-black housing development to challenge the authority of the white 
police officers who had stormed into their neighborhood.  As Hudson described it, the 
beating resulted from Williams’s need to assert his authority.  Beating Hudson in public 
was his response to what he perceived as a lack of respect for that authority.  “We will 
take you down here and beat you until you learn to say yes sir and no sir to white 
people,” Hudson recalled Williams telling her as he put her in the squad car. 
Memphis Police Chief Carroll Seabrook reiterated the perceived lack of respect 
for authority in his statement about the events surroundings Hudson’s beating.  “It was 
simply the case of a smart aleck from up North,” Chief Seabrook noted as he denied that 
the officers mistreated Hudson in any way.  According to the police account, Hudson had 
thrown the discovered air rifle on the floor and refused to answer any of the officer’s 
questions because she said she was from Detroit and “it was none of our business.”125  In 
the eyes of the Memphis Police Department, Hudson had not only disrespected the 
officers but also challenged the southern system of white supremacy.  As an outsider now 
living in the city, Hudson had to be taught how to show the kind of deference to white 
authorities that was expected of black people living in Memphis. 
The perception of Adelaide Hudson as a “smart aleck from up North” was less 
about the reality of Hudson’s experiences or attitude and more about the anxiety of white 
Southerners, like Seabrook and Williams, over the changing demographics of Memphis’s 
black community, as more and more black Americans migrated to the city to take 
advantage of wartime industries.  In fact, Hudson, was not an outsider or a Northerner.  
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The twenty-three-year-old had been born in Moscow, Tennessee, and moved to Memphis 
at age three or four.  She moved to Detroit at age nineteen, four years before the incident 
with the police.  When her sister died in the summer of 1946 leaving five children, 
Hudson had returned to Memphis to care for the children.126  
Hudson’s case was one of many cases of police brutality against blacks in 
Memphis during the latter part of the 1940s.  Just the week before, Cornell Thorton was 
shot in the back and killed by police.  Officers shot Thorton as they pursued him in 
connection with a stolen car.  However, it was never confirmed that he had been involved 
with the theft.127  Tensions were building in the city as white residents became 
increasingly anxious about black migration.  These tensions, as evidenced by both 
Hudson’s and Seabrook’s accounts, were particularly felt in the interactions between 
black residents and white police officers.  Out of this anxiety came an increased effort to 
assert white authority over blacks living in the city and to reinforce the social system of 
black deference.  White Memphians were accustomed to and expected black deference, 
and the Memphis Police Department was their chief enforcer.  
 Despite the attempts of white authorities to maintain southern social norms in the 
face of a changing city, black Memphians bore witness to and testified against the brutal 
treatment of one of their own.  Over the course of the late 1940s, publicity of police 
brutality increased, Hudson’s neighbors and others within the city’s larger black 
community became increasingly more vocal about the injustices of police violence.  
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Although threatened with harm if they interfered at the time of the beating, Hudson’s 
neighbors testified on her behalf in court after the fact.  However, the officers involved in 
Hudson’s beating continued to go unpunished.  A number of black citizens, including the 
editor of Memphis’s black newspaper, the Memphis World, asked questions about the 
necessity of the amount of force being used by the police against black Memphians and 
pointed out disparities in police behavior when dealing with blacks.128   
As black outrage over police brutality grew, newsman L.O. Swinger, local 
ministers alliances, and civic groups reignited a call for black police officers.  By 1947, 
stories of southern cities hiring black police officers began to appear with more frequency 
in the Memphis newspapers.  “Georgia Police Do Excellent Job,” “Sentiment Mount For 
Negro Police,” and “Appoints First Race Policeman” headlined news articles that 
outlined the success of other southern cities’ efforts to include black officers on their 
police forces, fueling interest in Memphis doing the same.  Reports declared, “Top-
ranking civic leaders and agencies have cited the role of Negro policemen in crime 
prevention as well as applauding the role they have played in alleviating racial tensions.”  
Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, in his study of American race relations in the 1940s, 
commented that black officers lowered crime rates in the black community, and they did 
not have to use as much force because they “know their way around the community” and 
were “personally respected.”  These articles and reports argued that the presence of black 
police officers in southern departments alleviated several issues facing southern cities in 
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the 1940s.  Black police officers eased racial tensions caused by white officers’ 
interactions with the black residents and reduced black crime.129 
  In Memphis, black ministers, black college students, and the editor of the black 
newspaper united with working-class black Memphians to push for black police officers.  
This call for black officers reemerged out of the outrage many working-class blacks felt 
over the alarming number of instances of overt police brutality against residents in black 
working-class neighborhoods in the late 1940s.  The driving purpose of this effort was to 
find a way to protect black neighborhoods from what black residents saw as a violent, 
unchecked white police force with little regard for black life or rights.  The violence 
against black Memphians was born out of white anxiety over a growing black population 
increasingly unwilling to abide by the traditional southern system of racial segregation 
and white dominance.  As white authorities used violence to try to maintain control over 
the city’s black population, black Memphians worked to find new ways to protect 
themselves and win justice for their fellow black citizens.  
This chapter examines several cases of police brutality and their impact on the 
differing elements of Memphis’s black community.  In all four cases of police brutality 
examined in this chapter, including Hudson’s case, the victims of police brutality were 
working-class blacks.  However, even as white police were a more physical threat to 
working-class blacks, the white supremacist ideology reflected in the accounts of these 
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incidents demonstrated an overt disrespect for black life and black rights that brought into 
question the safety of all black Memphians regardless of their position in the community.  
As black Memphians, from those living in working-class neighborhoods to the black 
economic and political elite, reacted to these cases and began to demand change, tensions 
developed among these varying groups over how to best resolve the problem of police 
brutality.  These tensions were intertwined with expectations of traditional leadership, 
notions of black manhood, and a growing demand for equal justice for black citizens.   
The city of Memphis was changing and the social, economic, and political tactics 
the Crump machine, city employees, and the police had employed to control the city’s 
black population were no longer sufficient.  The Memphis Police Department and these 
cases of police brutality became symbols of continued black inequality, disrespect of 
black lives, and rights.  The persistence of police brutality and the punishment of black 
victims by the legal system demonstrated for many average black Memphians the 
traditional black leadership’s (those black men associated with Crump) failure to protect 
the entirety of Memphis’s black community.  By the fall of 1948, these tensions had led 
to a call for greater protection that would quickly become a call for black police officers.  
Black ministers, students, civic organizations, and the black media led this effort, as they 
searched for ways to protect their families and communities from the degradation of 
police brutality.  
White Police and the Black Community: A History of Brutality 
The beating of the pregnant Adelaide Hudson and other acts of police brutality 
against black women during this period were part of a larger history of white men 
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dominating the black female body.  While the physical acts of sexual dominance were 
perpetuated against black women, these acts of sexual violence were implicitly an act of 
dominance over black men.  Scholars have traced white supremacy’s reliance on sexual 
domination back to the system of slavery.  Enslavement put control of black women’s 
physical bodies in the hands of white men.  As slaves, women’s bodies literally belonged 
to their master.  A master’s property rights perpetuated a culture of raping black women 
that further reinforced ownership of women’s bodies, as any child born of a slave woman 
became a slave to the mother’s master.  This system also denied black men “both the 
ability to protect black women and any other claims of conventional notions of 
masculinity.”130  Thus, sexual domination of black women and suppression of black 
masculinity became intertwined with notions of white superiority.  
The interconnection between sexual and racial domination carried over into the 
twentieth century and the Jim Crow era.  Even without the legal right to domination that 
came with slavery, white men and women continued to use sex and the language of sex to 
reinforce white masculinity and emasculate black men.  Almost immediately after losing 
their legal right to dominate the black body in slavery, white Southerners turned to 
violence to reinforce their dominance.  As discussed earlier, the perceived threat that 
black soldiers posed to white supremacy in the Deep South city of Memphis instigated 
the riot in 1866.  The white men perpetuating the violence focused their atrocities on 
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soldiers and their families, raping women with direct ties to the army.  These acts of 
sexual violence also worked to reinforce white male power by essentially stripping away 
both black women’s control over their bodies and the black soldier’s ability to protect his 
wife and family, particularly his ability to protect the sexuality of the women in the 
family, a pillar of traditional manhood. 131   
Even as white men were emasculating black men by attacking black women and 
families, the idea of protecting white womanhood and the white family became the 
central argument behind white supremacy in the early part of the twentieth century.  
Memphian and early twentieth century black activist Ida B. Wells spoke out against the 
rape of black women, emphasizing the hypocrisy of white men’s own definition of 
masculinity, which glorified chivalry and the protection of white womanhood, while also 
allowing for the violation of black women.  While Wells’s primary goal was to campaign 
against the rampant use of the vigilante terror tactic of lynching by white men against 
primarily black men, her discussion of rape emphasized the link between white 
supremacy and sexual violence.  Even as white men were claiming chivalry when they 
lynched black men accused of rape, white men who raped black women and girls went 
unpunished.132   
Ida B. Wells argued that real men valued all womanhood, not just the women of 
their own race.  But it was difficult to convince Americans, especially white Southerners, 
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of this idea at that moment in history.  Attitudes such as, “It is not the same thing for a 
white man to assault a colored woman as for a colored man to assault a white woman, 
because the colored woman had no finer feelings nor virtue to be outraged!” prevailed. 133  
This argument, articulated in a leading South Carolina journal of the late nineteenth 
century, exemplified prevailing assumptions about black inferiority and the conceptions 
of black female sexuality these attitudes fostered.  The author negated black women’s 
femininity while reinforcing her sexual objectivity.  This statement argued that a black 
woman was less of a woman because she lacked feminine virtue.  A black woman was a 
sexual object but not a sexual being.  A white woman had emotions and virtues that 
needed to be protected.  But because black women did not have these same female traits, 
they were not entitled to the same protections.  
Thus, rape was intimately intertwined with racial violence and intimidation in the 
years following slavery.  White men used rape and accusations of rape as the primary 
excuse for lynching black men.  The rape of white women and the image of the black 
rapist were used to justify lynching black men.  Lynching was the physical acting out of 
white manhood.  Lynching was imagined as the primary tool in white men’s protection of 
white womanhood.  It became a way to reinforce white superiority and dominance over 
the black community primarily through the threat of violence.134  
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White women also used the language of sex to justify white supremacy.  Even 
though the women’s rights advocate Rebecca Latimer Felton would argue that “the 
sexual exploitation of black women and girls not only revealed a violent disregard for 
black womanhood but also exposed a profound disrespect for white womanhood and the 
supremacy of the race,” her argument was rooted in an attempt to bolster white 
supremacy through an appeal to protection of the sanctity of white womanhood.135  Felton 
and other female white supremacists made the argument that any interracial sexual 
relations violated the laws of white superiority by denigrating the purity of white sexual 
behavior and potentially the white race through pregnancy.  White women’s arguments 
against the rape of black women and girls were an attempt to control white men’s sexual 
behavior.  In the early twentieth century, white women co-opted the language of sexuality 
and sexual violence to bolster their own racial superiority, which further entrenched the 
connection between sex and white supremacy in the white mind.136 
The tensions over the connections between race and sex persisted well into the 
mid-twentieth century.  According to sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s 1941 study of 
American race relations, sex was “the principle around which the whole structure of 
segregation…[was] organized.”  Eruptions of racial violence throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century can often be traced back to instances of or rumors of inappropriate 
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interracial sexual behavior.  In June of 1943, hundreds of black men took to the streets of 
Detroit to protect black womanhood.  The violence erupted after rumors spread that a 
white Southerner had thrown a black mother and her baby off of the popular beachfront 
Bell Isle Bridge.  After three days of rioting, thirty-four people were dead and millions of 
dollars worth of property was damaged.137  Detroit and other similar riots that began with 
rumors of the mistreatment of black women demonstrated the frustration building within 
black communities over the lack of respect for black womanhood, and more important, 
the continued subordination of blacks to white authority.  
Several years before Adelaide Hudson was dragged from her home, another case 
of police brutality in Memphis reinforced the system of white domination of black 
bodies, particularly black female bodies, and caused an uproar among working-class 
blacks who quickly gained support from local ministers and union leaders.  In the late 
summer of 1945, two white police officers raped two young black women as they made 
their way home in the middle of the night from their job as waitresses.  This case created 
a wedge between traditional black leaders of the business and political elite and those 
black working-class Memphians fed up with the token concessions and 
accommodationism that defined the relationship between men like George Washington 
Lee and Joseph E. Walker and Crump, who embodied the city’s power structure.  The 
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failure of these traditional black leaders to live up to the expectations that they would use 
their political connections to protect and bring justice to the working-class black women 
of the city led many black Memphians to question this black elite and their commitment 
to the city’s black citizens.  These concerns not only questioned elites’ roles as 
community leaders but also their manhood.  
 According to the young women’s statements to the NAACP, the officers picked 
them up in front of the café on Popular Avenue where they had just gotten off of work.  
“Mr. Police, I thought you didn’t pick up girls that were working?” one of the young 
women asked, alluding to the idea that their jobs should have demonstrated that they 
were law-abiding, respectable young women, not the kind of women who dealt in illicit 
activities that warranted police action.  “How do we know you ain’t loafing…we had to 
get this month’s number somehow, just as well start with you two.  We are going to fill 
this car up with girls,” the officer responded.138 
 The officers taunted the young women as they drove through town.  “What are 
you sitting so close together for?  You can’t fuck one another.”  The lewd remarks and 
questions about the women’s sexual past continued as the officers drove for an hour.  The 
officers did not take the women to headquarters nor did they pick up any more women.  
They drove to an empty field on the edge of town.  The officers made the young women 
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get out of the car and each of them forced themselves on one of the young women.  When 
they were finished, the officers drove the young women home and dropped them off.139  
 Upon hearing what had happened from their daughters, the young women’s 
mothers went to the café owner, who accompanied the women to the police station.  The 
two victims were taken into a room away from their mothers to be questioned by Police 
Chief Seabrook.  After he took the young women’s statements he allowed them the 
opportunity to identify the officers who had picked them up.  However, he warned them 
that if they were to identify the wrong men, they would be sent to the workhouse.  The 
young women did not positively identify the two officers at the police station.  As one of 
them noted later, “I was scared to say at Police Station they were same men.”  The police 
then kept the young women in custody over the weekend.  When they were finally 
released, one of the young women’s mothers was told by the police to take her daughter 
home and talk to no one about what had happened.  The other young woman was sent to 
West Tennessee Medical Center, where she was quarantined for eleven days and received 
shots of penicillin, presumably to prevent contracting a sexually transmitted disease.140  
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 Within two weeks, the NAACP was involved.  Although the officers were 
dismissed from the force a few days after the incident, following the discovery of 
physical evidence that corroborated the young women’s story, no charges were brought 
against them.  In a letter to the Memphis NAACP branch president, U.B. Phillips, Roy 
Wilkins, president of the NAACP, wrote, “Personally I feel that despite the ‘terror’ in 
Memphis, our association should do everything possible to see that these men are brought 
up on charges and convicted.”  Wilkins urged Phillips not to be intimidated by the power 
of the Crump machine and to use the resources and power of the national NAACP to 
support an effort to get justice for these young women.  Phillips responded by hiring 
Memphis attorney Drury Crawley to investigate the women’s charges against the 
officers.141  
 Crawley’s investigation, combined with petitions from black civic groups, put 
enough pressure on the city that charges of “criminal attack” against the two men were 
finally considered by a grand jury on August 28, 1945.  That the grand jury decided to 
bring charges against the two white officers was a significant acknowledgement of the 
city’s black citizens’ right to seek justice.  And, initially, black Memphians saw the trial 
as an advancement towards equal justice in a white supremacist legal system.  Police 
officers standing trial for a crime against a black person, especially the crime of 
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“violating the honor and person of a Negro woman,” was a rare occurrence.142  The idea 
that the state would use its powers to prosecute white citizens for crimes against blacks 
seemed like a significant evolution in black citizens’ struggle for equal justice.  Thus, at 
first, black Memphians saw the indictment of the two former police officers as a success.  
The trial, however, proved to be a disappointment.  After months of delays, the trial 
finally began in January of 1946 but was quickly concluded with the acquittal of the two 
officers.  
Just a year before the rape of the two young women in Memphis, another young 
woman, Recy Taylor, was raped in Abbeville, Alabama, drawing national attention to the 
lack of justice for black women in the South.  Upon hearing about the case, the NAACP 
asked a young investigator, Rosa Parks, to determine what had happened to Taylor.  
However, Alabama justice continued to be “blind, deaf, and mute,” as the New York 
Daily Worker reporter Eugene Gordon put it.  Gordon went on to highlight the hypocrisy 
of the white southern press that had “played up the rape of the unnamed wife of a white 
soldier in Florida” while remaining mute about the gang rape of Recy Taylor.  The 
attention that interracial advocacy groups for justice such as the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), the National Council of Negro Woman, the YWCA, and the 
NAACP brought to the Recy Taylor case forced the Alabama governor to take action and 
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launch an investigation.  However, persisting attitudes of white supremacy ruled the day, 
and although the perpetrators were finally charged, an all white jury acquitted them all.143  
Recy Taylor and the two young women from Memphis were just three of many 
women who were physically assaulted by white men, especially during the years 
surrounding World War II.  These stories and events had what historian Danielle 
McGuire describes as “symbolic power and political potency.”144  They symbolized 
generations of abuse and degradation of black womanhood, the inability of black men to 
protect black women, and the continuation of white male supremacy.  Their political 
potency came from white men’s attempts to use their cultural and social superiority to 
maintain control over the political sphere.  These events also spurred on the rising tide of 
black political action.  Black Americans used their increased political power, gained 
through increased political activity, to try to obtain equal justice for their local 
communities and black women specifically.  Political action in the form of calls for equal 
justice offered a way for black men to try to protect black women.   
As cases of white men’s sexual violence against black women continued to go 
unpunished, black men and women began to make louder and more aggressive calls for 
protection and equal justice.  Even though neither Taylor nor the young women from 
Memphis saw justice done, the mere fact that their cases were brought to trial 
demonstrated that white officials could not ignore black voices when raised loud enough.  
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While those women willing to speak out and the trials themselves brought “attention to 
the issue of sexual violence and often ignited local campaigns for equal justice and civil 
rights,” the failure of the courts and continued intimidation represented the obstacles 
facing blacks seeking more equal justice.145 The primary obstacle being the continuation 
of a white supremacist ideology that devalued black bodies and the right to protection, 
both physical and judicial.  
The black women survivors of rape by white men in the 1940s who had the 
courage to speak out were able to use their voices as weapons against white supremacy.  
But while Recy Taylor’s story “inspire[d] a nationwide campaign to defend black 
womanhood,” in Memphis the rape of the two young women and the campaign for justice 
it inspired became less about black womanhood and more about black manhood.  The 
demographic and economic changes the war brought to Memphis, blacks’ increased 
political activism, and black Memphian’s continued frustrations with the lack of justice 
brought to the forefront tensions within Memphis’s larger black community.  These 
tensions focused on the failure of traditional black leaders’ ability to protect black 
citizen’s rights to justice and protection of their physical bodies.  
In the mid 1930s, Robert R. Church Jr.’s connection to Crump saved him from 
police harassment.  After being arrested for reckless driving, Church reportedly declared 
himself “as good as” the arresting officer.  But rather than being beaten, Church was 
released and charges were dropped.  At the time, Church was in good standing with 
Crump.  Church and his political organizing efforts among black Memphians was crucial 
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to Crump’s political success and in return Crump “made a point of being friendly with 
Bob Church and his associates.”  The relationship between Crump and Church would 
deteriorate by the end of the decade when Church organized against Crump’s political 
candidates.  However, this episode demonstrated that connection to the Crump machine 
could be translated into physical protection, even for a black man who reportedly 
disrespected a white police officer.146  
In the aftermath of the 1945 rape case, black Memphians were outraged at what 
they saw as the failure of the justice system and the failure of the city’s traditional black 
leadership to protect all black citizens.  Many black Memphians expected that the black 
elites’ long standing political connections with the white leadership of the city would 
have resulted in some justice for the young women and black citizens more broadly.  The 
city’s claims that it offered blacks benefits and opportunities while allowing young black 
women to be “bestially outraged” by white police officers highlighted the hypocrisy of 
Crump’s paternalism.147   
When traditional black elites failed, black religious and civic organizations along 
with the black media criticized black elites’ standing as black men and thus their ability 
to stand as community leaders.  One editorial in the Memphis World denounced “an 
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apparently totally demoralized, disorganized, program-less, fearful, ‘back-gate’ talking, 
‘front-gate’ whispering, bewildered and supine Negro leadership.”  Calling leaders 
demoralized and supine suggested that black leaders were simply pawns of the white 
leadership.  Declaring the black elite disorganized and program-less suggested that their 
connection to the Crump machine had caused them to lose sight of what was best for the 
black community as a whole.  This editorial challenged not only black elites’ ability to 
protect black citizens but also the system of racial accommodation that had developed in 
Memphis during the twentieth century.148 
Further editorials called on black leaders to “be men” and do something to help 
defend the city’s middle and working-class blacks.  The mass of black Memphians were 
frustrated with what appeared to be the city’s black elites’ unwillingness to challenge 
white leaders.  As was said of the Crump appointed principle of the black Booker T. 
Washington high school, Blair T. Hunt, he was “nothing more than an errand boy.”  
Many among the city’s black residents saw this unwillingness as traditional black leaders 
subordinating themselves to the white leadership, which negated their power as men and 
as black men specifically.149  
The church-based organization, Deacons and Trustees Union, issued a statement 
declaring that it would work to “make Memphis safe” and that “the Deacons and Trustees 
Union faces this challenge like men.”  The members of the Union declared their manhood 
                                                
148 Ibid; and Edward Smith, “Writer Stressed Need to Consider State of the City for Negroes,” Memphis 
World, August 10, 1945. 
149 Tucker, 145.   
 119 
through their role as both the physical and moral protectors of the community.  The 
“supine” leadership’s association with the Crump political machine had emasculated 
them by limiting their ability to “be men” and call for greater protection for their fellow 
black Memphians.150  In a letter to Thurgood Marshall at the NAACP, one local minister 
associated with the organization defended leaders inaction, “I need not tell you that in 
this City most of our influential persons hands are tied.”  The letter seemed to call on the 
national office of the NAACP to take a more active stance in the city as its local leaders, 
men like U.B. Phillips, president of the Memphis branch, were “being criticized and 
unless something is done through this organization, it will be a hard matter to influence 
members to join again.”  Thus, it would be up to other groups to come forward to lead.  
As the outcry continued, more civic and church based groups joined together to pass 
resolutions denouncing police action.151   
Black civic clubs had been active in civic affairs since before the 1930s.  
Organized by neighborhood, these clubs focused most often on specific neighborhood 
improvements, although they also conducted voter registration drives.  Thus, by the mid 
1940s, these clubs already had the organizational capacity to, along with ministerial 
alliances, begin collecting of fund to hire local lawyers to investigate the rape case.  In 
1945 and early 1946, in the wake of the rape case, black ministers and black 
neighborhood civic organizations posed a challenge to traditional black leadership in 
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Memphis as they responded to the immediate circumstances by advocating for black 
advancement on their own terms.152  
In her study of Durham, North Carolina, another southern city in which there was 
a prominent and successful black political and business elite, Christina Greene found that 
the black elite negotiated with white leaders behind the scenes in order to secure gains for 
Durham’s black citizens.  This type of action was also true of Memphis’s black business 
and political elite.  However, this white generosity came with an “element of social 
control,” in which white cooperation was dependent on continued racial peace and 
compliance to the system of segregation and white superiority.  In other words, blacks 
were able to acquire limited benefits as long as they did not challenge the racial status 
quo.  But at moments when racial justice and the system of white supremacy came head 
to head, such as in the 1945 rape case, black elites faced scrutiny from the larger black 
community if these efforts to negotiate with white leaders did not seem to be working in 
the best interest of the city’s black population as a whole.  Thus, the criticism of 
Memphis’s black elite in 1945 referring to them as “back-gate talking” and “front-page 
whispering,” associating them with the corruption of the political machine, not with 
broader black community uplift.153  
As black leaders continued to be unwilling to openly defy the Crump political 
machine, black ministers’ criticism began to remold a definition of black manhood to 
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better reflect the black working-class desire for a strong leadership focused on protecting 
black citizens and standing up to Crump.  In 1946 when A. Phillip Randolph was in 
Memphis for a labor conference, the minister of Beale Avenue Baptist Church made 
reference to the lack of solid male leadership in Memphis when he told Randolph that 
“you are a man…in a man’s position, and perform a man-sized job.  I wish to heaven we 
had just a few men like you in Memphis.”  Randolph, as a powerful public figure, used 
his political sway to negotiate on behalf of black Americans and black workers to better 
their position in society.  Randolph had time and again proved his willingness to stand up 
against white political leaders.154  For black Memphians, Randolph and the kind of man 
he represented stood in stark contrast to the city’s traditional black leaders associated 
with the Crump Machine.  
The majority of black Memphians were coming to expect more out of the men in 
their communities and especially those in leadership positions.  For church and civic 
groups, expressions of manhood were rooted in the concept of black community 
protection and black community advancement.  News editorials venerated labor leaders 
for doing “a man-sized job,” while also writing of the “creeping moral paralysis” of 
Memphis’s traditional black leadership.  These criticisms offered an alternative 
expression of manliness for Memphis blacks.  Manhood was expressed through moral 
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leadership and action that was rooted in a commitment to black uplift and economic and 
political justice for black Memphians.155    
While the rape case of 1945 brought into the public consciousness black women’s 
particular vulnerability and the implications that had on black manhood, it was only one 
of many cases of southern police brutality during the second half of the 1940s.  After the 
war ended, many black veterans returned to the South expecting changes in the racial 
social order, while some returning white veterans expected the racial order to remain 
intact after the war.  These varying expectations resulted in violent clashes.  As discussed 
before, these clashes often took place in the now more crowded public spaces where the 
color line was much more difficult to control.  News of violent clashes between veterans 
and white police poured in from across the South.  The fact that southern policemen’s 
function was to control blacks rather than protect them became increasingly obvious in 
the years following World War II as clashes between white police and black citizens, 
particularly black veterans, increased.   
The war experience abroad and on the home front had changed black attitudes.  
Throughout the war, black servicemen and women had demonstrated their loyalty to the 
nation through their service.  Black Americans on the home front and at war tried to use 
the country’s war aims of freedom and democracy to “illustrate their country’s 
hypocrisy” in fighting a war for goals it did not live up to at home.  After the war had 
concluded, across the country, black activists continued to push for black rights.  In early 
1946, the student newspaper at LeMoyne College, The LeMoyne Democrat, ran a series 
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of articles calling for greater student involvement in “combat[ing] prejudice and bigotry 
in every way we possible can.”  In one editorial, the writer used the image of a dead black 
Union soldier who had come back from beyond the grave to remind black students “that 
southern reactionaries expect to continue the Jim Crow ideal.”  Using the image of a dead 
black soldier, who could have come from any of the wars in American history, these 
students were reminding their readers that participation in the military did not guarantee 
the rights of citizenship, the fight for democracy continued even as the war was over.  
The student writer called on students, many of whom were veterans, to take on a larger 
role in leading the struggle for black equality.  “As a segment of the intelligentsia of 
Memphis, we owe it to ourselves and our community.”156  Through The LeMoyne 
Democrat, the voices of the student editors calling for their fellow students to take part in 
action for change echoed the sentiments of other black religious and civic organizations 
speaking out and advocating for action by those black citizens not traditionally associated 
with black leadership in Memphis.  
The national rhetoric of freedom and democracy, the experience of serving in the 
military to protect their country, and greater economic opportunity for those at home had 
all led to a greater sense of what Gail O’Brien terms “entitlement and personal efficacy” 
among black Americans.  In January of 1946, two white Memphis police officers had 
been beaten up after harassing four black veterans.  The four veterans along with several 
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other bystanders who entered the fray were all subsequently arrested.  A young veteran 
writing to the newspaper acknowledged that white authorities had all the power in these 
situations, but he also warned that younger blacks in Memphis would speak out against 
the beatings and being “taken for a ride,” in other words being treated unfairly.157  This 
episode was a warning that the younger generation of black Memphians returning from 
the war would stand up for themselves in the face of discrimination, a sentiment repeated 
by the LeMoyne College students.  
Just one month after the episode involving black veterans and Memphis police, 
black veterans clashed with local police and the highway patrol in Columbia, Tennessee, 
in what official investigators called the Columbia Race Riot.  This case, which received 
national attention, highlighted the growing postwar racial tensions in the South.  The 
clash between Columbia’s black residents and city’s white police officers and Highway 
Patrol demonstrated both the increase in black self-determination and white vigilance to 
maintain the racial status quo.158  
After an altercation between a white and black veteran outside a downtown 
department store, armed civilians gathered in the streets of Columbia.  A group of armed 
white civilians, mostly young veterans, gathered in the main square, at the same time, 
blacks armed themselves and gathered in the black area of town known as the Bottom.  
While the local sheriff attempted to disperse the armed white mob, black men armed 
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themselves and posted up around the black business district, guarding their neighborhood 
overnight.  In an effort to protect themselves and their community these men fired on four 
white officers who attempted to enter the area.  At dawn, the Highway Patrol raided the 
Bottom.  By the end of the raid, one hundred men, most of whom were black, had been 
arrested and the majority of black businesses in the town had been ransacked.159 
As blacks demonstrated a growing sense of self-esteem and entitlement in the 
postwar years, white police officers acted as the front line of a white community 
desperate to maintain the status quo.  What happened in Columbia was a police raid, not a 
race riot.  In the aftermath, all law enforcement officers were exonerated.  A grand jury 
deemed their actions “not unreasonable.”  However, twenty-five black Columbians were 
tried for murder.  Only two were convicted.  Several of the men who stood trial were 
prominent black business-owners whose places of business had been ransacked by the 
Highway Patrolmen.  These officers made no distinctions between the elements of 
Columbia’s black community as they rampaged.  The officers saw all black Columbians 
as criminal and in need of subduing.  As in cases in Memphis, the root of white officers’ 
aggression towards the black citizens was the perceived lack of respect blacks had for 
white authority.  The testimony given by one officer in the trial emphasized that for him 
“the biggest thing” was the way that black citizens showed “disrespect.”  When pressed 
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by the attorney, he continued that “they were using a loud tone and [speaking] the way a 
‘nigger’ wouldn’t be talking to a white man.”160  This testimony demonstrated a sense that 
white Southerners felt they were losing control of changing as the country’s racial 
attitudes shifted in the wake of World War II.   
Protecting Black Bodies: Memphis Police Brutality in 1948 
The stories of the black servicemen beating on white police officers and the black 
Columbians’ attempts to protect their community through armed resistance demonstrate a 
growing pushback from within black communities against white police brutality.  
However, these episodes also demonstrate that white officials backed by a racist judiciary 
system continued to hold the power.  In Memphis, the city’s black residents continued to 
be victimized by white police officers.  As these incidents became more publicized in the 
years following the war, frustration over the continued lack of justice in their city caused 
some black Memphians to become more overt in their pushback against white authority.  
Black Memphian Eli Blaine was beaten by police when he tried to stand up and protest 
officers’ attempts to “take him for a ride” and ultimately lost his right eye.  Just two years 
after the rape case, the case of Eli Blaine fueled the call for justice for blacks in the face 
of police violence.161  
In the eight months between the Adelaide Hudson case and the Eli Blaine case, 
the Memphis Police Department had begun to change, as it faced growing public 
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scrutiny.  Increasingly vocal black criticism of Memphis officials focused on the 
mounting number of police brutality incidents and the lack of justice for black victims.  
These cases and the black response heightened racial tension and black resistance to 
white authority.  The case of Eli Blaine and police officials’ response to it demonstrated a 
more conscientious administration within the Memphis Police Department, one becoming 
more aware of the need to be perceived as equal and just in order to maintain racial peace 
and the system of racial segregation, even as patrolmen continued to abuse black citizens.  
 In the early hours of Sunday May 16, 1948, two white beat cops responded to a 
disturbance call at the apartment of Eli Blaine.  After the officers left without making any 
arrests or facing any kind of resistance, Blaine realized that he was missing ten dollars.  
Blaine, an employee at the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, reported the incident to 
his boss, a white man, who encouraged Blaine to make a report with the police at the 
station.  After Blaine recounted his story to the beat cops’ superior officer, the officers 
who had made the call to his apartment were called in.  Upon hearing Blaine’s 
accusation, one of the officers punched Blaine in the face, causing a gash above Blaine’s 
left eye.162 
The superior officer ordered this same officer and the other accused officer to take 
Blaine to the hospital.  However, when Blaine arrived at the hospital, he was so badly 
injured that he was immediately sent to surgery to have his right eye removed.  Upon 
questioning by their superior about how Blaine received the extensive wounds between 
the police station and the hospital, the officers claimed that Blaine had attempted to 
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escape from the moving vehicle, and his new injuries were from his fall out of the 
vehicle.  Doctors later testified that a blunt object caused the beating, not a fall. 163 
As in the cases of police brutality before, there was evidence of a blatant 
disregard for black humanity in the Blaine case.  The fact that the officer hit Blaine at the 
police station demonstrates that there was no question in the officer’s mind regarding 
how to properly handle a black accuser.  As Blaine recounted later, the officer even told 
him on the way to the hospital, “I ought to kill you.”164  In the officer’s mind, Blaine, as a 
black man, was worthless.  Blaine’s body was not his own but subject to the whims of 
white police officers.   
In subsequent reports of the Blaine incident by police and in the newspaper, 
Blaine was further relegated to a subordinate position.  Several articles referred to Blaine 
as “the prisoner.”  However, Blaine was never a prisoner.  He was never put under arrest.  
He had gone to the police station of his own accord in order to bring a complaint against 
an officer.  It was as if the newspapers had no other word to describe a black man in the 
care of the police.  As in the other cases involving blacks interacting with the police, 
black bodies were to be beaten, and if need be, arrested without regard to proper cause.  
Referring to Blaine as “the prisoner” bestowed on Blaine undo association with 
criminality.  Blaine as a prisoner struck by police reoriented the primary conflict of the 
story from Blaine as an innocent citizen seeking justice to another black criminal 
manhandled by police.  Because of these descriptions, the incident became less about the 
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unjust blatant police brutality and more about how police handled criminals in their care, 
thus removing an element of Blaine’s victimization in the situation.165  
The public outrage generated by this case was very similar to the outrage over the 
rape of the two young women and the beating of Adelaide Hudson.  In July of 1948, the 
Memphis World ran an editorial titled, “The Tragic Case of Eli Blaine,” accompanied by 
a photo of Blaine’s beaten and bandaged face.  This image of Blaine was a visual 
reminder of the danger of being black in Memphis.  The editorial referenced several other 
cases of police brutality, including the 1945 rape case, in order to emphasize the 
continued lack of justice for Memphis’s black citizens:  “Blaine had forgotten the color of 
his skin when he sought justice of white police officers.”  The editorial implied that 
Blaine was beaten simply because he was black in a city in which being black was always 
“criminal,” a fact emphasized by the use of the term “prisoner” by the white newspapers 
when referring to Blaine and his case.166  The “tragedy” of Blaine’s case was that blacks 
in Memphis lived under an unjust, racially discriminatory justice system, in which white 
officers had gone unchecked in their treatment of blacks.  The beating of Eli Blaine, for 
many black Memphians, was just another example of how little black life was valued in 
Memphis.  
However, in the Blaine case there was a key difference in the way that the legal 
system handled the situation.  The officers involved in Blaine’s beating were fired right 
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away.  As early as May 19, only a few days after the initial incident, Hollis Price, a 
Memphis NAACP official, noted that the police department “seems determined to 
prosecute this case to the limit,” even before a significant outcry from the black segments 
of the city.  After the officers were acquitted of the assault to murder charges against 
them, Police Commissioner Joseph Boyle called the verdict a “miscarriage of justice.  
The attack on the negro Blaine was a terrible example of abuse of a prisoner by police 
officers.”167  Even though Blaine was not a prisoner, the fact that Boyle admitted there 
was a problem of abusing prisoners in the police department and called it a miscarriage of 
justice that these two officers had gone unpunished for such a crime was a sign of 
changes underway in the Memphis Police Department, which was increasingly aware of 
the need to be perceived by the public as treating all citizens with respect.   
Even the Attorney General promised to continue with the prosecution, albeit on 
lesser charges of mayhem.  “The poor, and sometimes forgotten man is as much entitled 
to the protection of the law as any other citizen,” the Attorney General declared.  Even 
though an all white jury did not agree with the Attorney General or Commissioner Boyle, 
the Attorney General’s statements demonstrate a move toward more equal justice and an 
acknowledgment of the difficulties facing poor Memphians, the majority of whom were 
black.  By using the word “citizen,” the Attorney General also opened the door for a 
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discussion about the rights that each citizen of Memphis should have, regardless of 
race.168   
An editorial in the Commercial Appeal discussing the Blaine case emphasized 
citizenship rights as a key element of the case.  For the editor, the violation of rights by 
the police department was the central issue.  “The right to make a complaint…the right to 
expect decent treatment and a fair and honest examination of their charges…a right to be 
safe” were all the rights not afforded to Blaine that should be inherent in city citizenship.  
And, for this white editor, the root of the problem lay within the police department.  
Boyle made “at the very least, a grave error of judgment” when he had the very officer 
who struck Blaine escort him to the hospital.169  Boyle essentially enabled the further 
beating of Blaine.  The severity to which police officers beat Blaine shone a bright light 
on the police department’s disregard for black citizenship rights, particularly the right to 
protection. 
The ultimate outcome of this case was similar to the others cases discussed, as the 
officers were found not guilty and only one was fined $50 for punching Blaine at the 
station.  However, the city administration was beginning to demonstrate a change in 
attitude regarding police interaction with the city’s black residents.  There was no 
denying what had happened at the station, when the officer punched Blaine in the face 
unprovoked, and this act challenged people like Boyle and the Attorney General to think 
about the relationship of the police department to the city’s citizens, particularly the black 
                                                
168 Ibid. 
169 “Shocking Incident,” Commercial Appeal, May 19, 1948.  
 132 
citizens of the city.  The case opened the door for a discussion of rights, justice, and equal 
protection among black and white Memphians.170  
This discussion of rights, justice, and equal protection was playing out across the 
South in the years surrounding World War II.  Advocates for black police officers in 
Dallas, Texas made a direct connection between citizenship rights and the rights to 
protection.  For Lynn Landrum, writing for The Dallas News the question of hiring black 
police officers was not about race.  Hiring black police officers was a matter of protecting 
black rights.  “The blackest Dallasite in town has just as much right to police protection 
as the whitest has.”  Lyndrum connected physical protection of the city’s black 
community with their rights as citizens.  “In the name of all that we call civilization and 
democracy, they have a right to just that.”  Drawing on the language of democracy used 
during the war, the article argued that it was city’s duty to protect black citizens because 
it was their right and also because it reinforced “good relations between the races.”171      
Continued cases of questionable police action reinforced the need for this 
discussion in Memphis.  It was just a month after the Blaine beating that Viola Moore 
was hospitalized after an officer beat her while attempting to arrest her for disorderly 
conduct.  Because Moore actively resisted arrest, the officer claimed that force was 
necessary for his own protection, and he was ultimately exonerated of charges of 
                                                
170 “One Ex-Policeman Fined $50: Another Acquitted in Famed Police Brutality Case Here,” Memphis 
World, July 2, 1948. 
171 Lynn W. Landrum, “The Case For Negro Police,” The Dallas News, reprinted in New South, 2.2 
(February, 1947): 5-6.  
 133 
brutality.172  But even if force was necessary to subdue Moore during the arrest, the fact 
that she was hospitalized at the same time that two other officers faced trial for putting 
another black Memphian in the hospital, kept the discussion of white police officers’ use 
of unnecessary force when interacting with blacks in the forefront of black and white 
Memphians’ minds.  
The call for black police officers reemerged out of this discussion about police 
brutality.  In his editorial on the Eli Blaine case, Memphis World editor L.O. Swingler 
argued that this beating would not have happened had the officers dealing with Blaine 
been black.  “Had the officer’s skin matched Blain[e]’s [sic] in color, the good right eye 
would still be in place.”  Swingler acknowledged the work of the Attorney General and 
the statement by Boyle that the case had been a “miscarriage of justice” as a move in a 
positive direction, but, he argued, more needed to be done.  “A white jury of 12 men can 
wipe out any such efforts anytime and under any condition of crime committed against 
the Negro.”  A justice system operating on traditional segregationist values and 
dominated by white men committed to white supremacy would never allow for black 
Memphians to receive justice.  White supremacy was too ingrained in the justice system 
for it to serve all citizens equally.  “But Negro police officers can be the means of 
mitigating such injustice in the future,” Swingler argued.  Fixing the injustice had to 
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begin with the police department and the physical interactions between the justice system 
and the black community.173  
In August, the police killing of an unarmed black veteran escalated the protests of 
police brutality among blacks to the point that city leaders, black and white, were forced 
to make a change.  Twenty-two year old James Mosby was killed outside his 
Binghampton home on August 20 during a scuffle with police.  Mosby’s killing occurred 
at the end of a summer full of instances of white police officers using excessive force 
against working-class black Memphians.  In the wake of the Eli Blaine case and other 
police beatings, the Mosby killing solidified for black Memphians that white police 
officers held all the power, even within black neighborhoods.  Not only could black 
Memphians not expect justice when dealing with the police and court system, they were 
also vulnerable in their own neighborhoods and homes.  Even with the Attorney 
General’s pledge to give equal justice to even the poorest in the city and Commissioner 
Boyle’s admittance that changes needed to be made in the police department, white 
officers continued to wreak havoc in the black neighborhoods.174   
On the afternoon of August 20, 1948, officers were called out to investigate a 
domestic disturbance in the Binghampton neighborhood.  In an attempt to break up an 
argument between Mosby and his wife, officers put Mosby in the squad car.  But as the 
Press-Scimitar reported, Mosby tried to escape, lunging at one of the officers.  One 
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officer hit Mosby, who then began to scuffle with the other officer on the scene.  During 
this scuffle, the officer discharged his weapon, shooting Mosby twice in the stomach, 
killing him.175 
Although the department launched an investigation, within three days the officer 
was exonerated of any wrongdoing.  The police department report determined the officer 
acted in line-of-duty self-defense.  Eyewitnesses from the neighborhood reported that it 
was in fact Mosby who was acting in self-defense.  In an article titled, “Killing by Police 
Was Murder, Negroes Say,” the Press-Scimitar reported on a mass meeting held by black 
residents of the Binghampton neighborhood at which community members claimed that 
the shooting of Mosby was murder.  Mosby’s shooting was another example of 
unwarranted force used by police.  Those who attended the meeting felt that because of 
the “accumulation of acts” by police officers against residents of the Binghampton 
neighborhood and other blacks around the city, the city’s black residents, especially its 
working-class black citizens, needed protection from the police.  For them, the Mosby 
killing demonstrated that any black citizen was susceptible to police brutality.176   
A petition drafted at the meeting by the East Memphis Citizens Club of the 
Binghampton neighborhood, emphasized that police brutality was not merely directed 
against the criminal element of the black population, but, as with Eli Blaine, any black 
Memphian could fall victim to police brutality.  This latest victim was not a criminal but 
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a valued member of his community and a family man.  As historian Laurie Green argued, 
the East Memphis Citizen Club’s petition reversed the traditional black savage narrative.  
The petitioner’s description of the white police officers actions depicted them as the 
savages rather than Mosby.  Mentioning Mosby’s military service and employment with 
the city the petitioners emphasized that even though Mosby was a black man, he was a 
citizen who had worked to serve and protect both his country and his city.177  This 
description of Mosby bestowed on him the virtues of manhood venerated previously by 
black ministers and the media.  Mosby was a valued man among his neighbors, one 
struck down senselessly by white authorities.  By highlighting his service record, family, 
and occupational status, the authors of the petition aimed to demonstrate the 
indiscriminate nature of police violence, thus emphasizing the need for black community 
protection. 
Protection became the rallying cry among working-class black Memphians.  The 
neighborhood group’s petition called for “protection of the Negroes of the City of 
Memphis from the police brutality and police killings.”  The petition even referred to the 
rape of the two young women from this same neighborhood three years before to 
emphasize that this case was not an isolated incident, but one of many that, with the 
continued “violation of their Civil rights by policemen,” had left the neighborhood and all 
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black Memphians living in fear and frustration.178  At its base level, these were calls for 
physical protection, but black Memphians were also calling for the protection of their 
rights as citizens.    
White officers’ attempts to control the black population through intimidation and 
physical abuse had resulted in too many publicized cases of police brutality and police 
killings.  As these cases piled up, the city’s black residents became increasingly unwilling 
to continue to stand for the unequal justice doled out by the police department and justice 
system.  The context of race relations in Memphis had changed because of the war.  
Memphis was a new city and black Memphians would no longer stand for the old ways of 
maintaining control over the city’s black population.  White police and instances of 
police brutality from white policemen became symbols of America’s and Memphis’s 
continued failure to recognize the citizenship rights of blacks.  The two rape victims, 
Adelaide Hudson, Eli Blaine, and James Mosby were victims of the failures of the system 
of racial accommodation to protect black bodies and symbols of Memphis’s failures as a 
progressive postwar city.   
These instances of brutality also came to represent the traditional black 
leadership’s inability to protect and institute changes in the city for the betterment of 
blacks.  Traditional black elites’ ties to the Crump political machine, which had helped to 
secure benefits for black Memphians in the past in exchange for peaceful race relations, 
had failed to protect blacks in their interactions with the law.  Black reactions to this 
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string of police brutality cases in the late 1940s challenged the traditional 
accommodationist style of leadership and pushed city officials to negotiate over black 
demands.  Black police officers, black representatives within the very institution that had 
victimized black citizens, came to be seen as the solution to the lack of protection for 
black Memphians.   
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CHAPTER V 
“IT’S BECOMING TRITE”: THE CAMPAIGN FOR BLACK POLICE OFFICERS  
AND JUSTICE FOR MEMPHIS’S BLACK COMMUNITY 
 When Memphis World editor L. O. Swingler titled his August 24, 1948, editorial 
“It’s Becoming Trite,” he put words to the frustration felt by many black Memphians 
over the lack of justice for blacks in the city.  Swingler chose the word “trite,” meaning 
“something’s being overdone, being old-timey…being the much accepted answer,” to 
describe what he had come to view as the “trite” explanations for the beating and killing 
of black Memphians by white police officers.  As Swingler was sure to point out, it was 
not the beatings or killings that had become trite, but the explanations of those beatings 
and killings used to exonerate the officers.  “‘He was resisting arrest…‘he seized my 
nightstick,’” or the most recent explanation, “he bit me,” had all been used to excuse 
white Memphis police officers’ use of force against black citizens, who ended up in the 
hospital or dead as a result of these encounters.  
 The killing of the twenty-three-year-old veteran and city employee James Mosby, 
in front of his home in the Binghampton neighborhood, prompted Swingler’s editorial 
decrying the continued devaluation of black life by Memphis police officers and the 
system that exonerated those officers based on “trite” explanations for the use of force.  
Written in late August 1948, this editorial was one of many written by Swingler in the 
spring and summer of 1948 that addressed the growing concern over police brutality and
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the lack of justice for black Memphians.  By the time James Mosby was killed in late 
August, black ministers and black students among other black and white Memphians had 
joined Swingler’s call for black police offices.  Supporters of black police officers 
believed that if black officers patrolled black neighborhoods incidents such as the Blaine 
beating or the Mosby killing would not have occurred.  Supporters argued “there are 
upright honest negroes of integrity who would sacrifice better jobs to help render service 
to the peace and welfare of the Memphis Police Department and justice to their own 
people.”  As instances of police brutality against blacks continued to be highly 
publicized, black Memphians’ call for black police officers became intertwined with 
notions of equality, community protection, and justice for black Memphians.179 
 During the years surrounding World War II, black Americans across the country 
demanded greater citizenship rights.  Black labor organizations fought job discrimination 
in war industry, national civil rights organizations worked in the courts to end housing 
discrimination and to expand black voting power, and local black communities across the 
country protested against daily injustices.180  In Memphis, blacks also reacted to the 
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changes brought on by the war, and throughout the World War II era, black Memphians 
pushed for greater rights and more equal justice through a variety of means from labor 
organizations to federal agencies.  The campaign for black police officers was one front 
in the struggle to better black lives at this moment, but one that spoke directly to the 
immediate concerns over police brutality and black Memphians’ understanding of justice 
and equality within the confines of segregation.  
 This chapter examines the black community’s calls for black police officers in 
1948.  Calls for black police officers focused on immediate concerns over community 
protection.  Through their calls for black police officers, average black Memphians 
reflected a definition of equal justice and equal protection that reinforced rather than 
challenged segregation.  The central focus of the chapter is the campaign to hire black 
police officers.  However, as seen in chapter one, throughout the city’s history, blacks in 
Memphis advocated for their rights and a place in the city.  Continuing this tradition, 
black Memphians fought against labor discrimination, racism, and the limits placed on 
their citizenship throughout the 1940s.  Within this earlier activism the foundations for 
the campaign to hire black police officers were laid as black Memphians challenged 
traditional leadership, both black and white, and developed their own understandings of 
the World War II era rhetoric of freedom and democracy.  But by 1948, as incidents of 
police brutality seemed to be increasing, the injustices of the judicial system against black 
citizens became a primary focal point of black action for change in Memphis.  Black 
Memphians’ efforts to push the city government to hire black police officers 
demonstrated the ways in which immediate local concerns impacted the variety of 
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strategies employed to create positive change in the lives of blacks within the confines of 
a segregated society.   
Cities across the South addressed the question of whether or not to hire black 
police officers in the mid-1940s.  With data collected beginning in 1943, the Southern 
Regional Council (SRC) published articles in its journal, New South, touting the success 
of black police officers across the region.  The SRC, an interracial group geared toward 
improving southern race relations, hoped that these articles would encourage other 
southern cities to hire black officers.  The central message in these articles was that black 
officers were successful in controlling growing black urban populations and maintaining 
the racial order by “decreas[ing] criminal activity among Negroes” and “contribut[ing] to 
maintaining reasonably good race relations.”  According to the SRC, black officers 
helped to protect the status quo of the southern Jim Crow system of racial segregation.   
Sixteen southern cities had black officers in 1943.  In some cases this hiring of 
black officers to southern police forces meant only one token officer.  These token 
officers often operated as a plain-clothes officer rather than with the authority of a full 
uniformed officer.  However, over the course of a decade, cities across the South added 
divisions of black officers to their police forces.  By 1954, 143 cities in 13 southern states 
employed at least one black officer.  Between 1943 and 1954, the SRC kept track of the 
numbers and the duties of black officers in southern cities.  A 1943 report argued that 
“Negro officers would greatly aid in the detection and prevention of crime since Negroes 
understand each other better” and that “Negro officers would be a substantial factor in 
reducing race frictions and improving race relations.”  While the voices of the black 
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officers were absent from the journal’s articles, statements by white officials outlined the 
success of having black officers on southern streets.  Police chiefs across the South, from 
Newport News, Virginia, to San Antonio, Texas, reported, “colored police officers have 
been a great asset…crime in the districts to which they are assigned has dropped 25 
percent....  They are loyal and efficient policemen and take pride in their work.”  The 
comments of police chiefs in the New South highlighted white officials and white 
officers’ satisfaction with black police. Black officers, according to this interracial 
commission, would serve the dual purpose of reducing black crime and minimizing the 
interaction between residents of black neighborhoods and white police officers.  Black 
police officers offered black citizens a way to separate themselves from the white police 
force.181  
 Drawing on the regional trend of hiring black police officers used in other 
southern cities, the Memphis campaign represented a push by average black Memphians 
to better their lives within the confines of segregation.  Born out of the violence of police 
brutality followed by the lack of justice for blacks in the judicial system, black 
community calls for black police officers were intertwined with notions about power and 
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citizenship.  A close examination of these efforts offers insight into the ways in which 
black Memphians challenged the traditional system of racial accommodation without 
challenging racial segregation.  Through the campaign for black officers, black 
newspaper editor L.O. Swinger along with other advocates for black police officers, 
including religious and civic organizations, articulated an expression of equality that 
reflected local circumstances and the immediate concerns of the city’s black residents.  
The campaign for black police officers ultimately garnered what power blacks in 
Memphis did have in the vote and forced city leaders to respond to black demands for 
greater equality including the hiring of black police officers.   
A Brief History of Black Activism in 1940s Memphis 
 Although the 1940s began with the Crump machine suppressing oppositional 
black political voices, as war industry and the war rhetoric of freedom and democracy 
infiltrated the city, working-class blacks became more vocal in their protests against 
discrimination.  These protests demonstrate a context of activism in the 1940s in which 
black protests of inequality were multi-facetted with a variety of aims.  By 1948, one of 
these aims was black police officers.  The “reign of terror” by Memphis police against 
black Republican leaders in 1940 set the precedent for the relationship between the city’s 
black residents and white police officers throughout the decade.  As a result of this 
intimidation, members of the city’s black political and economic elite, such as Lt. George 
Washington Lee and Joseph E. Walker, fell in line with the Crump machine.  Their 
interactions with the machine accommodated to Crump’s vision of the city and the place 
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of blacks in that vision of the city’s future.182  But the experience of the war years created 
the space for blacks in Memphis to reimagine their place in the city.  The rhetoric of a 
war for freedom and democracy called into question the white supremacist segregated 
social system in the South.  As the 1940s progressed, black Memphians, working-class 
black Memphians specifically,  increased their protests against job discrimination, 
racism, and the limits placed on their citizenship rights in order to protect their 
community and assert their right to a place in the city.  
 As war industry ramped up, so too did labor organizing and federal involvement 
in the labor market.  In his study of labor organization in Memphis during the war period, 
Michael Honey argued that the importance of war industry to the city of Memphis 
changed the way in which city officials approached labor organizations.  The city actively 
courted new industry for the economic prosperity it would bring to the city.  Many of 
these industries prospered from federal contracts issued during the war.  Whereas the 
Crump machine had previously used police harassment to squelch labor union 
organizing, federal support of labor unions in war industry factories forced Crump to 
change his attitude.  As one labor organizer explained, “It might give Crump and the city 
administration pause in their ruthless fight on the CIO” if industry access to federal 
contracts was dependent on accepting labor organizing.  Thus, Crump acquiesced to some 
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labor organizing in Memphis in order to take advantage of wartime prosperity for the city 
as a whole.183  
Black workers in Memphis, and around the country, also began to believe in their 
right to take advantage of wartime prosperity to create a better life.  Black workers 
readily organized into industrial unions, primarily unions operating under the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), which worked to create biracial labor organizations.  
Black workers became essential to CIO organizing, especially in industries that employed 
primarily black workers.  However, black efforts to organize often caused tension as 
white workers and management worked to maintain the racial hierarchy among the 
industrial labor force.  For example, in 1941, black workers at the Nickey Brothers 
hardwood flooring plant attempted to organize under the CIO.  Management tried to 
break the CIO’s organizing hold on the plant’s workers by supporting an American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliated union.  This support of the AFL, which operated on 
a model of racial labor segregation, was an attempt to create a wedge between plant 
workers based on race.  Nickey Brothers’ goal was to gain white loyalty by supporting a 
white union.  However, because the majority of workers were black, the CIO union 
affiliate won by a large majority and was able to go on to bargain for better pay, 
vacations, and seniority rights for Nickey Brothers’ employees.  With the CIO and 
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federal policy on their side, black workers readily took to labor activism to increase their 
economic opportunities during the war.184  
Black workers, particularly women, also protested their job opportunities during 
the war directly to the federal government.  Throughout the war years, the segregated 
United States Employment Services (USES) offices steered black workers, especially 
women workers, towards service industry jobs.  Black women in Memphis protested the 
limits placed on their employment directly to the federal government.  They connected 
their desire for a war industry job with economic prosperity and their involvement in the 
war effort.  In a letter to President Roosevelt, Mrs. Ella Rose Dotson asked for help in 
securing a factory job rather than a house-cleaning job.  Cleaning houses only paid five 
dollars a week, a wage so meager, Dotson wrote, she could not afford to support the war 
effort by buying a defense bond.  Another Memphis woman, Margaret Jackson, lamented 
that industry jobs were reserved for white women only, “I cannot understand why our 
men should fight for a country that starves their womenfolks.”185  Dotson and Jackson, 
along with many other black women in Memphis, connected their attempts to gain 
economic opportunity with their responsibilities and rights as citizens, particularly their 
responsibility to participate in the war effort and the rights that participation should 
afford them.  Black protest in Memphis during the war years focused on working-class 
efforts to take advantage of the greater economic opportunity brought by the war.   
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The rhetoric of a war for freedom and democracy also worked to change black 
attitudes about public racism and the degradation of blacks that the racial hierarchy 
perpetuated.  During the war years, black Memphians became increasingly unwilling to 
stand for public forms of black degradation.  Busses continued to be a venue for 
confrontation over discrimination.  While many incidents on busses involved black 
soldiers protesting discrimination laws, civilians also protested overt discrimination on 
busses, often connecting their defiance to the rhetoric of democracy and citizenship.  
“This is a damned democracy you all been talking about,” a black Memphis man declared 
when he refused to give up his seat to a white passenger.186  This man’s frustration 
stemmed from the hypocrisy of a country claiming to operate as a democracy with equal 
opportunity and treatment for all citizens.  Yet, a black man could be forced from his seat 
on public transportation to make room for a white passenger.  This expectation of public 
acquiescence to whites that led to degrading experiences such as being forced to give up 
a seat on the bus prompted protest among working-class black Memphians, those most 
effected by segregation on public transportation.  But other members of their community 
supported these individual protesters.  When a black teacher was arrested for refusing to 
give her seat to a white passenger, two thousand members of her church, along with the 
minister, protested to the mayor.187  
Black business owners and black workers also protested public images of blacks 
they deemed degrading.  In 1942, the White Rose Laundry Cleaners erected a mechanical 
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sign that caused uproar among black workers, especially among black women, who 
perceived the sign’s depiction of a black laundress as disrespectful.  The mechanical sign 
showed a black woman, dressed in what Memphis historian Wayne Dowdy describes as 
“traditional mammy garb,” bending over a washtub.  But as the woman bent forward, her 
undergarments were exposed.  Although the white owners of the laundry saw humor in 
the sign, a letter written to the owners by the Negro Chamber of Commerce argued that, 
for black citizens, the sign “appears to be unwarranted derision directed to what might 
otherwise have been to them a symbol of the hundreds of thousands of poor Negro 
mothers.”188  Domestic work was the primary occupation of black women, with a history 
dating back to slavery and the forced domestic labor black women performed.  Thus, this 
image was not only a lewd depiction of a black woman, but it also mocked the image of 
laboring black women and the memory of hundreds of years of black women’s work.   
The Chamber’s petition also connected black women’s labor with citizenship.  
Black women, “with a prayer in their humble hearts and a song on their lips, toiled long 
hours daily to help support their families, to educate their children – and to make them 
worthy and respectable citizens of a great country.”189  At a moment when black 
Americans were making efforts to prove themselves respectable citizens and thus 
deserving of equal citizenship rights, many saw the White Rose Laundry sign as an effort 
to strip black women and black women’s labor of its respectability.  The protests against 
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the White Rose Laundry sign were primarily a protest against public degradation of black 
citizens.  
The White Rose controversy also demonstrated an increased willingness by the 
black workers to unite with black business owners and other segments of the black 
community to organize in protest of discrimination.  The Memphis branch of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) saw an increase in 
membership during this period, tripling between 1939 and 1943.  Membership then more 
than doubled in the war years, rising from 1,500 in 1943 to 3,600 by 1946.  The 
LeMoyne College chapter of the NAACP became particularly active in the years 
following the war as students returned from service.  In 1946, the student chapter was 
involved in the successful campaign for the removal of Memphis Street Railway 
Company rail-coach operators accused of mistreating black riders.  The chapter also put a 
great deal of energy into investigating possible cases of discrimination around the city, 
from taxi fares to service in local stores, working to ensure “that treatment of Negro 
customers be as for all other customers” in downtown businesses.190 
Calls for greater participation and action were made by many of the groups 
operating in Memphis during the war years.  According to the NAACP chapter at 
LeMoyne, “Today as never before, the world is in desperate need of capable leadership.  
Especially is this true of minority groups who must develop an awareness of changing 
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conditions as well as develop leaders to cope with these changes.  As an American youth 
who must soon assume responsibility for leadership, you must begin now to plan your 
part in building a new world order.”  These young Memphians were adopting the 
language of the expectation of opportunity and advancement in postwar America.  They 
believed that their place in their city and the nation would be determined by the action 
taken by a new generation of strong leadership.  Thus, part of the chapter’s plan for the 
upcoming year was to begin to organize youth chapters in all the local high schools in 
order to foster this attitude of action in the next generation.191  
Implicit in the college chapter’s statement about new leadership was a critique of 
the traditional black leaders and the tradition of racial accommodation in the city.  Less 
than a year since the black elite’s leadership was called into question after two young 
black women were raped, these students were also marking the need for a change in 
leadership.  Black students were declaring their desire to be a part of a new generation of 
leaders who would offer new strategies to deal with changing circumstances.  The 
students criticized “a religious leader in Memphis who thinks this is the ‘most wonderful 
city he has ever seen.’  Is the man blind or is he just oozing ‘soft-soap,’” trying to 
whitewash the reality of discrimination in the city.  In the spring of 1946, a column in the 
student newspaper, The LeMoyne Democrat, declared it was “time for spring-cleaning….  
Not only get rid of dead, dried branches from hedges, but dead dried ideas.  Not only turn 
up the new earth for planting flowers, but turn up new ideas that will help others as well 
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as yourself.”  The students called for black citizens, and their fellow students specifically, 
to take responsibility for bettering their lives.  
Throughout the late 1940s, the college newspaper called for new ideas and new 
kinds of action against discrimination in the city and the country.  Articles encouraging 
NAACP membership and veteran involvement with the city’s American Veterans 
Committee (AVC) chapter, alongside articles such as “Let’s Have Initiative,” “Less Talk-
Act!,” and “NAACP Take Note,” demonstrated a growing activist spirit among the city’s 
younger generation of educated blacks, who were demonstrating a willingness to push 
back against traditional race relations in the city.  As the students noted, “We can use all 
the get up and go we can muster in order to raise the stand of our present situations.”192 
This call for a more determined leadership can also be seen on the Memphis labor 
front.  Although labor leader A. Phillip Randolph’s initial 1943 speech had been canceled 
following the Crump machine’s intimidation of black leaders, Randolph returned to 
Memphis in the spring of 1944.  In his speech, the labor leader railed against the Crump 
machine and black leaders’ accommodation to that machine.  The Memphis World 
reported that Randolph “point[ed] to the establishment of schools and playground by the 
city for Negro citizens [as] no proper justification for denying them or anybody else 
freedom of speech.…Negroes do not want to be well-kept slaves.  Like white people they 
want to be free.”  Randolph criticized the paternalistic attitude of white officials and the 
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black leaders who used this attitude to their advantage but did not do enough to improve 
the condition of black life in Memphis.  The labor leader also drew on the ideology of the 
war and the changes it would bring to demand that workers and leaders take 
responsibility for their own prosperity.193  The war offered an opportunity, as the federal 
government’s support of civil rights, as seen through their support of labor rights, opened 
up space for blacks to advocate for change.  
 The fact that over one thousand black and white Memphians came to hear 
Randolph speak demonstrated an increased willingness to participate in a dialogue about 
change among varying elements of Memphis’s community, black and white.  Throughout 
the war, labor leaders, especially in the CIO, made gains towards biracial labor coalitions.  
A small but integrated AVC chapter appeared in Memphis in the 1940s.  The Memphis 
Community Relations Committee was formed in the fall of 1947 by a group of students 
and faculty from LeMoyne College and Southwestern (now Rhodes College).  This 
biracial organization held integrated public meetings featuring scholarly lectures on 
issues of human rights locally and globally.  While these groups ranged from working-
class labor organizations to intellectual societies, their biracial make-up and bent towards 
questioning social norms and city leadership in the city demonstrated an increasingly 
active population of Memphians looking for change.   The action by students, the 
development of the AVC chapter, and the work of labor leaders to organize black 
workers demonstrated that black Memphians from varying segments of the black 
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community were involved in organizations and activities to advance opportunities for 
black citizens in Memphis.194  
As black men returned home to the South, and Memphis specifically, they 
expected that their sacrifices abroad in the name of freedom would justify greater 
freedoms at home.  Thirty thousand veterans, black and white, returned to Memphis to 
face housing and job shortages.  In 1946, two hundred barrack-type housing units were 
dismantled in Florida and brought to the city.  Over thirty-nine thousand black and white 
veterans applied.  Jobs too were limited.  The USES office reported in February of 1946 
that it had ten times more applications than it had jobs available.  Blacks and women 
were laid off by the thousands as part of the “last hired, first fired” mentality.  But the 
war, as Michael Honey argues, had profoundly altered the southern economy by bringing 
more workers and industry to the urban South.  And with this economic change came the 
prospect of social change.  Black and white veterans returned home with less tolerance 
for the undemocratic regimes that ruled southern politics and expected to take advantage 
of a better standard of living than they had experienced before the war. 195  
For example, returning veterans to Athens, Tennessee, overturned one of Crump’s 
“satellite” governments in a six-hour gun battle with local political leaders.  Armed 
veterans nearly lynched the sheriff and his deputies for beating a white veteran and 
shooting a black voter.  Athens was just one example of pro-democracy revolts in the 
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South during the 1946 elections.  This kind of veteran militancy seemed to indicate the 
seeds of change in the South, as a new generation of veterans worked to overthrow the 
old political leaders and their rigid adherence to a democracy defined by color.   
After the war ended, black Memphians continued to draw on the democratic 
rhetoric of the war and the expectations of citizenship rights for blacks in postwar 
America.  The most prominent example of blacks protesting the limits placed on their 
rights as citizens occurred in the fall of 1947 when the American Heritage Foundation 
(AHF) announced the Freedom Train tour.  While the AHF-sponsored Freedom Train 
tour carried with it national implications about the nature of American democracy, the 
fight against communism, and the state of postwar America, in Memphis the controversy 
over the Freedom Train became representative of the limits white city leaders imposed on 
black citizenship rights.   
City officials refused to abide by the AHF’s policy of desegregated viewing.  As a 
result, the train bypassed Memphis on its journey south.  As mentioned previously, 
Mayor James Pleasants argued that desegregated viewing would cause racial tension that 
would lead to racial violence.  He continued to argue that it was Memphis’s strict 
adherence to segregation laws that had kept the city from experiencing any racial trouble 
in the recent past.  For Memphis officials, the Freedom Train represented a challenge to 
the city’s social and political system, not a celebration of America’s founding 
principles.196 
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When Mayor Pleasants voiced his decision not to allow the Freedom Train in 
Memphis because the desegregated viewing would cause racial unrest in the city, there 
was uproar among the city’s black citizens, particularly student and veteran groups.  The 
city’s chapter of the AVC questioned the mayor’s logic behind barring the train from 
visiting Memphis.  Particularly they called into question his assertions about racial 
harmony in Memphis: “The mayor assures us there is less race trouble here than in any 
other American city.  Why then should he feel that this particular train — guarded by an 
able contingent of American Marines — would bring violence and bloodshed to 
Memphis?”  Black Memphians criticized the mayor’s insistence on making the issue of 
the Freedom Train a racial issue.  “We regret to see a public official attempt to exploit 
personal, political, and racial animosity for the obvious purpose of clouding a clear 
issue.”  For the AVC, the issue of the Freedom Train was an issue of the freedom and the 
right to celebrate American democracy.  Viewing the founding documents was seen as a 
way to act out those rights, especially in the wake of World War II in which Americans 
had fought for the cause of democracy.  The AVC along with black students criticized 
city officials for bringing race to the forefront of the debate and using the threat of racial 
tension to justify denying black citizens the freedom to see the country’s founding 
documents.197 
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Critics of the city’s decision lambasted officials for their adherence to this white 
supremacist state of mind, criticizing their hardline stance on maintaining segregation as 
counter to the principles of the freedom and democracy the Freedom Train hoped to 
foster.  In their petition advocating for the Freedom Train, the AVC linked the right to see 
the Freedom Train with the war effort, saying the city’s decision to let the Freedom Train 
bypass Memphis was “a callous denial of a privilege to which thousands are entitled by 
virtue of their wartime sacrifices at home and abroad.”  One Memphis citizen writing in 
the Press-Scimitar likened viewing the Freedom Train to a “civic exercise” in the same 
vein as “voting and paying taxes.”  For this reader, the act of visiting the Freedom Train 
was similar to the other ways in which people acted out their citizenship.  Denying a visit 
from the Freedom Train was a denial of the right of Memphians, black and white, to 
demonstrate their American citizenship.  The AME Ministers Council went so far as to 
call Mayor James Pleasants and his decision “un-American.”198  
Refusing to miss the opportunity to see the Freedom Train, students and faculty 
from LeMoyne College traveled to Jackson, Tennessee, to view the train.  In an article for 
the LeMoyne Democrat, titled “A Glance at Freedom,” one student visitor described the 
documents as “soul-stirring” and “dramatic.”  For another student, viewing the 
documents of the Freedom Train “served to stir a greater awareness of the advantages we 
enjoy as Americans and to incite greater future participation.”  For him, this was an 
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experience “that every loyal American regardless of race, creed or color, should be proud 
to enjoy.”  The Freedom Train and its clear connection to the rights and privileges of 
American citizenship became a readily identifiable symbol to many black Memphians of 
the limitations placed on their rights because of the city’s strict adherence to racial 
segregation.  As an editorial about the Freedom Train’s bypass of Memphis in the Tupelo 
Mississippi Journal argued, city leaders were not afraid of racial mixing but of what the 
Freedom Train would inspire in the city’s citizens: “somebody might get the idea that 
American Freedom should also apply to Memphis and Shelby County.”  The Freedom 
Train incident put in stark light the absence of citizenship rights for Memphis blacks.199 
This fear of disrupting the white supremacist segregated social and political 
system in Memphis was implicit in official responses to the growing activism of the latter 
half of the 1940s.  Many of the city’s arguments in response to black activism against 
discrimination blamed the protests on the ubiquitous “outsiders” causing trouble in a city 
that otherwise, white leaders claimed, had peaceful race relations.  In response to the 
AME Ministers’ Council petition calling for desegregated viewing of the Freedom Train, 
Mayor James Pleasants accused the ministers of being pawns of “some low-down white 
man or some imported negro.”200  Pleasants was negating the ministers’ ability to develop 
their own opinions about citizenship rights.  Pleasants’ reference to “some imported 
negro” echoed the sentiments verbalized by police officers in their encounters with black 
                                                
199 Quoted in Green, 130; F.D. “A Glance At Freedom,” The Democrat: LeMoyne College, January 1948; 
and Tupelo Journal editorial reprinted in “Memphis Officials Fear Freedom Train will Inspire Citizens,” 
Press-Scimitar, November 20, 1947.  
200Quoted in Green, 127.  
 159 
citizens, both of which shifted the blame for any opposition to the city’s governance and 
social order onto outsiders.  This denial of dissent from within Memphis’s own black 
citizenry worked to reinforce Crump and his officials’ view of a docile and content black 
population.  
As historian Wayne Dowdy argued in his study of the White Rose Laundry 
controversy, just as protests demonstrated a willingness to push against the city’s racial 
order, they also revealed that there were limits to black power to enact change.  Even 
while protesting, blacks struggled to break from Memphis’s long history of black 
deference and accommodation to Crump and city officials under his control.  Even as the 
Negro Chamber of Commerce asked the machine to help them do away with the 
offensive White Rose Laundry sign, they did so using the language of deference,  
“respectfully ask[ing]” rather than demanding the sign be brought down.  The exile of 
Robert R. Church, Jr. and his fellow Republican leaders in 1940, for their efforts to 
campaign against the Crump machine, was still fresh in the minds of black leaders and 
reminded them of the limits on independent black political thought.201  
 The episode with Church, Jr. was not the only time during the 1940s that Crump 
moved to silence a black leader he viewed as too radical.  After the death of Lucien J. 
Searcy in 1943, the new executive secretary of the Memphis Urban League (MUL), the 
young activist Benjamin Bell turned the organization in a more radical direction.  Searcy 
had believed in working with white leaders to achieve the League’s goals, adding white 
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Members to the Board of Directors in 1940.  Searcy took a conservative approach to the 
League’s activities, especially when racial issues were involved.  He wanted to keep 
“local Negro problems from becoming quagmires in which our social gains might 
become bogged down.”  Searcy was unwilling to challenge the racial status quo; rather, 
he made efforts to work within the system to create change, even though those changes 
would necessarily be limited.  Bell, on the other hand, envisioned a more activist 
organization. 202  
Benjamin Bell was a Chicago native who, after receiving his masters in social 
work from Atlanta University, moved south to work on Gunnar Myrdal’s study and 
became involved in labor and social work projects in Missouri, Virginia, and Texas.  And 
when he arrived in Memphis, Bell quickly became involved in the MUL’s labor 
activities.  Bell’s focus on labor relations caused the MUL’s executive directors, white 
and black, to worry that his work would exacerbate racial tensions.  Coinciding with the 
controversy over A. Phillip Randolph’s speech in Memphis, the Chicago Defender 
published two articles written by Bell criticizing Memphis’s black leadership for being 
afraid of the Crump machine and thus unresponsive to the real troubles of Memphis’s 
black workers.203  
By early 1944, Bell’s criticism of the black elite and their relationship to Crump 
caused him to lose the support of the MUL’s executive board.  A Chicago Defender 
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article claimed that Crump had threatened to cut off funding for the League if Bell 
remained as executive secretary.  Thus, Crump was able to oust the radical leader.  In a 
NUL report on the problems in Memphis, Bell was described as “a man of considerable 
courage, but appears to be lacking in the experience, tact, patience, and administrative 
ability essential…for meeting the complex problems that Memphis presents.”  According 
to Hollis Price, Bell lacked “knowledge of the Southern situation,” essentially 
admonishing Bell for acting too aggressively against the system of accommodation and 
deference to the Crump machine and strict racial segregation.204 
The more conservative Reverend James A. McDaniel replaced Bell that year.  
McDaniel was Pastor of the Bethel Presbyterian Church and a member of the Negro 
Chamber of Commerce.  McDaniel took a more conservative approach to the MUL’s 
activities, in particular helping the black USES office advertise domestic labor jobs for 
blacks.  McDaniel emphasized the need for black workers to have jobs rather than 
fighting for better paying war industry jobs for black workers.  “No one can afford to 
dissipate his or her energies in idleness,” McDaniel wrote, reinforcing the importance of 
black employment over securing better opportunities for black workers.  The replacement 
of the more activist Bell as the MUL executive secretary with the more conservative 
Reverend James McDaniel emphasized what Memphis historian Gloria Brown-Melton 
described as “the recalcitrance of white leaders when labor and minority groups 
threatened to disrupt the community tranquility.”  As NUL secretary Isobel Chisholm 
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noted after a field visit in the spring of 1948, “It is doubtful that a more dynamic and 
more energetic or progressive Executive could survive in this politically dominated, 
strictly segregated community.”  McDaniel was “conscientious” of the situation in 
Memphis and although often criticized by the NUL for being weak, “carrie[d] on a 
program in line with the basic survival of its operations” within Memphis.205   
 The critiques of black leadership continued, resurfacing during the Freedom Train 
controversy.  In his address to the public about the city’s decision to let the Freedom 
Train by-pass Memphis, Mayor Pleasants informed black Memphians in particular that 
“every thinking negro agrees with our position.”  This phrase “thinking negro” became a 
magnet for criticism.  An editorial in the Memphis World challenged the “thinking” black 
who would give in to pressure from the machine, arguing that he would “find himself as 
far out of line with the more advanced thinking of the people on racial matters” as those 
in city government.  Whereas the city argued that the thoughtful among black citizens 
saw the value of the city’s position, the Memphis World editorial argued that these black 
leaders were not thinking for the rest of black Memphians but rather deferring their 
thinking to the machine.  By the end of 1947, the Memphis World was setting itself up as 
a mouthpiece for opposition to the old guard of leadership and the system of black 
accommodation to the Crump machine. 206  
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The silencing of activist black political voices by the Crump machine limited 
black activism in Memphis in the 1940s.  However, it did not silence calls from within 
the black citizenry demanding the city acknowledge their rights as citizens.  Throughout 
the 1940s, as the fervor of wartime activism developed in Memphis, Memphis blacks 
pushed for greater acknowledgement of their right to a place in the city.  But while these 
were moves to create greater equality, rarely were they moves to disrupt the social order 
through integration.  Although the Freedom Train controversy was centered on 
desegregated viewing of the exhibit, this desegregation was to be limited to a single day 
at a single venue.  Other instances, such as the struggles over jobs and the White Rose 
Laundry sign, were primarily concerned with the lack of equal opportunity and respect 
for black workers.  Even the Freedom Train was at its roots about citizenship rights more 
so than desegregation.  However, even these limited challenges to the racial status quo 
were seen as a threat to the Crump machine and his vision for Memphis.  
Crump’s iron-fisted control over city governance and the fear of black leaders that 
led to a culture of accommodation limited the ability of activist voices to create a larger 
movement for change.  But black Memphians were becoming exacerbated with the limits 
placed on their rights, and they did wield some political power in the form of voting.  In 
the years after the war, as blacks in Memphis were continually denied the promises of 
greater rights and greater opportunity that many expected in the aftermath of war, they 
became increasingly willing to search for ways to enact change to bring about greater 
equality within the segregated system.  The black action against discrimination and 
limitations placed on their efforts at labor organization and their citizenship rights met 
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with both successes and failures depending on the extent to which they challenged the 
system of racial segregation.  It was within this context of activism for acknowledgement 
of black rights that black community calls for black police officers gained momentum.  
The Campaign for Black Police Officers 
 This frustration over limits on black rights came to a head in the summer of 1948.  
The combination of two years of increasingly publicized instances of white police 
brutality against blacks and the failure of the justice system to bring black citizens justice 
in these cases created a feeling of dissatisfaction among black Memphians.  Black 
Memphians, particularly working-class blacks who represented those most affected by 
the strictures of the southern racial hierarchy, were fed up with a system that continued to 
devalue black life.  As other cities across the South touted the success of using black 
officers to patrol black neighborhoods, others active among the city’s black population, 
including students, veterans, and civic and religious groups, joined Memphis World editor 
L.O. Swingler’s two-year-old campaign for black police officers.  Memphis blacks saw 
black police officers as a way to increase protection of black neighborhoods and create a 
more equal justice system.  The push for black police officers in the city’s black 
neighborhoods became a symbol of black power to create positive change within 
segregation.  Having black police officers was seen as a manifestation of an expression of 
black equality rooted in the World War II rhetoric of freedom and democracy. 
 Calls for the city to employ black police officers emerged in the aftermath of the 
1945 rape of the two young black women.  The incident evoked feelings of physical and 
social vulnerability among Memphis’s black working-class residents.  Two weeks after 
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the attack on the young women, the Press-Scimitar ran an expose that demanded the 
arrest and prosecution of the police officers and the hiring of black police officers.  The 
Press-Scimitar admonished white Memphians and black leaders for their lack of action 
towards justice after having two weeks “to quiver, shake heads, bemoan, deplore, wax 
indignant, express disgust and otherwise castigate” the white supremacist racial justice 
system that allowed the heinous crime not only to happen but to go unpunished.  As the 
article implied, neither the city’s white officials, white police officers, nor black leaders 
were working to protect the black citizens.  Thus, it was up to these black residents to 
demand protection.207   
 The need for black Memphians to take control of demanding protection of their 
physical bodies and citizenship rights continued.  The failures of the city’s justice system 
to protect black citizens continued.  In August 1947, Frederick Jackson lost the final 
appeal to commute his death sentence.  Fred Jackson was a mentally handicapped 
seventeen-year-old black boy from Memphis accused of raping and murdering a white 
woman and her children.  Jackson was convicted and sentenced to death by electrocution.  
Although a psychiatric examination of Jackson determined he had only the mental 
capacity of an eight-year-old, the governor refused to commute his sentence.  The 
Jackson case reinforced in the minds of black Memphians that the justice system was 
stacked against them.  In an outline of the existing system of justice, a black LeMoyne 
College student wrote, “Jail – For black by white…Defense – White against black for 
supremacy…Verdict – white for white.”  This evaluation of the system of justice in 
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Memphis emphasized the understanding among blacks that the justice system worked for 
whites against blacks.  After he was executed, thousands of black Memphians visited the 
funeral home to “view Jackson’s body and show their dismay.”  In the same month, 
Adelaide Hudson was beaten in the yard in front of her home and another young 
Binghampton resident, Cornell Thorton, was shot in the back and killed by police.208  
 By the end of 1947, the actions of police and other city officials had made it clear 
that black life was of little value to officials or the traditional black leadership.  Instances 
of police brutality, the Freedom Train controversy, the continued denial of full citizenship 
rights, and black leaders failure to negotiate for justice or advancement led many black 
Memphians to begin looking for their own ways to make a change.  The idea for that 
change was drawn from the trend among other southern cities in the mid-to-late 1940s to 
hire black police officers.   
While the immediate circumstances for hiring black police officers varied from 
city-to-city, in Memphis when black calls for black police officers reached their height in 
the summer of 1948, it was the result of the continued lack of justice for black 
Memphians and the inability of the current system of accommodation to protect the black 
citizens from police brutality.209  The series of instances of police brutality in 1947 and 
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1948 had escalated racial tension in that city and spurred black protest that resulted in 
political action.  As the August primary election approached, this memory of injustice 
combined with a growing demand for full black citizenship rights resulted in broad 
support for black police officers to patrol black neighborhoods.  During the campaign, 
black police officers were seen as the physical representation of black equality, 
citizenship, and black citizens ability to protect their own communities.  
 “The Beale Street memory is pretty long,” Memphis educator and syndicated 
columnist Nat D. Williams commented early in 1948.  Editorials, petitions, and other 
public statements appealing for greater justice in Memphis made frequent references to 
the rape case in 1945; the Columbia, Tennessee, race riot; and the names Frederick 
Jackson and Adelaide Hudson.  As Swingler made his appeals for equal justice, he 
reminded officials and the larger Memphis community that this “is not a single isolated 
instance which has involved miss-treatment of citizens and violation of their Civil 
rights.”  Swingler, Williams, and other black supporters drew on historical memory of a 
past filled with injustice.210    
The case of Eli Blaine became a prime example of the inability of white police to 
treat black Memphians as equal citizens.  The beating of Blaine by two police officers in 
the police station “serve[d] to strengthen the conviction that Negroes will not receive fair-
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play and justice when they are left solely in the hands of white officers.”  Blaine had gone 
to the station to confront the officers who had searched his home earlier in the evening 
about money gone missing.  But, as one editorial put it, “Blaine had forgotten the color of 
his skin when he sought justice of white police officers.”  The fact that the white daily, 
the Commercial Appeal, referred to Blaine, who had gone to the station on his own 
volition, as “the negro prisoner” further degraded Blaine and his position as a citizen 
seeking justice and reinforced the system of racial injustice black Memphians 
experienced when interacting with police.211   
For whites, placing Blaine in the category of prisoner reinforced the notion of 
black criminality and offered justification for the force used against him by police.  In a 
statement to the Memphis World, MUL executive secretary Reverend James McDaniel 
argued that this continued case of police brutality was “evidence that white officers alone 
are inadequate to cope with the problems of law enforcement where Negroes are 
concerned justly.”  For McDaniel, the issue was one of police training, a systemic 
problem within law enforcement and thus in need of a systemic change.  The Memphis 
Industrial Union Council (MIUC), a CIO affiliate in Memphis, asserted their disapproval 
of the Memphis Police Department in a letter to the Mayor in early September, “Our 
policemen apparently are ‘too quick on the trigger.’”  The council was “concerned over 
what does appear to be irresponsibility on the part of certain police officers.”  The MIUC 
framed the issue of police violence not in terms of race, but rather in terms of “risking the 
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lives of Memphians” more broadly.  Although they did not frame their condemnation of 
the police department in racial terms, the MIUC still saw the system of policing in 
Memphis as an issue that needed to be addressed.212 
 Swingler also articulated this understanding of the problem as systemic.  For 
Swingler, there was a culture among police officers that encouraged the brutal treatment 
in police interactions with the black citizens.  According to Swingler, “These rookie 
officers are out to make a reputation and they think the way to do so is to start using 
blackjacks on the heads of Negroes.”  Further, the white officer “believes he is upholding 
white supremacy…feels that he is elevating his own social position…by maltreating and 
‘showing out’ with the killing of some Negro.”213  The lack of justice for the black 
community, primarily where police officers were concerned, was rooted in a system of 
white supremacy upheld by violence.  
The systemic problems of racial prejudice and injustice that blacks faced extended 
beyond black encounters with police.  The link between black and criminal was an image 
perpetuated by other white officials as well.  In June of 1948, the city held a children’s 
day in which white children “managed” the city, acting as mayor, commissioners, judges, 
etc.  The day was designed to give children a glimpse at the job of city leadership.  
Memphis’s black children were excluded from children’s day, except to play the role of 
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criminal in the mock courtroom.214  This relegation of black children to the role of 
criminal when they were excluded from all other positions reinforced the image of blacks 
as criminals in another generation of white Memphians.  
The example of the children’s day role-playing demonstrated that the system of 
justice had been built on the premise of white superiority and black inherent criminality 
and was thus inherently unequal.  The same prejudice that festered in white police 
officers was present in the court system as well.  “It has become apparent that the courts 
under the present jury system are not adequate to cope with the situation” of prosecuting 
white police officers for brutality against blacks, Swingler argued.  While waiting for the 
results of the prosecution of the two officers who brutality beat Eli Blaine, the Memphis 
World editor wondered “whether the trial will result in another fiasco and horrible 
miscarriage of justice such as resulted when two other officers were tried for misusing 
two Negro girls.”  Swingler both reminded readers of the brutal treatment of black 
citizens by the Memphis police and of the failures to bring justice for the victims.215 
Just as in the 1945 case when both officers were acquitted of violating the two 
young women, the court system left the officers in the Blaine case essentially 
unpunished, only imposing a minor fine of $51 on the officer who hit Blaine in the 
station.  Adelaide Hudson was fined $102 for resisting arrest and disorderly conduct after 
police beat her.  A woman beaten so badly by police in June of 1948 that she fell into a 
comma for a week was fined $78 for resisting arrest.  The byline, “Beaten By Police – 
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Then Fined,” summed up the frustration many blacks felt towards the imbalance of the 
justice system in Memphis.  Another article in the Memphis World pointed out this 
disparity in fining white officers versus black defendants, noting that the fine given to the 
woman was higher than the one given to the officer who struck Eli Blaine.  216  
As the campaign for black police officers gained momentum, the developing 
activist voices within the black community drew not only on their memories of a history 
of injustice but also reacted to their frustration with black leaders associated with the 
Crump machine and the system of political accommodation those traditional leaders 
relied on when dealing with city politics.  Swingler had criticized these leaders during the 
rape case of 1945.  During the Freedom Train controversy, students called for the 
younger generation to stand as an alternative to traditional leadership.  Memphis historian 
Laurie Green argues that the students at LeMoyne worked to distinguish themselves from 
the established leaders.  Articles in the LeMoyne College student newspaper, The 
LeMoyne Democrat, encouraged students to be a part of the “‘intelligentsia’ and to 
challenge ‘prejudice and bigotry with sound, common sense and logic’ rather than 
cooperating with the machine’s racial paternalism.”  Students were trying to forge a more 
independent type of leadership and activism.  They imagined a black leadership that did 
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not exclude working with whites, but that did not accommodate at the expense of black 
rights.217 
Residents of black working-class neighborhoods who experienced the majority of 
police harassment were also becoming increasingly frustrated with and resentful of 
traditional elite leaders.  At a meeting in the Binghampton neighborhood in April 1948, 
one black minister was inflamed by the news of a mass meeting to be held at the Masonic 
Temple in which a section for white supporters would be reserved. “Can you imagine 
forming a mass meeting in our Negro Church and reserving a special section for whites 
when they will lynch our brothers and fathers and rape our sisters and mothers.”  What 
angered the minister was the continued accommodation to supposed white supporters, 
who were guilty at the very least of a failure to punish the continued crimes against 
blacks.  According to one speaker, “That’s what our ‘Big Shots’ will do for you, Our paid 
City Snitches – Our Crump Men – They will gamble on your life and mine to be a ‘Big 
Shot.’”  Connection to the Crump machine and accommodation to the white supremacist 
system were of more importance to black leaders than the lives of average black citizens, 
according to the speaker.  Held in the working-class neighborhood of Binghampton, this 
meeting and its speakers objected directly to the failures of black leaders to protect 
working-class black Memphians and the need for unity and to “vote this lynching and 
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raping set out.”  In a clear reference to the 1945 rape case, the speaker calls on the 
attendees to take control of creating change in their community.218  
 In the lead-up to the August 1948 primary elections, one editorial warned black 
Memphians to be wary of campaign promises, especially from traditional city and black 
leaders.  The author declared, “Negro leaders have settled for parks and pleasure spots 
while the Negro in coveralls, with one eye, fumbled to eke out a livelihood.”  In 
referencing Eli Blaine the editorial emphasized the argument that working-class blacks 
suffered while the economic and political black elite had used their position to garner 
favors that did little to create opportunity for a better life for the mass of black 
Memphians.  “Injustice, brutality, and exploitation have become an issue….  Minorities 
feel they have been betrayed” by traditional black leaders.219  
The AME Ministers’ Council came out in support of Swingler and the campaign 
to hire black police officers in late July 1948.  Ministers rejected the actions of “certain 
so-called leaders” who had approved token concessions while the rest of the city “had 
been repeatedly shocked by the unbridled brutality of the police upon the colored 
citizenry of the city.”  The Ministers’ Council cited police brutality directly as their 
motivation for supporting the campaign for black police officers.  The ministers believed 
that “all the citizens be given the protection that is due them regardless of color or 
nationality” and noted that the recent cases of police brutality were both “anti-Christian” 
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and “anti-democratic.”  The ministers connected police brutality and the hiring of black 
police officers directly to community protection and black citizenship rights.220   
The support of the AME ministers made apparent the lack of support from Baptist 
ministers.  The Baptist Ministers Alliance, representing the “rank and file” of the 
majority of black churchgoers, was “strangely silent.”  An article in the Memphis World 
commented that this “rank and file” wondered, “how their leaders can remain so quiet to 
the ‘Stormy Present.’”  The article also connected the push for greater justice with 
citizenship rights and further criticized the Baptist leadership for not showing its support: 
“No citizen can afford not to stand up and be counted during these times…certainly not 
our leaders.  We hope that the Baptist ministers and our leaders in all other circles will 
live up to what they confess to be.”221  As they were criticizing black leaders, members of 
the black ministry called on their fellow religious leaders to step forward and lead black 
Memphians in social and political change.  
In the midst of growing resentment against traditional Memphis leaders, more 
blacks began to look to Swingler as the voice of change for black Memphians.  “He has 
been consistent, persistent and determined” in working to create change for blacks in 
Memphis, particularly in finding an alternative solution to the old problem of injustice.  
Working-class black Memphians had been lamenting the lack of black leadership, a 
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leadership that would work for them and help to create changes that would bring more 
equal treatment to black citizens.222  
In the wake of the Eli Blaine case and Swingler’s editorials connecting the lack of 
justice received by Blaine with the need for black police officers, more and more 
Memphians were beginning to see black police officers as the way to achieve greater 
justice for black Memphians.  Joining Swingler’s campaign for black police officers 
would be the way of justice, a veteran and graduate of LeMoyne College declared in an 
editorial in early August.  For two years, Swingler had been pushing for black police 
officers, and by early August 1948, his campaign had gained a significant amount of 
support from among black Memphians.  In a letter to the regional office of the NUL, 
MUL director McDaniel asked for more information on the hiring of black police officers 
in the South noting that community action and public opinion had “the iron hot and a 
little information from your office might help stimulate the cause,” by informing other 
Memphians and officials of the success of black officers in other southern cities.223  
Much of this support from Memphis’s black civic and religious organizations for 
Swingler’s campaign for black police officers came after the court failed to prosecute the 
officers in the Eli Blaine case.  As with the AME Ministers’ Council, the majority of 
these groups connected the campaign for black officers with black citizenship rights and 
the need for a more equal justice system.  McDaniel connected the campaign for black 
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officers directly with the war effort:  “Negroes served their country in the time of war, 
why not let them serve in the time of peace?  Let’s make America and Memphis safe for 
everybody.”  Hiring black police officers would be a direct way of demonstrating how 
service in the war could be translated into greater justice and equality at home.  At a 
moment when nationally black Americans were arguing that their support of the war 
effort justified greater equality at home, McDaniel tapped into this sentiment by 
supporting more equal protection for the black community in Memphis through the hiring 
of black police officers.  McDaniel was also offering proof of the validity of having black 
men serve the community because “men with good character, men with college degrees 
and veterans who served honorably their country…will make themselves available now 
for war against all crimes committed in our communities.”  Through his references of the 
need to make America and Memphis safe for everyone, McDaniel put the hiring of black 
police officers in a larger context.  Rather than making the issue of black police officers a 
race issue, McDaniel made it an issue of bettering the larger community.  “Justice and 
truth demands a change in our present condition,” McDaniel argued in mid-July.224  
 The conservative MUL director worked to balance the needs of the community 
with what others described as the “complexity” of Memphis power relations.  Isobel 
Chisholm noted that the MUL and its director were doing what they could in order to 
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survive.  As had been demonstrated in the ousting of Bell from the MUL, Crump’s 
acceptance of the MUL’s continued work in the city was tenuous. Crump’s support could 
be withdrawn if they were to go “all out.”  Thus, McDaniel framed the hiring of black 
police officers as a move to “increase morale, devotion, and loyalty to the city” rather 
than a challenge to the system of accommodation and racial segregation.225  
This idea of more equal protection leading to increased community stability was 
one reiterated by many supporters of employing black police.  Advocates of black police 
officers made the case that these officers, although they would be physically present in 
black neighborhoods, would serve the larger Memphis community.  Supporters like 
McDaniels imagined that black officers would create a more equal justice system and 
foster a greater respect for the law.  Articles describing the success of black officers in 
other southern cities emphasized the reduction of crime in black neighborhoods, a fact 
that Memphis supporters, particularly those addressing the white community, were sure 
to highlight.  As part of their series profiling southern police departments with black 
officers, the white daily Commercial Appeal noted “police officials of the cities including 
Miami, Louisville, and Dallas, report negro crime greatly reduced in the negro areas 
patrolled by the negro officers.”226   
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But black police advocates in Memphis also focused on the way black police 
officers would impact the relationship between the people and the law.  AVC chairman 
Leon Springfield noted after a review of the experience of other southern cities with 
black police officers that the presence of black officers had “increased the dignity and 
justice of their police departments, obtain[ing] wider respect for their officers by all 
groups.”  The public, especially the black public, had lambasted the Memphis Police 
Department in the wake of the police brutality cases.  “White officers alone are 
inadequate,” one local minister argued.  Swingler criticized the department, “Sending the 
young ‘hotheads’ now on the force to police Negro areas is just bad police business.”  
Not only were white police officers brutal in their treatment of blacks, but also they were 
also corrupt.  “White officers were making a good profit” by allowing criminal activity to 
continue for the right price.  White officers were known to take a bribe rather than 
arresting small time offenders.227  The Memphis Police Department enforced the law 
arbitrarily and often brutally, so there was little respect for the police among black 
Memphians.  
Advocates for black police officers argued that black officers would give black 
Memphians a greater stake in the law and thus create a more peaceful city community.  
As a Commercial Appeal editorial argued, “It would give all negro citizens an increased 
feeling of sharing in community objectives…It would make every thinking negro a 
supporter of law and order.”  Black representation on the police force would allow black 
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Memphians to feel as if the law was working for them, “it is his policeman, his laws” that 
were being enforced.  A black war veteran who advocated for black officers believed that 
one of the major benefits of black police would be the “psychological effect” their 
appointment would have on young black Memphians.  Black police would give the youth 
in the community something to be proud of and give them greater respect for their own 
race.228  These men would be representative of a more positive future for blacks in 
Memphis, a future where blacks would have equal representation in the city and black 
men would uphold the law, thus allowing for more equal justice.  
The immediate benefit of having the black population respect the law would be a 
reduction in crime as well as a reduction in racial tension.  With racial violence erupting 
across the country in the years following the war, racial tension was a concern for 
Memphis leaders.  The NAACP in their condemnation of the Mosby killing echoed this 
sentiment.  “Brutality does not uphold the good name of this fair city,” nor did it help 
race relations.  In their letter, the NAACP was tapping into city leaders’ desire to 
maintain peaceful race relations in order to maintain a positive image of their city to the 
rest of the nation.  Black advocates were sure to remind white officials that if police 
brutality against blacks continued “the ultimate result is always race trouble.  And that’s 
just what is brewing in Memphis,” in the summer of 1948.  Thus, employing black police 
officers would be a move to maintain the peaceful race relations and enhance Memphis’s 
image as a progressive southern city.   
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Advocates acknowledged that black officers would not solve all of the racial 
problems in the city, nor did they believe that black officers would be easier on black 
criminals.  However, advocates did believe that black officers would help create a more 
equal justice system.  According to Swingler, “The presence of Negro officers on local 
forces is a symbol of at least a modicum of fair-play and justice at the hands of law 
enforcement.”229  While black police officers would only have a direct impact on one area 
of black life in Memphis, the campaign for their hiring took on larger meanings of justice 
and equality for black citizens.  Because advocates drew connections between citizenship 
rights, equality, and the presence of black officers in black neighborhoods, the question 
over the city employing black police to solve the problem of racial inequality came to the 
foreground of the debate over inequality in Memphis in 1948.  Advocates imagined black 
police officers as symbols of black advancement and a way to protect black citizenship 
rights.  
As the primary election in August of 1948 approached, other black rights 
advocates for equality, including black unionists, intertwined reactions to police brutality 
and the upcoming election with the community’s calls for black police officers.  The 
hiring of black police officers became associated with black political power and the 
ability of black Memphians to use that power to enact change for the betterment of black 
citizens.  The black media and civic and religious organizations made the issue of black 
police officers an issue in the 1948 election and used black political power as a way to 
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force city leaders to address local concerns over black equality and community 
protection.  
The year 1948 began with several calls for black citizens to take a greater interest 
in civic engagement.  The civic club in the primarily black neighborhood of Orange 
Mound encouraged its residents and black Memphians as a whole to show the broader 
Memphis community that they “have accepted the challenge of civic responsibility” and 
would continue to work to better their community through action.  Nat D. Williams called 
for Memphis blacks to “achieve a higher civic status” in 1948 in his weekly column, 
“Down on Beale Ave.”  Williams advocated that Memphis blacks work harder to make 
Memphis a better place to live, not only in their immediate neighborhoods with activities 
such as taking part in charity work, opening businesses, and taking a greater interest in 
schools, but also in the larger Memphis community by paying their taxes and voting.230  
With an election approaching, voting became the primary form of civic 
engagement and action called for by the new group of emerging leaders among black 
Memphians, including students, ministers, and civic organizations.  Creating change in 
black Memphians’ position and the vote went hand-in-hand in 1948.  The “appointment 
of negro police officers would be a prime mover in getting out the negro vote” for 
machine candidates, a group of black citizens informed the mayor in July.  The thirty 
traditional black elite, including Blair Hunt, principal at the local black high school, and 
Dr. J. E. Walker, who attended the meeting, attempted to use their usual approach to 
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garnering benefits for black Memphians.  These men used the promise of black votes to 
try to bargain for benefits for the city’s black population.  Although the mayor made no 
promises at the meeting, in a statement afterwards, he announced that those who attended 
the meeting had pledged their support to the machine candidates in the upcoming 
primary.231  
This meeting was a response by the traditional black elite to the growing criticism 
of their inability to enact real change within the city for blacks and their subservience to 
the Crump machine.  The fact that the mayor refused to make any promises along with 
his release of the names of attendees and their support for machine candidates reinforced 
the perception that these black elites were pawns of the machine.  Their failure to secure 
any promises from the machine highlighted the lack of any real power these men had to 
provide black Memphians with the protection they called for and needed.  Two days after 
the meeting, attendee Dr. S.A. Owens came out against the use of his name in connection 
with the machine candidates.  In an attempt to separate himself from the political 
wrangling of machine politics and appeal to the growing black demand for black police 
officers, Owens declared, “I can be counted on to cast a ballot for the persons I think will 
serve the best interest of the people.”  Owens spoke of the “desire to enjoy all of the 
rights and privileges of a good citizen of our city, state and nation,” the “regrets 
expressed concerning the police brutality,” and the “much needed negro police officers,” 
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and connected the upcoming election and black citizenship rights with the campaign for 
black police officers.232   
Owens was not the only one to highlight the link between the campaign for black 
officers and political participation.  “We cannot urge too strongly upon our people the 
importance and necessity of voting intelligently…as a means of improving our status in a 
democratic form of government and furthering the assurance of our civil and 
constitutional rights,” the CME District Conference declared in its endorsement of black 
police officers.  Black civic and religious organizations were calling on black citizens to 
use their voting rights to enact change.  After the meeting in which the mayor had refused 
to take a stand on the issue of black police officers even as black leaders promised black 
votes in return, it was clear that traditional strategies of negotiation were not going to 
create the change a growing number of black Memphians desired. 233  
Throughout the month of July, in the lead-up to the primary election, Swingler 
and the Memphis World reminded black Memphians of the injustices of the past.  
Reminding readers of recent judicial failures and voter suppression, Swingler argued the 
importance of using the vote to voice black desires for change.  Although blacks had 
retained the right to vote in Memphis, the Crump political machine was known to use 
“‘intimidation’ and such practices as ‘coaching’ the ballot,” in order to secure victory for 
machine-backed candidates.  The corruption of the Crump political machine had kept 
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many black voters away from the polls.  In one editorial in the lead-up to the election, the 
author recounted how “both parties ask for the Negro vote, but as he approaches the 
polling places he hears the same familiar growl – ‘hey you-nigger, get in line there!....  
Get in your place, nigger!’  And he feels the same familiar whack over the head by the 
big stick that represents the law.”  The author reminded readers that the law and the 
political machine that guided that law had not worked for black Memphians.  The 
political machine and the votes it elicited from black voters had kept black citizens in an 
inferior “place.”  The author intimated that times had changed.  “If candidates want the 
Negro vote they will have to see to it that there are Negro police officers at the Negro 
polling places, to insure the voter he won’t have to trade an eye for his effort to cast a 
ballot.”234  In yet another reference to the Blaine beating, the editorial drew a connection 
between the lack of black police officers and blacks’ inability to act out their rights at 
citizens.  Advocates for black police officers worked to associate the campaign with 
larger political and citizenship rights, imploring black citizens to use their vote to enact 
change within the community that would bring immediate relief in the form of black 
police officers but also break black votes free from the Crump machine.  
Crump and his candidates lost the primary election in early August 1948.  In a 
headline reading, “Negro Voters Join with Liberal Whites to Lift ‘Iron Curtain,’” the 
Memphis World emphasized the importance of the black vote in defeating the machine.  
The black electorate voted with its memory of the 1945 rape case, the Fred Jackson case, 
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the Blaine case, and all of the other instances of injustice experienced by black 
Memphians in the recent past.  Historian Laurie Green deems these votes cast by black 
Memphians in the 1948 primary as votes of protest, against not only the lack of equal 
justice but also Crump’s continued adherence to a strict system of white supremacy.  
Crump’s break with the Democratic Party over Truman’s civil rights platform 
emphasized his commitment to white supremacy and the continued suppression of black 
rights.  This move pushed not only black Memphians but also white moderates and labor 
organizers to mobilize voters against Crump candidates.  This coalition dealt Crump his 
first electoral defeat in nearly two decades.235  
Then, just two weeks after the primary elections, police shot James Mosby in 
front of his Binghampton home.  The Mosby killing intensified calls for black police 
officers.  A mass meeting was held in the neighborhood in which the East Memphis 
Citizens Council circulated a petition advocating for greater protection for the city’s 
black residents.  The Council delivered the petition to the mayor “appealing…for 
protection of the Negroes of the city of Memphis from police brutality and police 
killings.”  The petition reiterated the justifications previously laid out for black police, the 
need for more equal protection, justice for black citizens, and the end of continued 
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violations of black civil rights.236  Similar petitions from the CME Pastor’s Alliance and 
the Memphis CIO Council quickly followed the Binghampton petition.  
By the time Swingler wrote his “It’s Becoming Trite” editorial on August 24, 
1948, after James Mosby was killed, the excuses used by white police officers to justify 
the beating of blacks had become far too familiar.  The excuses of and absolution for 
officers guilty of wrongdoing had become “too much the accepted answer.”  Swingler 
chose the word “trite” in part because of its meaning of “being old-timey.”  Using 
excuses to absolve an officer of unjustified beatings of black citizens had become an 
unwanted relic of a time past in Memphis, and many black citizens were no longer 
willing to listen to the over-used excuses.237  As Nat D. Williams had said, black 
Memphians had long memories, ones filled with instances of injustice.  By the time 
Swingler wrote his August editorial, all Memphians were increasingly aware of black 
Memphians’ demands for greater justice for black citizens in the form of black police 
officers.  
Beginning on August 27 and running daily through September 5, the Commercial 
Appeal ran a series of articles examining the success of black police officers in other 
southern cities from Dallas, Texas, to Richmond, Virginia, and closer to home in 
Nashville, Tennessee.  The goal of this series was to gain support for black officers 
among white Memphians.  While black appeals had focused on the need for justice and 
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equality, the articles in the Commercial Appeal focused on the benefits to city 
management.  In these other cities, black crime had been reduced, racial tensions had 
been reduced, and cities had ultimately saved money.  Most of the articles mentioned that 
black officers were only used in black neighborhoods, dealt almost exclusively with 
blacks, and had separate white commanders.238  All of the articles mentioned the success 
of black officers in easing racial friction in other southern cities.  
In the wake of Crump’s primary defeat, blacks in Memphis continued to see 
voting as their way to create change.  Even before the Mosby killing, Swingler reminded 
Memphians that hiring black police officers was still an issue on the minds of many black 
citizens, and he linked the pre-election promise of consideration with the post-election 
political landscape.  Throughout the month of September, as outrage over the Mosby 
killing grew and the campaign for black police officers garnered greater support both 
from black and white Memphians, advocates for black police continue to draw a link 
between black voting and the campaign for black officers.  “Your and my problems are 
tied up in the ballot box,” a Baptist minister told a group of prominent black 
Memphians.239  The defeat of Crump in the primary had proved that the black vote could 
make a difference.  
By helping to defeat the Crump candidates in the primary, black voters 
demonstrated a willingness to go against the machine.  After a decade of injustice and in 
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some cases outright brutality, black Memphians took hold of the activist spirit of the 
postwar years and used what little power they did have to demand greater equality.  The 
loss of the election caused a crisis for Crump, and in its aftermath, he tried to win back 
black votes.  By September Police Commissioner Joseph Boyle announced the city would 
begin looking into hiring black police officers.  Swingler praised black Memphians’ 
support of the campaign.  “It was an effort to help ourselves,” Swingler claimed.240  
In the late 1940s, in a city run on racial segregation and steeped in a tradition of 
white supremacy, city officials’ decision to hire black police officers was the result of 
black community efforts to demand acknowledgment of their citizenship rights.  The 
success of black calls for black police officers demonstrated the ability of black 
Memphians to come together for a common cause, the ability to form biracial coalitions 
with liberal whites, and a willingness to push back against a white supremacist power 
structure.  Black Memphians were no longer satisfied with token accommodation.  They 
wanted greater equality and had developed alternative strategies for negotiating with the 
city’s white power structure, strategies that forced city officials to take into account the 
wants and needs of the mass of the city’s black citizens.  
But while the campaign to hire black police officers was a success, there were 
limits to this success.  As black Memphians demanded more equal justice, they were not 
demanding integration.  Advocates for black police officers wanted these officers to 
replace white officers in black neighborhoods.  Black Memphians wanted greater 
protection under the law through a more equal system of law.  However, this protection 
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and any efforts to more equally enforce the law would still be operating within a system 
of legal segregation.  As we will discover in the following chapter, the black officers who 
were hired in the fall of 1948 were not treated as equals of their white counterparts.  So 
while the campaign to hire black police officers was a success, laying the groundwork for 
a shift in Memphis’s political and racial landscape, the reality of having black officers did 
little to promote black equality.  
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CHAPTER VI 
RACE AND THE REALITY OF BEING A BLACK POLICE OFFICER IN 
POSTWAR MEMPHIS 
 
 
We cleaned up Beale Street that was our job.  
Quoted in Chris Conley,  
~ Commercial Appeal, November 7, 1993. 
Ain’t no nigger gunna arrest me. 
Quoted in “Proud and Unbowed,”  
~ Commercial Appeal, February 18, 1989. 
 
 
 
In the mid-1950s, Hernando Road became a one-way street.  Located in south 
Memphis, the street was part of the city’s black police officers’ patrol area, so it was their 
responsibility to enforce the new traffic pattern.  “Some superiors we had were on us to 
write tickets,” Wendell Robinson, one of the original nine black police officers hired in 
1948, remembered.  So Robinson checked out ticket books and wrote up traffic tickets to 
anyone, black or white, violating the new one-way traffic pattern.  But when he finished 
his shift, he was called into police headquarters.  “The inspector of the shift asked us who 
gave us the authority to give white folks a ticket.”  The inspector reminded Robinson that 
even though he wore the uniform of the Memphis Police Department, he did not have the 
full authority of a police officer.  According to Robinson’s superior, the regulation 
restricting black officers from arresting white suspects extended to restrictions on black 
officers issuing traffic tickets to white offenders. 
Robinson and the other black police officers had to walk a fine line when it came 
to acting on their authority.  As Robinson remembered, “If a colored man turns a corner 
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and we give him a ticket, and then a white man turns the same corner – hundreds of 
Negroes are looking on to see if we’ll pull him a ticket.”  Black Memphians were 
watching to see if Robinson and his fellow black police officers treated blacks and whites 
equally.  When the black community had campaigned for the hiring of black police 
officers, they did so with the expectation that black officers would foster a more equal 
justice system by enforcing the law equally, unlike their white counterparts.241  
When Robinson asked the inspector what he should have done, the inspector 
replied, “Put that ticket book in your pocket and don’t write the ticket.”  The inspector 
did not expect the black officer to enforce the law equally.  To the inspector, the authority 
of black police officers did not extend to white violators of the law.  Even though they 
were police officers, Robinson and his fellow black officers were black men first and thus 
limited in their authority, regardless of the uniform they wore.  So Robinson put his ticket 
book in his pocket and left it there until he retired, never again writing another traffic 
ticket to a black or a white citizen. 242   
This episode was a reminder that black police officers in Memphis in the late 
1940s and 1950s were defined by their race before their position on the police force.  
Memphians of both races expected these black officers to act differently from their white 
counterparts.  Blacks hoped for more equal justice while whites anticipated black officers 
would control those of their own race, thus reducing crime and easing racial tensions. 
Robinson’s story about traffic tickets highlights the balancing act black police officers 
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had to perform in a segregated city, as both officers of the law and members of the black 
community. 
The nine black men hired to the Memphis Police Force in 1948 came from within 
Memphis’s own black community.  Nothing is known about these men’s specific 
involvement in the campaign to hire black police officers, but each, for their own reasons 
took advantage of the opportunity created by black Memphian’s campaign.  Out of the 
150 applicants, Wendell Robinson, Rufus J. Turner, Ernest Withers, Marion Teague, 
Jewel Jubirt, Roscoe McWilliams, Claudius Phillips, James Pegues, and Daniel Evans 
were the nine men who were selected and completed the two-week training course.  
These men applied to be Memphis’s first black police officers in three decades for a 
variety of reasons.  Wendell Robinson applied because he was “curious.”243  Ernest 
Withers cited his ambition as the reason for his application.  Withers imagined that being 
a police officer would offer good pay and a way to move up in the world.  Claudius 
Phillips echoed this sentiment, “Following a police career is a good profession, especially 
for a negro.”  For Roscoe McWilliams the reasons were much more practical, as his wife 
had recently become pregnant and he needed to find a steady job.  Whatever their 
reasons, these nine men became the black officers added to the Memphis Police  
Department in 1948.244 
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The nine men shared a common background.  Natives to Memphis, all nine were 
graduates of the local black high schools.  Marion Teague, Wendell Robinson, and Rufus 
J. Turner attended Booker T. Washington High School together.  After high school, 
Wendell Robinson, along with Ernest Withers, Jewel Jubirt, Roscoe McWilliams, and 
James Pegues, left Memphis to serve in the armed forces during World War II.  Thus, 
more than half of the nine officers were veterans who had worn a uniform, followed 
orders, and served their country, demonstrating their ability and willingness to serve the 
larger community.  Upon returning from service in the war, Robinson attended the local 
black college, LeMoyne College, of which Claudius Phillips was also a graduate.  
Robinson never completed his degree, as he dropped out in his third year to take the job 
as police officer.245  These nine men were representative of a certain generation of 
Memphians.  They grew up during the Depression, managed to receive at least a high 
school education, and had gone to war to serve their country.  The nine black officers 
hired in 1948 represented black Memphians’ abilities to be productive members of 
society, and the officers’ backgrounds seemed to offer them the tools to successfully 
protect black neighborhoods and help to bring greater equality to the Memphis justice 
system in terms of treatment of black citizens. 
Both black and white Memphians had high, yet varying, expectations of these 
black police officers.  “We were more or less in a fish bowl,” Robinson remembered.  
From their first night on patrol in the Beale Street area of Memphis, these officers were 
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on display.  The black community had advocated for their hiring because they expected 
that black police would protect black citizens and work to create a more equal justice 
system.  White advocates for black officers expected that black police in Memphis would 
offer the same benefits black officers in other southern cities had: a reduction in crime, a 
lessening of racial tension, and the maintenance of the southern system of racial 
segregation.  Thus, when black officers began their patrol duties on the night of 
November 5, 1948, Memphians, black and white, were watching to see if these black 
officers would live up to their different expectations.246  
The idea that these black officers would “clean up” Beale Street, the primarily 
black business and entertainment district in Memphis often frequented by white revelers, 
was on the surface a common goal for black and white Memphians.247  However, the 
varying expectations over how this task would be accomplished speak to the difficulties 
of being black police officers in a segregated city.  This chapter examines those varying 
expectations of Memphis’s black police officers and how those expectations impacted the 
reality of being black and a police officer.  Black expectations of protection and equal 
justice were not necessarily contradictory to white expectations of maintaining 
segregation and racial status quo.  Hiring black police officers to enforce the law in black 
neighborhoods protected blacks from white police officers, reduced racial friction, and 
further reinforced the structure of segregation in Memphis society.  For white officials, 
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black police officers represented a way to appease black citizens’ demands while 
maintaining the racial status quo.   
However, because of the segregation of the police department and the 
discrimination against and disrespect of black police officers that came with that 
segregation, black officers were unable to live up to the hopes of those black Memphians 
who had advocated for their hiring.  The juxtaposition of the expectations blacks and 
whites had for these officers and the officers’ actual experience as Memphis police 
officers demonstrates a disconnect between black anticipations of equality and southern 
white officials’ continued commitment to segregation.  The restrictions placed on their 
service meant that black officers did not stop police brutality or create a more equal 
justice system.  Rather, those black officers hired in the postwar era became monitors of 
the black population, maintaining racial segregation and enforcing a system of law 
controlled by whites.  The story of these black police officers, while on the face a triumph 
for black action for change, when examined more closely, brings into focus the limits of 
black negotiating power in the postwar South.  
As seen in the previous chapter, the campaign to hire black police officers in 
Memphis was part of a trend among southern cities in the mid-to-late 1940s.  While only 
sixteen southern cities had black officers in 1943, by 1954, 143 cities in 13 southern 
states employed at least one black officer.  The number of black officers employed and 
the duties they were permitted to perform varied from city to city but common among 
them was the idea that the black officers’ patrol areas were confined to the black 
neighborhoods in their respective cities.  Published by the Southern Regional Council, 
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who kept track of the numbers and the duties of black officers in southern cities, reports 
indicate that the addition of black officers was not a move toward integration but a move 
toward maintaining peaceful segregation.  This moderate interracial group used these 
reports to advocate for the hiring of black police officers across the South.  Their 
conclusions about the value of black police officers echoed the sentiments of white 
advocates in Memphis.248   
Hiring black officers offered a way for white officials and black leaders to show 
action towards accommodating the demands of a growing black population without 
forcing integration or equality.  The result of the conflicting expectations of whites and 
blacks was an experience for black officers that was, on the one hand, a move towards 
uplifting the black community and, on the other, a reinforcement of the power and reach 
of segregation.  An examination of the reality of implementing the expectations of the 
black Memphians who advocated for the hiring of black police officers reveals a 
complicated story about relations within Memphis’s black community as a whole and 
between black Memphians and white city leaders. 
Discovering Their Purpose: The Expectations of Black Police Officers in Memphis 
The black officers hired in 1948 entered a department known for its aggressive 
adherence to and enforcement of white supremacy in a segregated city determined to 
continue to maintain that separation.  From the outset, black officers had to recognize the 
tensions between the potential extent of their authority and the limits to the practical 
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application of that authority.  For black and white Memphians, this potential authority 
was rooted in the idea of protection.  This protection was both physical and ideological.  
The experience of World War II at home and abroad created a situation in the South in 
which black and white Southerners felt the need to increase their physical protection as 
well as protect their differing conceptions of the American social order.  
The wave of racial violence that swept the country in the years surrounding World 
War II made the threat of racially motivated violence a reality for both black and white 
Memphians.  In 1942, rumors of black unrest and the potential for racial violence spread 
among white Memphians.  Congressman Clifford Davis reported “a few citizens have 
thoroughly worked themselves up” over rumors of “Eleanor Clubs,” supposedly 
clandestine organizations formed by black women in an effort to disrupt the racial order.  
In the same year, the Director of Social Services for the Memphis and Shelby County 
Welfare Commission also reported rumors of racial unrest to Mayor Walter Chandler: 
“There is going to be an uprising among the negroes on Tuesday night…the negro who 
told one of my case workers this, told her that it would be well for her and her family to 
stay off the street Tuesday night.”  Although a black uprising did not occur in Memphis 
during the war years, these rumors expose the persistent white fear of black-instigated 
violence.249 
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However, the racial violence of the period was primarily directed at black soldiers 
and civilians.  It is estimated that some forty black men, mostly veterans, were lynched in 
the aftermath of the war.  During the war, the shooting of a black soldier by police in 
1943 instigated the outbreak of racially motivated violence centered in Harlem.  In that 
same year, rumors of the killing of black women in Detroit, a city already fraught with 
tensions over jobs and housing, incited a wave of violence. 250  In Memphis, publicity of 
police brutality against blacks was on the rise in the immediate postwar years, making the 
threat of violence an everyday occurrence for black Memphians.  These instances 
emphasized both the continued disregard for black life and the white pushback against 
growing black resistance to racial segregation and discrimination.  Thus, physical 
protection was at the forefront of black and white Memphians’ minds by 1948.  
The series of articles discussing the experience of other southern cities with black 
officers that ran for two weeks in the fall of 1948 in the white Memphis paper, the 
Commercial Appeal, tried to inform the Memphis public about the potential benefits, 
especially for the white community, of having black officers.  The articles described 
black police officers’ primary function as monitoring and controlling black citizens, thus 
creating a safer city for whites.  The first article in the series, “Negro police in 
Memphis?” noted that fifty-one cities in ten southern states were employing black police 
officers.  In Miami, Florida, the hiring of black officers “was organized as a wartime 
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emergency” in 1944 to deal with the immediate issues arising from an increased black 
population.  But since that time, both crime and juvenile delinquency among blacks had 
greatly declined, a success the Miami Police Chief argued “couldn’t have been possible 
otherwise.”251  The Miami Police Chief’s description of how black officers had served 
their community would have appealed to white Memphians also concerned with the 
growing black population and the rising racial tensions in their city.  
The majority of the articles in the Commercial Appeal series mentioned the 
reduction of crime as well as the fact that there had been no confrontations between 
whites, officers or city residents, and the black police.  In Nashville, the largest 
Tennessee city using black police in 1948, officials described the hiring black officers 
was an “experiment.”  The assistant police chief, who trained the officers, had been wary 
of the plan to have black officers, but he admitted that the black officers had “done 
excellent work in apprehending negro law violators.”  Tulsa officials praised black 
officers were praised for being able to speed up investigations involving black offenders.  
The Tulsa chief’s statement implied that black officers were better able to root out the 
criminal element among those of their race.  Both articles emphasized the key function of 
these black officers as seen by white officials: controlling the black population by 
policing public behavior and apprehending the criminal elements to which black officers 
supposedly had greater access. 252 
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Concerns over how to control the black community were also on the forefront of 
white officials’ agenda as black challenges to the ideological underpinnings of southern 
society continued throughout the World War II era.    In Birmingham, Alabama, in 1943, 
a black soldier sat down in the front seat of a bus, violating the Jim Crow law that 
relegated blacks to seats in the rear of buses.  When he refused to move to the back of the 
bus, a white passenger carrying a knife attacked him.  This white passenger believed he 
was protecting the racial order of the South.  The rhetoric of the war and the increase in 
black activism during the war years posed a threat to white supremacy and the southern 
social hierarchy.  Memphis’s Commissioner of Public Safety, Joseph Boyle, blamed the 
national civil rights agenda for fueling black discontent in the South.  A public statement 
in early September 1948 quoted Boyle as saying: “Negro police won’t settle the negro 
problem by any means, when three candidates for the presidency of the United States are 
advocating FEPC and elimination of the ‘Jim Crow’ Law.”  For Boyle, the nature of the 
“Negro problem” was the anticipation of greater rights and equality that he had seen 
among the city’s black residents.  Particularly black working-class Memphians involved 
in union activity.  Black willingness to advocate for and attempt to act on these rights 
posed a threat to the ideological foundations of Memphis’s social order.  In Boyle’s 
interpretation of the situation, the presidential candidates were “all advocating complete 
social equality,” an idea in direct violation of the white supremacist attitude that ruled 
Memphis.  Boyle assured white Memphians that changes in the city’s social structure 
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“will not happen in Memphis.”253  Boyle had no intention of letting the advocates for 
black equality, and black police officers specifically, pose a challenge to the Jim Crow 
system of racial segregation.  Rather, he believed that black officers would help to pacify 
black activism for equality and work to bolster segregation. 
White and black proponents of the plan to hire black officers assumed that having 
black police would offer both physical protection, by easing racial tensions, and 
ideological protection.  For the black advocates of hiring black police officers who 
connected the hiring with citizenship rights, black officers represented black 
advancement toward greater equality, while for white leaders, these officers reinforced 
racial separation and thus the southern social order.  City leaders saw the black officers as 
a solution to the problem of maintaining segregation within a changing local and national 
context.  What Commissioner Boyle called the “Negro problem” was, for white officials, 
the problem of a growing black population that increasingly demanded greater 
acknowledgement of their citizenship rights.  As this problem continued to grow, the city 
needed an alternative means of maintaining white supremacy while simultaneously 
appeasing black demands.  The Commercial Appeal pointed out that even the new black 
officers realized that “for modern Memphis, they are the principals in an entirely new 
undertaking.”254  The press and police department assured white Memphians that this 
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“new undertaking” would not undermine the traditional system but would work to 
maintain it. 
The idea of having blacks work for the city for the purpose of dealing with 
members of their own race was not entirely new to Memphis.  Eleven years earlier, the 
Memphis Housing Authority (MHA) hired black managers, engineers, and clerks to 
handle issues dealing with the housing projects in black neighborhoods.  “By having 
negro employees to deal with negro tenants we have achieved excellent co-operation,” 
MHA director J.A. Fowler noted.  Having black city employees deal with members of 
their own race had proven to reduce tensions and increase cooperation.  Fowler went on 
to argue that the hiring of black police officers would also “prove a forward step in 
helping keep the peace of the city.”255  City leaders believed that racial separation of 
government functions would ease the growing racial tensions and give the residents of 
black neighborhoods plagued by police harassment a stake in maintaining racial 
segregation. 
Police officials emphasized that black police officers’ limited authority did not 
allow them to challenge the status quo of southern racial segregation.  In cities across the 
South black officers helped to reinforce the separation of the races.  The purpose of black 
officers in the cities investigated by the Commercial Appeal was to control the black 
population by using black men to police members of their own race.  This purpose was 
further reinforced by the fact that black officers were hired from within the local black 
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community, and once on duty, only patrolled in black neighborhoods.  In Little Rock, 
Arkansas, white officers were initially opposed to having black police officers until they 
learned that this change would mean the white officers would no longer be patrolling 
black neighborhoods.  Presumably, the opposition of Little Rock’s white officers was 
rooted in the threat of having black police officers placed on equal standing with white 
officers.  But having black officers only in black neighborhoods not only freed white 
officers from interactions with black residence but also limited the patrol areas and shifts 
of black officers, thus eliminating any threat of job equality between black and white 
officers.  Overall, the message for white Memphians was that black police officers 
reinforced separation of the races, reduced the threat of racial tension, and protected the 
racialized social order.256  
Hiring black officers was also seen as a way to improve the image of the 
Memphis Police Department and its relationship with black Memphians.  The public 
perception of the Memphis Police Department in the wake of the Eli Blaine case had 
been greatly diminished.  While commissioner Boyle continued to argue that the 
department worked to protect the ideology of white supremacy, the brutality with which 
his department did so had the unintended effect of fueling black resentment and black 
calls for the protection of their rights.257  The Memphis Police Department, while trying to 
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protect the white supremacist values that predominated in Memphis, was in fact 
responsible for the majority of racial friction in Memphis in the late 1940s.   
When the Commercial Appeal officially endorsed the idea of hiring black police 
officers on September 7, 1948, the paper argued that the move would give the city’s 
black residents a stake in law enforcement.  Having black police officers “would give all 
negro citizens an increased feeling of sharing in community objectives….  It would make 
every thinking negro a supporter of law and order.”  Having members of their own race 
involved in community law enforcement, officials believed, would make black 
Memphians more apt to support the police, and the law more generally.  By labeling 
members of the city’s black community as “thinking Negroes,” white leaders implied that 
the majority of black Memphians wanted to support the police and obey the law but that 
continued police mistreatment of the city’s black residents, primarily working-class 
citizens who made up the majority of the black population had simply eroded their faith 
in the justice system.  Likewise, Memphis World editor L.O. Swingler argued that black 
officers would help to “render service to the peace and welfare of the Memphis Police 
Department and justice to their own people.”258  Swingler, however, expanded the 
argument of the Commercial Appeal to include the positive impact black officers would 
have on the functioning of the Memphis Police Department, which in turn would increase 
black cooperation with the law.  
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The city’s chapter of the American Veterans Committee (AVC) argued that hiring 
black officers in other cities had “increased the dignity and justice of their police 
departments, combined wider respect for their officers by all groups, and lowered crime 
rates.”  White proponents focused their arguments concerning bettering race relations on 
the reduction of black crime and the increased control over the black population.  The 
AVC, an organization with a large number of black student veterans, shifted the focus 
onto the role black police officers would have on race relations through their impact on 
the functioning of the Memphis Police Department and the enforcement of law in the 
city.259  Having black community representatives in law enforcement would allow 
Memphians to see the department as a more dignified and just organization, thus 
increasing the respect all city residents, black and white, had for police officers in 
general. 
In hiring black police officers, white leaders hoped that these men would be 
visible symbols of improved race relations.  According to their white superiors, those 
black officers who began training in October 1948 “have expressed a genuine desire to be 
of service to their people, to the cause of law and order and to all of Memphis.  They 
have fully accepted the limitations placed on their power.”  Indeed, there would be limits 
on black officers’ authority to ensure that they were doing the job of maintaining the 
status quo, not becoming symbols of change.  Whites intended that these initial black 
officers would be first and foremost police officers committed to upholding the law as it 
stood, not posing a challenge to the southern legal system.  Police chief Bill Rainey 
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warned the original officers that they would have to sell themselves and prove their value 
to the broader white community.  Rainey realized these officers were in a precarious 
situation; they would have to satisfy the different expectations of whites, blacks, and 
other officers.  One of the original nine officers, Ernest Withers, remembered feeling as 
though he and the other men were “good will ambassadors” from the city of Memphis to 
its citizens, not the symbols of authority with which police officers were generally 
associated.260 
Like other southern cities, white leaders in Memphis saw hiring black police 
officers as an experiment: an alternative way to reinforce old values.  Those leaders, like 
the editor of Commercial Appeal, who supported the idea of black officers, were trying to 
balance a demographically and economically changing city with the white expectation 
that the city government would continue to adhere to the traditional social system of 
segregation and white supremacy.   
In his study of black police in the United States, Marvin Dulaney argued that the 
black officers hired in the South during this period were hired to be “reformers.”  The 
idea was that officers would “set a good example for their race.”  Memphis’s black 
officers would be reformers of black public behavior to better meet with white ideas bout 
respectable black behavior and black deference to whites.  Just three months after they 
began patrolling the Beale Street area, Commissioner Boyle praised the black officers for 
being “most effective in their main purpose of reducing the use of profanity in public 
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places among people of their own race.”261  By identifying reducing profanity as the 
officers’ main purpose, Boyle deemphasized the officers’ role as law enforcement 
officers.  His praise highlights the fact white leaders envisioned the officers as enforcers 
of respectability whose job was to control black residents’ public behavior.  
White Memphians also made assumptions about the character of the men who 
would become black police officers.  Petitions and news articles used words like 
“courteous,” “exceptionally honest,” “sober,” and “intelligent” to describe the ideal black 
police officer.  These descriptions connote a certain amount of respectability.  As 
Dulaney found in his study, across the South, black police officers represented the “best 
of the race.”  These were men who fit middle-class notions of respectability.  To white 
leaders and the broader white community, these men were safe in terms of their 
commitment to monitoring the behavior of black residents in black areas of the city, 
which presumably made the city safer for white residents.262 
Hiring men who already appeared to meet standards of respectability was key to 
the success of these black officers.  Many black advocates for the black police officers 
recognized the importance of having respectable black men serving as the city’s first 
black police officers in over twenty years.  In his statement of support, Memphis Urban 
League (MUL) director, Rev. James McDaniel, argued, “a high type of Negro can be 
obtained.”  McDaniel and others noted that the candidates for black police officers would 
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be “men with college degrees, and veterans.”  Black leaders recognized that these men 
needed to be positive representations of the black community in order to be successful.  
These men’s duties as officers would be limited when they dealt with white Memphians, 
thus black officers were trained and drilled on the “necessity for and value of a courteous 
approach.”263  However, they also had to be fully committed officers of the law when 
dealing with black citizens.  These men would have to rely on their intelligence and 
integrity in order to balance the differing notions about how black police officers would 
do their job.  
The men hired as black police officers were men who had proven themselves, 
both in terms of their character and intelligence and also in their service to their country, 
demonstrating their ability to work within a hierarchical structure, taking and following 
orders.  Advocates for the black officers, both black and white, were largely focused on 
the idea that these men would be representatives of the race.  Unlike the average white 
police officer, who had very little education, the black police hired would be highly 
educated, especially for black men at that time.  “We were no dummies,” one of the 
officers recalled, emphasizing the fact that several of the original officers had some 
college education.264   
Some white Memphians predicted that black police officers would have negative 
consequences.  Some, such as the members of the Fraternal Congress of Memphis, an 
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umbrella organization composed of nineteen primarily fraternal insurance groups, feared 
the aggression and potential abuse of power black men would demonstrate when given 
positions of authority.  The Fraternal Congress argued that as southern born men, they 
“know that it is unwise to place an armed negro in a position to dominate or have 
authority over any white man or women,” even though city leaders had made it clear that 
black officers would not have the authority to arrest whites.  Using the term “domination” 
and mentioning white women in their statement of opposition, these white southern men 
drew on the traditional narrative of white supremacy and the protection of white 
womanhood to oppose the idea of having black men in any position of authority.  In a 
letter to the mayor, another Memphian opposed the idea of hiring black police officers 
and cited examples from Chattanooga and Kansas City in which black officers had 
supposedly arrested whites and used excessive force.265  Those opposing the idea of black 
police officers did so on the grounds that blacks were not as qualified to do the job as 
whites, and giving them authority would only lead to the officers overstepping the bounds 
of white supremacy.  Although white officials had continually stated the limits on black 
police officers and therefore their inability to be a threat to white supremacy, these 
opponents, mostly white males, saw any authority, even limited authority over those of 
their own race, as a challenge to white supremacy.   
 Black proponents of the plan and the black officers themselves argued that black 
police would deal almost exclusively with blacks, working to protect black women and 
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children.  Juxtaposing Ernest Withers’s comment that “the only thing that was really 
wrong on Beale Street was the cursing, the disrespect of women” and Jerry Williams’s 
pronouncement that the officers “cleaned up Beale Street, made it a safe place for women 
and children” demonstrated black men’s understanding of their role as protectors.  When 
discussing his role as a black officer, Williams, who was hired in 1949, a year after the 
first nine, connected his and the other officers hiring directly back to the rape of the two 
girls in 1945.  Protection of women and children was central to Williams’s understanding 
of himself as a police officer and as a black man.  So even as the white opponents of the 
idea of having black officers used notions of masculine duty to protect as the foundation 
of their opposition, black men adopted the same language of protection to justify their 
hiring.266  Thus, black supporters tapped into the same notions of masculine protection 
and respectability but applied them to the black community.  Serving as black police 
officers would allow these men the opportunity to perform their masculine duty to protect 
their own community.  The hope was that being in a position of authority, even within the 
confines of black neighborhoods, would elevate white perceptions of black men and offer 
proof of black men’s equality to white men, at least in terms of their ability to police and 
protect their communities.  
Supporters and the officers themselves imagined that black police had the 
potential to create change in the way the law was enforced in Memphis.  On his first night 
of duty, Officer Jewel Jubirt told the Press-Scimitar, “We’re going to make some 
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changes.”  However the majority of black advocates and the officers themselves did not 
anticipate changes to the system, rather they expected changes to the way the law was 
enforced.  Black Memphians wanted the function of policing in black neighborhoods to 
change.  Many believed that black officers would treat all black Memphians equally 
under the law.  Thus, black police officers would function primarily as protectors of black 
residents.  In their petition to the mayor, the East Memphis Citizens Club, representing 
the primarily black neighborhood of Binghampton, reiterated their understanding that 
black police officers would reduce crime in the city’s black neighborhoods.  The CME 
Pastors’ Alliance reiterated this hope in their petition to the mayor, believing that the 
black police officers would “result in a material savings of private and public 
property.”267  This savings would come from black officers policing of black public 
behavior, thus reducing vandalism and physical altercations.  
While the arguments of both black and white Memphians focused on the 
reduction of crime and the betterment of race relations, each group expected very 
different things from the black police officers in order to achieve these better relations.  
White Memphians expected black police officers to monitor and control the city’s 
growing black population.  The fact that the Memphis Police Department elected to have 
black officers serve strictly in the Beale Street area of Memphis highlights white 
intentions for control.  Many white Memphians frequented Beale Street for 
entertainment, particularly for the Midnight Ramble, when the black W.C. Handy theatre 
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permitted white patrons in for a late show by that week’s featured black musicians.  Thus, 
black police officers on Beale Street would be visible reminders of the city government’s 
attempts to control black behavior.  Ernest Withers, long-time Beale Street area resident 
and one of the original nine black officers, remembered years later that the officers “were 
tactfully placed on Beale Street….  We were very delicately taught about the discipline of 
the Midnight Ramble and dealing with white people.”  Positioning black officers in the 
Beale Street area appeased black demands for black officers in black neighborhoods and 
made the job the black officers were doing visible to white Memphians as well.  The 
implication of Withers’s statement was that black officers were trained to treat white 
Memphians on Beale Street “delicately”; these officers were not policing whites.  Their 
purpose was strictly to police blacks and make Beale Street a safe place for white 
visitors.268 
Prior to the hiring of the black officers, Beale Street policing was a corrupt 
operation in which money was the true hand of the law.  According to Withers, “If a guy 
got into a fight or anything, he would end up around the corner in a private court session 
between two officers, and a collection of a little fine, you know, not really a fine but a 
shakedown.  Anything short of murder, they’d just settle it with the ward policeman.”269  
White police officers used their positions to line their pockets, allowing for Beale Street 
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to continue being home to criminal activity and furthering the police department’s 
reputation for corruption.  
Because so many white Memphians frequented Beale Street looking to take part 
in the area’s entertainment offerings, the corruption and illicit behavior was highly visible 
to Memphis’s white population.  Ernest Withers described Beale Street as “a street of 
frolic, a street of loud hollering and boisterousness.…It was a street of high vulgarity,” 
where black Memphians went to forget the day-to-day drudgery of their lives.  Beale 
Street, for white officials, had become synonymous with gambling, prostitution, and 
bootlegging.  Because it was an area populated predominately by blacks but frequented 
by whites, the Beale Street area offered a place for black officers to be a visible symbol 
of how city officials were working to keep the growing black population in its place.  
Unlike other patrolmen who could be put on patrol in any part of the city, the black 
officers were confined to a 4-block radius surrounding Beale Street.270  This confinement 
to the predominately black area of the city reinforced the specific function of black 
officers: to clean up this highly visible section of the city’s black neighborhoods.  The 
intention was that these officers would clean up Beale Street by putting an end to the 
vulgarity, crime, and corruption, a goal many believed could only be achieved by 
policing the behavior of black residents and black visitors of the Beale Street district.               
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Hiring black police officers to patrol Beale Street was a direct concession to black 
demands for black police officers.  However, they also offered city officials an alternative 
way of controlling the growing black population that was increasingly pushing back 
 against the city’s racial hierarchy.  The supporters of black officers all shared in the idea 
that these men would reduce crime and operate as a buffer between whites and blacks in 
the city in an effort to ease racial tensions.  These black officers would thus allow for  
greater physical protection of both black and white Memphians.  White supporters  
imagined this separation and physical control of blacks would serve to uphold racial 
segregation and white supremacy.  For black supporters, however, this separation was 
seen as an opportunity for greater equality in law enforcement and a way for black 
citizens to advance their citizenship rights.  As Wendell Robinson said, these black 
officers “had to be diplomats,” negotiating the balance between being police officers and 
being black.271  
The Limits of Separation: The Officers’ Experience 
The original nine black police officers came on to the Memphis Police force as 
tokens of racial harmony.  However, the reality of their experience proved that in fact 
black officers represented continued white control and the limits of black equality.  As 
they began their tenure as black police officers for the Memphis Police Department, the 
black officers focused on their job as law enforcement officers.  But when they took to 
the streets to do that job, they could not escape their race and the implications that fact 
would have on their role as police officers.  White officials altered almost every aspect of 
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being a Memphis police officer, from duties to dress, to separate these black officers from 
their white counterparts.  The steps taken to isolate black officers undermined their power 
and authority.  The differences between black and white officers identified black officers 
as unequal to their white counterparts.  These differences were a constant reminder that 
although the city now had black police officers, their presence would not be a catalyst for 
creating racial equality, as racial separation perpetuated ideas of racial difference.   
Black police officers were only police officers within the confines of the 
regulations put in place by the Memphis Police Department, making it difficult for the 
black officers to garner the kind of respect they deserved among black citizens.  Black 
officers looked different from their white counterparts, wearing blue shirts under their 
blue uniforms rather than the white shirts worn by the rest of the department.  This 
distinct uniform further physically differentiated black officers within the police 
department and relegated them to the status of “other” by their appearance.  Black 
officers were required to change their clothes upon beginning and finishing their shifts, 
wearing their uniforms strictly when they were on patrol.  This uniform regulation 
symbolized the limits of black policing.  Black police officers were only police officers 
within the confines of their patrol shifts and their specified duty assignments.272  
In Memphis, the restrictions on black officers’ authority were introduced in their 
training, as their training officer advised them on how to best balance the restrictions with 
their duties as officers of the law.  The officers’ two-week training course was conducted 
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entirely separate from any training of white officers.  At the conclusion of their training, 
Inspector Bill Rainey assured them, “Look you are a police officer, you are a member of 
the Memphis Police Department….  You have a badge, you have a pistol, you have a 
club and you have authority.  But, I would recommend you use some common sense.”  
His message to these officers was that although they technically had the authority of the 
Memphis Police Department behind them, there were limits to what the citizens of 
Memphis, especially whites, would accept.  They would have to be constantly aware of 
the limits on acceptable black police behavior.  Even as Rainy told the officers they had 
all the authority of a police officer, he also reminded them that they could not detain 
white offenders.  They were limited to arresting black offenders only.  Thus, the part of 
their training where they were “delicately taught about the discipline of a Midnight 
Ramble and dealing with white people as such.”273  The message was that black officers’ 
only real authority lay in their ability to control the black population in order to make 
Beale Street safer for white visitors. 
Cities across the South with black police officers on their forces used a variety of 
tactics to separate black officers from white officers.  Only about one third of cities 
allowed officers to arrest any lawbreaker, regardless of color.  Some cities allowed black 
officers to arrest whites only when the white offenders were in black neighborhoods.  In 
other cities, when a black officer detained a suspect, he was expected to call white 
officers and monitor the suspect until the white officer arrived.  These types of 
restrictions ensured that the black officer was “kept in his place.”  The restrictions 
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reinforced subordination and ensured the black officers did not have authority beyond 
that deemed appropriate for their race.  This type of “second-class officership” reminded 
the black officers of their second-class citizenship and was a constant reminder that 
although they were now police officers, white supremacy would continue to dominate 
their experience.274  
Black officers were also physically isolated from their white counterparts.  Black 
officers in Memphis met for roll call at a separate sub-station located on Beale Street, 
while all other police officers met for roll call at the main police station.  This practice 
ensured that back officers did not intermingle with white officers and remained confined 
to their designated beat.  In courtroom proceedings black officers’ physical separation 
and second-class officership were also clear.  Even if they were the arresting officers, 
black officers were not permitted to be the official lead officer in court.   Black officers 
had to sit on separate benches when they came to the courtroom.  If these benches were 
filled by the white officers also present in court that day, then the court required the black 
officers to stand.275  Thus, from arrest to trial, the department’s insistence on continuing to 
abide by social customs of white supremacy and black deference consistently undermined 
the authority of black officers. 
Even with all of the restrictions on black officers, the nine black men first hired in 
1948 had a job to do.  When they began patrolling the streets of Memphis, they did so 
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with high hopes about the impact they would have on their community.  “I am going to 
enforce the law to a T,” Roscoe McWilliams told a reporter for the Press-Scimitar his 
first night patrolling Beale Street.  Officer Claudius Phillips articulated his first priority as 
a policemen that first night as well, “I’m going to enforce the law just like it should be, 
regardless of who it hurts.”  These officers imagined that they would be first and 
foremost officers of the law, enforcing it equally and justly for all citizens.  From the 
outset, these men wanted to be a positive influence on their communities.  Just as their 
supporters wanted them to represent the best of the race, these men also wanted to 
“conduct ourselves so that our appointments will be a cause of pride.”276 
The Noonday Lunch Club, an organization made up of prominent black business 
and community leaders, honored the black officers at a luncheon several months after the 
officers were first appointed to the force.  Officer Wendell Robinson assured the group of 
black elites that “we know that our record will become a source of pride on the part of 
you here.”  Robinson acknowledged that his success in the Memphis Police Department 
depended in large part on the support of the men in the room.  His statement also 
reinforced the idea that these men would represent the best the race.  The officers’ service 
to the city’s black communities would be a source of pride for the men associated with 
the Noonday Lunch Club because the officers would work to uphold the standards of 
respectability to which Club members ascribed.  “We realize we are paid servants of the 
public,” Officer Wendell Robinson told the group, “and wish to assure you now that we 
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are desirous of being the best friends our citizens can look to.”277  Working to uphold the 
expectations laid out for them by the business and political elite who envisioned the 
officers as ambassadors of the race, black officers worked to enforce a standard of 
respectability amongst Memphis’s black citizens, particularly the working-class men and 
women who frequented Beale Street. 
Even in those first days on the force, black officer Jewel Jubirt described how the 
officers were “going to get rid of so many whisky bottles on this street.  There’s not 
going to be all this public profanity.”  Jubirt’s statement speaks to this idea of reforming 
the behavior of blacks on Beale Street to better meet expectations of respectability.  The 
officers would simultaneously protect the black residents and visitors to the street from 
white authority and enforce respectability.  Jubirt framed the officers’ job in terms of 
familial protection and a sense of community.  Jubirt’s understanding of his job can be 
attributed to the context in which he became a police officer.278  Jubirt and his fellow 
black officers became police officers in a city with a history of police brutality in which 
women, and even children, were subject to the threat of violence.  Black officers were 
hired to the police force as a result of a grassroots community campaign calling for 
greater protection of the city’s black residents, particularly those living in the primarily 
working-class neighborhoods.  The black police officers hired at this moment came onto 
the force believing their job was to protect black Memphians from abuse by white police.  
Thus, these officers worked to bring safety and respectability to their fellow black 
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Memphians.  These black officers saw their job of cleaning up Beale Street in both literal 
and figurative terms. 
Their conception of their role as police officers who enforced the law and worked 
to end the corruption and vice on Beale Street informed the way black officers did their 
job.  The officers’ first arrests reflected the purpose of enforcing respectability and 
cleaning up Beale Street.  After a black man slapped his wife, she went to the officers, 
asking them to arrest her husband.  When they discovered that she had been cursing 
loudly in public, they also arrested her.279  From their beats on Beale Street, black officers 
could control the black population and enforce respectability.  In many ways, these 
actions translated into tighter control over black behavior on Beale Street.  
While white officers saw Beale Street in terms of black inferiority and the 
opportunity to exploit the community, black officers imagined the Beale Street area as 
one belonging to the city’s black residents, a source of pride for black Memphians that 
needed to be protected so it could continue to thrive.  And from the outset black officers 
worked to change Beale Street from a center for vice to an area all blacks, including 
families, could enjoy.  Almost a year after they began, the Y.W.C.A. praised the officers 
for making the streets around the center safer.  For several years, the organization had 
been collecting money for the purpose of erecting a fence.  “The fence was necessary due 
to the fact that hoodlums had been doing a great deal of damage,” a member of the 
Y.W.C.A. board of directors told the Commercial Appeal.  But after black officers took 
to the streets, “the need for the fence no longer existed because the hoodlums have been 
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dispersed ever since the negro police started patrolling.”280  Their focus on enforcing the 
law distinguished the black officers from the white officers who previously had patrolled 
the Beale Street area.  Black officers worked to clean up the area rather than profit from 
it. 
The black officers’ actions in comparison to those of the white officers highlight 
the difference in the ways that these black officers envisioned their patrol area.  Because 
the Beale Street area was the primary business and entertainment district geared toward 
Memphis blacks, it was the heart of the city’s black community.  Officer Jerry Williams 
had fond memories of Beale Street in the 1940s: “It should have been named ‘Soul 
Street’ because that was the place people came to be renewed, refreshed – spiritually or 
whatever.”  Williams “used to anticipate going to work every day because I knew you 
could have a good time down there.”  As members of that larger black community, black 
officers had a stake in the continued success of Beale Street.  Unlike white officers who 
saw the Beale area as a place to make a profit, the black officers were connected to the 
black business owners and Beale Street customers and therefore viewed it in terms of 
using their authority to better the area.  “I had a pride in my heritage.  I believed I could 
be a service to the community,” Officer Wendell Robinson told a reporter many years 
later. 281  The officers wanted to set themselves apart by not operating in their own self-
interest or in the interest of the highest bidder, as was the previous practice of corrupt 
white police officers. 
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From the outset, black officers tried to set themselves up in contrast to the white 
officers in carrying out their police work patrolling the Beale Street area.  As Claudius 
Phillips had articulated that first night, his first priority as a policeman was “to enforce 
the law just like it should be regardless of who it hurts.”  Officer Phillips and others in his 
cohort of black officers spoke of focusing their energies on being law enforcement 
officers above all else, working to uphold the law equally.  As officer Robinson told a 
reporter that first night, “This is an honor.  As long as people co-operate we’re going to 
get along fine.  If they don’t, we’ll have to use other measures.”282  These officers’ 
comments hint at the tension within the community over how black officers were going 
to do their job.  The expectations that black officers would simultaneously protect the 
black community, enforce the law equally, and uphold racial segregation were potentially 
conflicting objectives, and in some cases caused mistrust among the black Beale 
Streeters.  
In his column “Down on Beale Ave.,” the black writer, teacher, and disc jockey, 
Nat D. Williams, noted that “even with Technicolor policemen walking the Beale Street 
‘beats,’” there was still a tendency for Beale Streeters to hide from the police.  Some of 
the people on Beale Street continued to fear the police, even police of their own race.  
According to Officer Roscoe McWilliams, because this was the first time that many black 
citizens could remember there being black police officers, “a lot of people could not 
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adjust to that readily so there was more resisting arrest.”283  These black officers had to 
prove to the average black Memphian, who frequented Beale Street for business and for 
pleasure that they were going to be different from the brutal and corrupt white police 
officers. 
However, black officers’ attempts to uphold the law equally sometimes caused 
resentment towards them and the job they were trying to do.  “Ain’t no nigger gonna 
arrest me,” one black woman told Officer Robinson as he attempted to detain her for 
public disturbance on Beale Street.  This woman clearly did not concede any sort of 
authority to Robinson and his role as a police officer.  The lack of respect shown to these 
black officers led several of them to feel as though “we had to be tougher” on black 
defenders.  Because white officers had allowed blacks to cuss, beat up on each other, and 
partake in general vice activities unencumbered, when black officers began to crack 
down on such activity, some in the black community resented it and resisted the authority 
of the black officers.  Even though newspaper editorials leading up to the hiring of black 
police officers had warned that black officers would not be “easier” on black offenders, 
the experience of black officers revealed that some in the black community expected 
otherwise.  “Our people look for us to bend,” Ben Whitney commented, “They say ‘I’m a 
Negro just like you!’”  Just as the police department defined these officers first by their 
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race, so too did members of their own community, even as the officers continued to 
assert, “We are policemen first.”284  
This resistance to the job black police officers did persisted.  One black Beale 
Street café owner told the Press-Scimitar that a black officer was a “bully” after he 
arrested an employee of the café for profanity, an arrest that was just one of several 
arrests of the café’s employees by the black police officer, according to the owner.  One 
city court judge admonished the black defendants in a case before his court for not 
“giving proper respect to the Colored Officers” who arrested them.  The case involved a 
resisting arrest charge against a black husband and wife, who had been arrested during a 
public quarrel with the wife’s sister.  The judge reprimanded the defendants for their 
treatment of the officers.  The judge then expanded his criticism to all black citizens for 
not showing proper respect for black officers and their authority.  The judge insisted that 
black Memphians “must respect” black officers in order for them to be successful.285  The 
obvious differences between black and white officers caused some among Memphis’s 
black residents to question the authority of black officers, thus making it more difficult 
for them to perform their duties. 
Black officers’ approach to policing also caused tensions with their white 
counterparts.  “There was the animosity we got from our own people and from the White 
police officers,” Jerry Williams remembered.  These tensions were primarily due to black 
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officers’ unwillingness to operate in the same corrupt manner that white officers had.  
With black officers patrolling the Beale Street area, white officers were no longer 
collecting bribes and handouts from the criminal elements of Beale, who could no longer 
buy their way out of trouble.  White officers had made a considerable profit, Williams 
recalled, “You’re talking four or five hundred dollars a week that some of those people 
were making down there…so you can understand the hostility.”  Officer Ernest Withers 
contends that he was fired in 1951 because of this hostility.  According to Withers, he 
was terminated in retaliation for the arrest of a known bootlegger whose operations were 
supposedly protected by a white police officer.  “Some people are not able to live through 
transitions without maintain[ing] a sense of anger,” Withers noted as he remembered the 
abuse he and other officers sometimes experienced from their white counterparts.286 
White officers also did not treat black officers as equals in their professional 
positions or as men.  Although Police Department officials quickly realized the regulation 
barring black officers from arresting white offenders was impractical and within the first 
few years stopped enforcing it, the regulation remained official, as notions about racial 
space and deference continued.  In one instance, after arresting two white offenders, the 
black officers called in white officers to drive the perpetrators to the station.  Because the 
black officers also had to go to fill out the arrest forms, all six people piled into the patrol 
car, black officers and white offenders in the back seat and white police officers up front.  
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When spotted by a fellow white officer, the officer outside the vehicle called out, 
“Goddamn what you got them two niggers back there with them white folks?”  It is 
unclear whether he was noticing that the black officers were forced to ride in the back of 
the police car with the perpetrators as if they themselves were also criminals, or if the 
officer was commenting on the impropriety of having blacks and whites seated together 
in the vehicle.  The use of the term “nigger” implied the racist attitude of the officer, 
making the latter observation the more probable explanation for his comments.  The 
black officers would have been in uniform, clearly identified as police officers.  That the 
white officer chose to refer to them as “niggers” emphasizes the lack of respect some 
white officers had for their black counterparts.  The white officer’s comment degraded 
the black officers as police officers and as black men. 287 
Unlike some of the white officers, supporters of black officers, like the court 
judge cited above and other white officials, recognized the impact these officers could 
have on reducing black crime.  The officers proved to be a valuable tool for white law 
enforcement, particularly when it came to major crimes, such as armed robbery or 
homicide, in black neighborhoods.  Black officers were better able to communicate with 
community members to gain access to information.  In one instance, R. J. Turner and 
Marion Teague went undercover to stop a string of armed robberies.  By going 
                                                
287 Story recounted in an interview with Ernest Withers by Ed Frank, March 12, 1995.  The details of this 
story could not be confirmed, but the spirit of the story speaks to the white supremacist mentality that 
prevailed in the police department and colored black officers’ ability to perform their duties.  
 227 
undercover, the officers were able to discern the identities of the robbers and thus make 
the arrest.  In this instance, the officers were able to use their race to their advantage.288 
The differences in the way the black officers enforced the law brought them 
praise from local leaders, both black and white.  At the Noonday Lunch Club luncheon, 
Club member and MUL director Rev. J.A. McDaniel praised the officers for having 
“acquitted themselves above reproach, [having] been alert to duty, avoided temptations 
and offers of gratitudes…and more important than all hav[ing] become our ambassadors 
of inter-racial goodwill.”  McDaniel’s praise of the officers echoes the expectations of 
earlier advocates for hiring black police officers.  The officers proved themselves to be 
valuable assets to the Memphis Police Department, enforcing the law and bringing 
respectability to black neighborhoods by reducing profanity, public drunkenness, and 
vice.  Both white and black officials praised the black officers throughout the first years 
of their employment for their role in controlling the black population and acting as 
“goodwill ambassadors” between the races.289 
For white leaders, these black officers lived up to expectations.  They successfully 
limited black crime, reduced black complaints against the police, and were a useful tool 
for the Department in solving crimes involving blacks.  In the annual report released by 
the Police Homicide Bureau for 1948, the homicide division praised black officers for 
helping the homicide unit to secure information about cases outside their patrol area but 
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involving black suspects.  In some cases, these black officers were even used to pick up 
suspects wanted by the homicide division.290  Black officers proved to be a valuable tool 
for policing of black neighborhoods.  Their presence offered a buffer between white 
police officers and black residents, alleviating some of the tensions over police treatment 
of black Memphians by white police officers.   
However, for black Memphians living in black neighborhoods outside of the 
Beale Street area, black officers had not provided the kind of protection and equal justice 
originally imagined.  As the East Memphis Citizens Club reminded the mayor, in the 
Binghampton neighborhood, “We are still without their protection.”  Keeping black 
officers confined to Beale Street did not serve to protect black community members in 
other black neighborhoods, leaving them vulnerable to continued white police brutality.  
The success of black police officers in the eyes of white officials and black Memphians’ 
continued demands for black officers in other black neighborhoods led to the expansion 
of black officers’ duties in late 1948 to include a patrol car shift in the Orange Mound 
neighborhood.  However, this new beat did not mean an expansion of authority.  In the 
announcement of the patrol car unit, officials were sure to remind the public that black 
officers would only patrol this primarily black area of the city and would not arrest white 
offenders.291  Even as their duties expanded, the black police officers in Memphis 
continued to be defined by their race.  
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The black officers hired in 1948 “traveled a tough road,” Wendell Robinson noted 
when looking back.  The reality of balancing the expectations of the white and black 
communities while facing continued segregation, discrimination, and disrespect proved a 
tall order for the nine black police officers hired in 1948.  By the middle of the 1950s 
only two of these original nine remained on the force.  The racial discrimination the 
original officers faced was cited as the reason for at least two of the officers leaving the 
force.  Ernest Withers’s dismissal in 1951 for conduct unbecoming an officer was 
supposedly the result of his arresting the wrong bootlegger and putting a dent in the 
pocketbook of the white officer who protected the criminal.  A year later, Roscoe 
McWilliams left the force because of the sporadic work schedule.  According to 
McWilliams his schedule became more sporadic after his sister began working with the 
NAACP to register black Memphis voters.  In both cases the officers were seemingly 
pushed out of the Police Department for overstepping the bounds of white supremacy.  
Clearly an attitude of racial suspicion surrounded the working lives of these officers, 
which further isolated them based on their race.292 
Three of the officers were fired for reasons related to public drunkenness.  In the 
spring of 1949, Claudius Phillips was suspended for being drunk in public.  Then four 
months later he was fired after reporting for roll call inebriated.  Marion Teague was fired 
in 1950 after being arrested for drunkenness and assault and battery while off duty.  
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James Peques resigned from the force in 1955 after he “got in a little trouble.  I had an 
accident and had a few drinks.”  These alcohol-related dismissals hint at the pressure 
these officers experienced being black police officers.  The fact that, while off duty, these 
men were drinking to excess points to the need they had to disconnect themselves from 
reality.  Pegues, who spoke sparingly of his time on the force, simply described the 
experience as “difficult.”293 
When they discussed their experience on the police force in those early years, 
many of the original officers spoke mainly of the difficulties.  “There were times I just 
couldn’t take it any more and wanted to quit,” R.J. Turner remembered.  Jerry Williams 
did quit, choosing to join the military and fight in Korea rather than remain a Memphis 
police officer.  As he recalled, “Being a black police officer in a Southern city in 1948 
was hell.”  Even as police officers these men could not escape their race.  Being a black 
police officer in 1948 meant you were first and foremost identified as black.    Thus, these 
men faced continuous discrimination and disrespect from both white and black 
Memphians.294   
Wendell Robinson and R. J. Turner stayed on with the Memphis Police 
Department, each serving more than thirty years before retiring.  Both men believed they 
had to stick it out to prove black men were equally qualified to serve as police officers.  
Turner believed “the only reason I stuck it out was because I wanted to prove they 
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couldn’t run me off….  If we (Robinson and Turner) had quit too, it might have been a 
long time before there were more black police officers.”  Robinson believed that the work 
he was doing was advancing the place of black Memphians.  “The city might have said, 
‘We gave them their chance, and they couldn’t do it.’”295  True to the original 
expectations of these black officers, Robinson and Turner believed they were serving the 
larger black community of Memphis in their role as police officers, serving not only to 
protect black citizens but also to advance the place of blacks in Memphis by proving 
black ability and thus justifying greater equality in all areas of life.  
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CHAPTER VII 
BLACK POLICE OFFICERS: 
REINFORCING SEGREGATION OR PAVING THE WAY FOR  
BLACK EQUALITY? 
If there were heroes in this story of Memphis’s first black police officers, they 
were Wendell Robinson and R.J. Turner.  Robinson and Turner were the only two of the 
original nine officers hired in 1948 who remained on the force through retirement.  These 
two men remained with the Memphis Police Department because they believed they had 
to prove their ability, and black ability more generally, to do the job of police officer.  
These two men believed they were not only police officers but also ambassadors of their 
race.  Over the years, Robinson and Turner were able to move up in the ranks, paving the 
way for advancements by blacks in the police department.  In 1973, Robinson became the 
first black head of a police bureau in Memphis when he was named head of the homicide 
division.  
The hiring of black police officers in 1948, however, did not solve the problems 
of police brutality or an unequal justice system.  An NAACP complaint against the 
Memphis Police Department in 1965 mirrored the attack on Adelaide Hudson some 
twenty years previous.  In early December of 1965, police entered the home of Mrs. 
Barbara Garner, a black Memphis woman.  A statement by the NAACP charged that the 
officers search Garner’s home without a warrant and “pushed around” Garner and her 
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fourteen-year-old son.  Both Garner and her son were arrested on charges of disorderly 
conduct and resisting arrest.  This episode highlights white police officers continued 
disregard for the sanctity of a black person’s home and black women and children’s 
continued vulnerability at the hands of white officers.  Even though by 1965 the white 
officer who “used a little bit more authority than necessary” was dismissed from the 
police department, challenges to that authority could still be met with brutality.296 
The potential repercussions for excessive force in arresting a black person did not 
end police brutality either.  Three years after the Garner incident the NAACP called for 
city council members to meet with civil rights leaders to discuss police brutality.  The 
city of Memphis had been in an uproar in the days following the assassination of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and the local NAACP chapter received multiple complaints of police 
brutality.  Maxine Smith, the executive secretary of the Memphis NAACP chapter and 
black civil rights activist, called for a special panel to be formed to hear these accusations 
of police brutality.  “I have no faith in the Police Department’s investigating itself,” 
Smith declared, echoing the distrust in the Memphis Police Department heard two 
decades earlier.  Tension continued to dominate race relations in Memphis, particularly in 
terms of black community and police interactions, as white police officers in Memphis 
continued to use violence to control the black community.297  
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For black Memphians in 1948, black police officers were representative of 
equality.  They were symbols of black authority and the hope of a fair deal for blacks in 
Memphis.  However, as seen in the continuation of police brutality against blacks through 
the 1960s, their presence did not guarantee equality.  Thus, if measured by the standard of 
the initial intention of equal justice and acknowledgement of black civil rights, the story 
of hiring black police officers was not one of success.   
But black police officers continued to hold symbolic meaning for the black 
community.  Looking back over forty years of service, Officer Wendell Robinson 
declared, “All my years and all the crap I took wasn’t in vain.”  In Robinson’s estimation, 
the continued presence of black police officers on the Memphis police force starting in 
1948 eventually led to black advancement and greater black equality.  However, as 
Robinson’s comment suggests, the continued adherence to racial segregation by the 
Memphis Police Department, and the disrespect and degradation of black police officers 
that resulted, limited advancement for those black police officers hired in 1948.  Both 
black officers’ own advancement within the police force and the opportunities for 
advancements for the black community as a whole were limited by continued racial 
segregation.  In numbers alone, it was not until four decades later that black police 
officers represented one-third of the total number of police officers in Memphis, in a city 
where the black population was just under 50 percent.298   
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In Memphis, the push for black officers emerged out of the contentious racial 
climate of the immediate postwar period.  The rhetoric of black equality that captured 
national attention in the late 1940s and an increase in the number of brutal attacks by 
police on black citizens ignited the black community campaign to hire black police 
officers.  In 1948, Memphis leaders imagined the hiring of black police officers as a new 
strategy for maintaining racial peace.  For the black community, black police officers 
represented black equality and a more equal justice system.  For whites, they represented 
control.  Black officers were token concessions to the black community to ensure the 
continuation of the old racial hierarchy.299   
Like other southern police departments that hired black officers during the 1940s, 
the Memphis Police Department was slow to hire additional black officers after the initial 
hiring in 1948.  Four additional black officers were hired in 1951, but by the mid-1950s 
hiring of black police almost halted completely.  No additional black officers were hired 
until the 1960s, by which time only two of the original nine officers remained on the 
force.300 
By the mid-1950s, race relations in the urban South had shifted in the wake of the 
Brown v. Board Supreme Court decision, which fundamentally altered the legal 
framework of the Jim Crow system of segregation.  Historian Elliot Rudwick found that 
throughout the South the total number of black police officers serving on southern police 
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forces stagnated between 1954 and 1959.  Rudwick wondered, “Had white opposition to 
the Supreme Court school desegregation decisions snuffed out newly-won gains of 
Negroes in the police field?”  Although Rudwick did not find direct evidence of this 
connection, a review of the statistical data led Rudwick to the conclusion that post-Brown 
white backlash extended to the hiring of black police officers.301  Rudwick’s conclusion is 
reflected in the hiring pattern in Memphis, where, although black officers continued to 
serve on the Memphis police force, they did so in small numbers and within a racially 
segregated system. 
The hiring of black police officers in Memphis picked up again after 1960 when 
the department hired twelve more black officers.  And by 1962 there were twenty-six 
black officers out of a total of 987 officers in the Memphis Police Department.  It was not 
until 1964 that black officers joined white officers for roll call at police headquarters, and 
even then, the black and white officers lined up on opposite walls.  But by 1969 there 
were seventy-eight black police officers on the Memphis police force; training was 
integrated as well as squad car patrols.  As one black officer described it, “We are no 
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longer flies in the buttermilk,” describing black officers as integrated into the force rather 
than undesirable pests.302 
Officers Robinson, Turner, and the other black officers who followed them, 
believed that, as police officers, they were working to better their own black community 
in Memphis.  As Robinson noted years later, he joined the police force because he 
“believed I could be a service to the community.”  This belief in serving the black 
community was reflected in the work these two men did as police officers.  R.J. Turner 
founded the Community Relations Squad in the late 1960s, a special unit within the 
police department charged with improving community relations between black 
Memphians and the police department.  The attitude of those black officers who came 
into the department in the 1960s also reflected this focus on bettering the community.  
When Officer Thomas Bethany decided to join the force in 1968, his mother warned him 
that he could not be a good Christian and a police officer.  But Bethany believed that he 
could.  Bethany knew of the “police brutality and friction between the black community 
and police.  I decided the only way to do anything about it was to become a part of it,” 
and work from within the system to improve it.303  The black officers who joined the force 
between 1948 and the late 1960s came from within Memphis’s own black community.  
Reflective of the expectations of those who had originally campaigned for the hiring of 
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black police officers in 1948, these later black officers imagined that helping to protect 
and better their community was part of their purpose as black police officers.  
 This emphasis on these officers being black police officers continued to define 
the experience of black officers in Memphis.  Officers Robinson and Bethany understood 
their role as police officers in terms of the black community from which they came, as 
did their white counterparts.  Even as black officers became more integrated within the 
Memphis Police Department during the 1960s, their duties as police officers continued to 
be specific to their race.  In 1962, fourteen years after their initial hiring, black officers 
were still confined to patrolling black neighborhoods.  When black officers were finally 
allowed to conduct business at headquarters in 1964, they continued to be separated from 
the white officers.  A 1969 article in the Commercial Appeal profiling black officers 
noted the praise they received from their superiors.  Several white officers declared that 
they preferred a black partner, especially when working crimes in black neighborhoods.  
They found that “Negro witnesses will talk more to a Negro detective.  They help us 
overcome communication barriers.”  So, even as black officers were seen as an asset to 
the department, white officers continued to identify race as black officers’ particular 
strength when performing their police duties.304  
Black police officers in 1969 continued to act as a buffer between white police 
and the black community.  In light of racial tensions at the time, black officers had 
become particularly valuable assets to the Memphis police force.  The 1969 Commercial 
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Appeal article was written less than a year after the assassination of Martin Luther King 
Jr. in Memphis during a strike among the city’s sanitation workers.  In the wake of 
King’s assassination, several days of rioting erupted in Memphis, and the continued 
disregard for black life and black civil rights was thrown into the national limelight.  
Thus in 1969, the article noted, “Many white detectives – especially since racial tension 
has increased in recent years – want a black partner.”  Just as had been the idea in 1948, 
black police officers would work to further segregate white from black.  The idea that 
black officers communicated better with the black community reiterated the arguments 
made two decades before when those advocating for the hiring of black police officers in 
the 1940s argued that “Negro officers would greatly aid in the detection and prevention 
of crime since Negroes understand each other better.”305  Just as in 1948, black police 
officers continued to be black first and police officers second.  
While the duties and perceptions of black police officers continued to reinforce 
racial segregation in the decades following the 1948 hiring, injustice and discrimination 
in police interactions with black Memphians also continued.  In 1971, a case of police 
brutality again caused uproar within the black community.  A mob of police officers beat 
seventeen-year-old Elton Hayes after a brief car chase that ended when Hayes crashed his 
pickup truck.  While officers claimed that Hayes’s injuries were sustained during the 
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crash, a medical examiner later testified that Hayes’s death was the result of a severe 
beating.  Black outrage over the killing of Elton Hayes turned violent, resulting in several 
days of rioting and the suspension of twenty-three white police officers.  Two years later, 
the eight policemen and sheriff’s deputies charged with Hayes’s murder were acquitted.306  
Reminiscent of the police brutality cases almost three decades before, the Memphis 
justice system refused to hold white police officers accountable for the death of a black 
man.  The presence of black police officers did not eradicate police brutality, nor, it 
would appear, did it help to secure greater justice for black Memphians.  
In the late 1970s, Memphis NAACP leader Maxine Smith testified before the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights in Memphis.  Her words reflected the continued lack of 
racial justice in Memphis.  According to Smith’s testimony, when white police officers 
came into the black community “the sanctity of the home is just completely ignored.  
Police just enter homes as if they owned them…without benefit of a warrant or anything 
else.”307  Smith’s words brought to mind the invasion of Adelaide Hudson’s or Eli 
Blaine’s homes in 1947 and 1948.  Then, the invasion of black homes was about white 
control and domination over the black community.  The home invasions and subsequent 
beatings of Hudson and Blaine were a response to the perceived threat to white 
supremacy and the southern system of racial segregation.  Those advocating for black 
police officers in 1948 argued that black police officers would bring more equal justice to 
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black community interactions with police.  However, according to Smith’s testimony in 
the late 1970s, white police efforts to dominate and control the city’s black community 
continued to lead to injustice.  
This systematic injustice and the use of “trite” explanations, as L.O. Swingler 
termed them in 1948, for police brutality continued to be the norm in the Memphis Police 
Department.  Making the same argument that Memphis World editor L.O. Swingler made 
three decades before, Maxine Smith argued that the injustices of police brutality were 
rooted in a racially biased policing system.  The use of charges “such as ‘disorderly 
conduct’ and ‘resisting arrest’ were often used as ‘license’ for a police officer to 
physically and verbally abuse a citizen.”  The Memphis Police Department, as it tried to 
justify the actions of its officers, continued to make excuses for police brutality that put 
the onus of wrongdoing on the victims of the police brutality. The “trite” explanations for 
police brutality used in the 1970s, as in the 1940s, represented the lack of justice for 
blacks in their encounters with white police officers and reinforced black inequality.  
Further mirroring the past, Smith called for hiring even more black police officers to 
bring more “sensitivity to the needs and the desires of black people,” by having more 
black voices on the city’s police force, particular in policy-making positions.308 
The words of Maxine Smith in the late 1970s reflected the ways in which the 
problems of the past had not been solved by the strategy of hiring black police officers.  
In her estimation, the justice system still discriminated against the black community.  
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Smith argued that the city and its leaders had “done no more than it has been forced to 
do” in terms of addressing injustice towards black citizens and expanding black 
representation.  As the black community discovered during the campaign for black 
officers in 1948, city leaders would not act in favor of greater black equality unless 
forced.  Black Memphians used their voting power in 1948 in order to force change.  By 
defeating the Crump political machine candidate in the August 1948 primary election, 
black Memphians were able to force the Crump machine to acknowledge the needs of 
black Memphians and take action to meet their demands for black police officers.  What 
was clear in Maxine Smith’s testimony was that the onus of creating change continued to 
rest with the city’s black community.309 
Maxine Smith’s words not only reflected the arguments for black police officers 
used in the 1948 campaign, but they also demonstrated that the same definitions of 
freedom and equality continued to dominate the discussion of black rights in Memphis.  
The definitions of freedom and equality were still intertwined with notions of physical 
protection.  The police and the black community’s interactions with police still 
dominated the discussion of racial injustice and racial inequality.  As Memphis Urban 
League director Herman Ewing reminded the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in the 
late 1970s, there were white officers “who were certainly very vigorous in enforcing the 
separate but equal doctrines of not many years ago,”  at a time when the function of the 
police department to enforce racial segregation was not far removed from the Memphis 
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of the 1970s.310  The city continued to live with the legacy of racial inequality, and the 
police department continued to be the physical embodiment of racial justice (either the 
lack thereof or the hope of greater equality within the justice system).  What was clear in 
the 1970s was that the black community continued to associate racial discrimination and 
racial injustice with police brutality.   
Throughout the campaign for black police officers in 1948 and continuing 
through subsequent decades, black Memphians continued to push for positive change.  
Officers Wendell Robison and R.J. Turner were representative of this activist spirit 
among black Memphians, as they remained in the Memphis Police Department 
continuing to work to better their community and relations between police officers and 
the black community.  This spirit of activism for change continued into the 1970s when, 
in 1973, black police officers in Memphis founded the Afro-American Police 
Association.  This black police officers’ organization was founded with the purpose of 
fighting against continued discrimination in the hiring and promotion of black police 
officers.  Today, the organization’s mission statement continues to reflect that focus on 
justice and the relationship between the black community and the Memphis Police 
Department.311 
In 1948, in Memphis, surrounded by a national rhetoric of freedom and equality, 
black Memphians faced an entrenched system of white supremacy and a racial hierarchy 
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enforced, often violently, by white police officers.  This violence became the physical 
representation of black inequality and injustice.  Thus, the local strategies for black 
community uplift in Memphis reflected this symbolism and were manifested in a 
campaign to hire black police officers.  These officers were expected to represent and 
protect the black community in a more equal justice system.  However, whites continued 
to dominate the city’s power structure, and black officers were incorporated into a 
racially divided system in order to appease black demands and protect the racial 
hierarchy.  Thus, within this story of black police officers we find a moment in history 
when black activism both laid the foundations for greater black uplift in the long term 
and simultaneously reinforced racial segregation. 
 245 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
ARCHIVAL 
Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana  
- Walker/Ish Papers 
- Papers of the American Missionary Association 
Duke University Library, Duke University, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Microfilm 
Collection 
LeMoyne-Owen College Archive, Hollis T. Price Library, Memphis, Tennessee 
- The Beacon 
- The Democrat: LeMoyne College 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
- National Urban League Papers 
Memphis and Shelby County Room, Memphis Public Library  
- African American Life and Culture in Memphis 
- E.H. Crump Collection 
- James J. Pleasants, Jr. Papers 
- The Papers of Memphis Mayor Walter Chandler  
- The Papers of Memphis Mayor Watkins Overton 
National Archives and Record Administration, Washington D.C.  
- Records of the Adjutant General’s Office 
Shelby County Archives, Memphis, Tennessee 
- Joe Walk Collection 
Special Collections, Ned R. McWherter Library, University of Memphis, Memphis, 
Tennessee   
- Edward Meeman Papers 
- General Black File
 246 
-    Oral Interview with Ernest Withers by Ed Frank 
- Police Files 
- Watkins Overton Papers 
Tennessee State Library and Archive, Nashville, Tennessee 
 - Adjutant General’s office (Tennessee) Records 
 
PERIODICALS 
The Afro American (1973) 
Chicago Defender (1944) 
Commercial Appeal (1919-1999) 
The Lakeland Ledger (1974) 
Memphis Daily Avalanche (1866-1874) 
Memphis Daily Post (1867) 
Memphis Downtowner Magazine (1992-1997) 
Memphis Evening Herald (1878) 
Memphis World (1944-1950) 
The New South (1947-1955) 
New York Daily Worker (1944) 
Pittsburgh Courier (1943) 
Press-Scimitar (1945-1973) 
The Southern Frontier (1943) 
 
 
 247 
PUBLISHED  
“Negro Policemen are Needed in Southern Cities,” The Southern Frontier, March 1943. 
Benefits and Opportunities for Colored Citizens of Memphis (1943), Memphis and Shelby 
County Room, Memphis Public Library, Memphis, Tennessee.  
United States Commission on Civil Rights, “Civic Crisis - Civic Challenge: Police – 
Community Relations in Memphis: A Report.”  Prepared by the Tennessee 
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1978. 
WEBSITES: 
http://afroamericanpoliceassociation.com/AboutUs.html.  
SECONDARY SOURCES 
BOOKS: 
Alex, Nicholas.  Black in Blue: A Study of Negro Policemen.  New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1969. 
Ash, Stephen V. A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook The Nation ONe 
Year After the Civil War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2013. 
Bayor, Ronald H. Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century Atlanta.  Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
Berg, Manfred.  The Ticket to Freedom: The NAACP and the Struggle for Black Political 
Integration. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. 
Biondi, Martha. To Stand and Fight: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Postwar New York 
City. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Brandt, Allan M. No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United 
States since 1880. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Brown, Kathleen.  Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, 
and Power in Colonial Virginia.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996.  
Chamberlain, Charles. Victory at Home: Manpower and Race in the American South 
During World War II. Athen: University of Georgia Press, 2003. 
Dowdy, Wayne G.  Mayor Crump Don’t Like It: Machine Politics in Memphis.  Jackson, 
Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2006. 
 248 
Dulaney, Marvin W.  Black Police in America.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996.  
Estes, Steve. I Am A Man!: Race, Manhood, And The Civil Rights Movement. Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
Feimster, Crystal N. Southern Horrors: Women and the Politics of Rape and Lynching.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Franklin, John Hope, and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham.  From Slavery to Freedom: A 
History of African Americans, 9th Edition.  New York: McGraw Hill, 2011. 
Frederickson, Kari.  The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968.  
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
Gilmore, Glenda.  Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in 
North Carolina, 1896-1920.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996. 
Gilmore, Glenda E.  Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950. New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008. 
Goldfield, David.  Region, Race, and Cities: Interpreting the Urban South.  Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1997. 
Goldfield, David.  Promised Land: The South Since 1945. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan 
Davidson, Inc. , 1987. 
Green, Laurie.  Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom 
Struggle.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. 
Greene, Christina.  Our Separate Ways: Women and the Black Freedom Movement in 
Durham, North Carolina.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 
Gritter, Elizabeth. River of Hope: Black Politics and The Memphis Freedom Movement, 
1865-1954.  Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014.  
Hahn, Steven. A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South 
From Slavery to the Great Migration. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2003. 
Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd . "'The Mind That Burns in Each Body': Women, Rape, and Racial 
Violence," in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, edited by Ann Barr 
Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson, 328-349. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1983.  
 249 
Honey, Michael. Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers. 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993. 
Honey, Michael.  Black Workers Remember: An Oral History of Segregation, Unionism 
and the Freedom Struggle.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
Honey, Michael. Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Marting Luther King's 
Last Campaign. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. , 2007. 
Jenkins, Earnestine Lovelle.  African Americans in Memphis. Charleston, SC: Arcadia 
Publishing, 2009. 
Kelly, Robin D.G. Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class. New 
York : The Free Press, 1994. 
Kersten, Andrew Edmund. Labor's Home Front: The American Federation of Labor 
During World War II. New York: New York University Press, 2006. 
Korstad, Robert. Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for 
Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth-Century South. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003. 
Kruse, Kevin.  White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.  
Kruse, Kevin Michael  and Stephen G Tuck. Fog of War: The Second World War and the 
Civil Rights Movement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Lamon, Lester C. Black Tennesseans, 1900-1930. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1977. 
Lemann, Nicholas.  Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War.  New York: Farrar, 
2006.  
Lentz-Smith, Adriane.  Freedom Struggles: African Americans and World War I. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
Levenstein, Lisa. A Movement Without Marches: African American Women and the 
Politics of Poverty in Postwar Philadelphia. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009. 
Lichtenstein, Nelson. Labor's War at home: The CIO in World War II. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Litwack, Leon.  Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery.  New York: 
Knopf, 1979. 
 250 
Marable, Manning and Leith Mullings, ed. Let Nobody Turn Us Around: Voices of 
Resistance, Reform, and Renewal: An African American Anthology.  New York: 
Bowman and Littlefield, 2000. 
Markovitz, Jonathan.  Legacies of Lynching: Racial Violence and Memory.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004.  
McGuire, Danielle M.  At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and 
Resistance- a New History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the 
Rise of Black Power.  New York: Vintage Books, 2010.  
Muhammad, Khalil Gibran.  The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the 
Making of Modern Urban America.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.  
Myrdal, Gunnar.  An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.  
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941.  
O’Brien, Gail Williams.  The Color of the Law: Race Violence, and Justice in the Post-
World War II South.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 
Perman, Michael.  Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879.  Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1984.  
Pfeifer, Michael. Rough Justice: Lynching and American Society, 1874-1947. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2004. 
Roberts, Dorothy E. Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning of 
Liberty.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1997. 
Sigafoos, Robert.  Cotton Row to Beale Street. Memphis: Memphis State University 
Press, 1979. 
Silver, Christopher and John V Moeser. Separate City: Black Communities in the urban 
South, 1940-1960. Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 1995. 
Trotter, Joe William.  The African American Experience.  New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 2001. 
Tucker, David M. Lieutenant Lee of Beale Street.  Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1971. 
Ward, Jason  Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Momvent and 
the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011. 
 251 
Wells, Ida B.  A Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynchings in the 
United States, 1892-1893-1894.  Chicago, 1895.  
Wintersmith, Robert.  Police and the Black Community.  Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1974.  
JOURNAL ARTICLES: 
Dalfiume, Richard. "The "Forgotten Years of the Negro Revolution." Journal of 
American History 55, no. 1 (June 1968): 90-106. 
Dowdy, Wayne  "The White Rose Mammy: Racial Culture and Politics in World War II 
Memphis," The Journal of Negro History 85, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 308-314. 
Goldfield, David. R.  "The Urban South: A Regional Framework," The American 
Historical Review 86, no. 5 (December 1981): 1009-1034. 
Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the 
Past." The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-1264. 
Hardwick, Kevin R. “’Your Old Father Abe Lincoln Is Dead and Damned’: Black 
Soldiers and the Memphis Race Riot of 1866.”  Journal of Social History 27:1 
(1993): 109-128. 
Jacobs, James B. and Jay Cohen.  “The Impact of Racial Integration on the Police.”  
Journal of Police Science and Administration 6 (1978). 
Kelley, Robin D.G. ‘“We Are Not What We Seem’: Rethinking Black Working-Class 
Opposition in the Jim Crow South.”  The Journal of American History, 80 (June 
1993): 75-112. 
Kephart, William.  “The Integration of Negros into the Urban Police Force.”  The Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 45 (1954): 325-333. 
Kitchens, Allen H. “Ouster of Mayor Edward H. Crump, 1915-1916.”  West Tennessee 
Historical Society Papers 19 (1965): 105-120.  
Page, Brian D.  “‘Stand By the Flag’: Nationalism and African-American Celebrations of 
the 4th of July in Memphis, 1866-1887.”  Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 58 
(1999): 284-301. 
Parks, Joseph H. “A Confederate Trade Center Under Federal Occupation: Memphis, 
1862 to 1865.” The Journal of Southern History 7.3 (August 1941): 289-314 
 252 
Rousey, Dennis C. “Yellow Fever and Black Policemen in Memphis: A Post-
Reconstruction Anomaly.” The Journal of Southern History 51.3 (1985): 357-374. 
Rudwick, Elliott M.  “The Southern Negro Policeman and the White Offender.”  The 
Journal of Negro Education Vol.30, No. 4 (Autumn 1961): 426-431. 
Rudwick, Elliott M. “The Negro Policeman in the South.”  The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, 51.2 (July-August: 1960):  273-276.  
Rudwick, Elliott M.  "Negro Police Employment in the Urban South." The Journal of 
Negro Education 30, no. 2 (1961): 102-108. 
Walker, Donald.  “Black Police Values and the Black Community.”  Police Studies 5 
(1983). 
DISSERTATIONS: 
Berkley, Kathleen.  “`Like a Plague of Locust’: Immigration and Social Change in 
Memphis, Tennessee.”  Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1980. 
Brown-Melton, Gloria.  “Blacks in Memphis, Tennessee, 1920-1955: A Historical 
Study.”  Ph.D. diss., Washington State University, 1982. 
	  
 
 
 
